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1Welcoming Remarks
Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
Good morning, everyone! It is my pleasure to welcome you all to Newport andto the Naval War College and to this very important symposium. I enjoyed
meeting many of you last night, and I look forward to the opportunity to spend a
couple of moments with each of you as we spend the next two and a half days to-
gether. In our audience today are fifty-two chiefs of naval operations, plus eighteen
representatives of CNOs who could not be here; four commandants of coast
guards, plus five additional representatives; fifteen war college presidents, plus
thirty-three additional representatives from those schools whose presidents could
not attend—all together totaling one hundred forty-two senior delegates from the
United States and seventy-two of our most trusted friends and allies. I am particu-
larly pleased to note that twenty-four of today’s delegates are alumni of this college,
having graduated from our Naval Command College or the Naval Staff College. In
fact, two delegates are graduates of both colleges. To our former students, congrat-
ulations on your obvious success, and welcome back to Newport.
The officers assembled here today are the senior leaders of the greatest navies in
the world. The cut and color of our uniforms may vary, as do the languages and the
cultures of the participants. But we all have a common set of bonds that will always
link us together. These include an understanding and respect for the sea that comes
only to those mariners who have challenged the oceans throughout their careers, a
commitment to service and sacrifice in support of our respective nations, and a de-
sire to work collectively with our friends and allies in coalitions to solve common
problems.
It is this desire to improve our nations’ security through cooperation and collab-
oration that lies at the heart of the International Seapower Symposium series. For
over three decades, the leaders of the world’s seafaring nations have gathered on
the shores of this historic Narragansett Bay to share ideas, strengthen alliances,
and plan for the future. We can all certainly agree that the world has changed sig-
nificantly since the first International Seapower Symposium thirty years ago.
Tremendous political, social, and economic changes have occurred over the ensu-
ing decades, including the fall of communism and the rise of terrorism. I would
argue—and most of you in this audience would likely agree—that the net effect of
these changes has been to increase the need for strong navies and coast guards.
The title of our symposium is “Seapower for Peace, Prosperity, and Security.” In
the relatively short time that we have together, we will look at the many ways the na-
vies around the world help ensure peace, promote prosperity, and provide
maritime security shields for their citizens. The importance of increasing our na-
tional security posture has never been greater. The horrific events that took place
in the United States on 11 September 2001 served as the catalyst for many changes
and have sharply increased our awareness and commitment to our number one na-
tional security objective.
This symposium is all about the sharing of old experiences and the consider-
ation of new ideas. The Global War on Terrorism affects all of us, and I can think of
no conference over the past three decades where we have come together more as
equals. The experiences of large nations and small, of blue-water navies and navies
and coast guards that operate in the littorals, and of economic powerhouses and
emerging nations all are of value. I encourage open discussion and full participa-
tion by our delegates. All of us need to hear your individual voices. Our
professional program will include prominent speakers, a trio of panel discussions,
and, for the first time, a series of structured seminar working group sessions that
will provide you the opportunity to test new ideas in a number of realistic scenarios.
If your schedule allows, I encourage you to read the scenarios this evening so that
we can get off to a faster start when we assemble in our seminar groups tomorrow.
This indeed promises to be a most challenging and rewarding two days.
As we embark on this year’s symposium, it may be useful and instructive to
briefly look back on previous meetings in order to broaden our context while re-
viewing issues that may still be worthy of reflection over the next two days. The last
ISS meeting, in 1999, marked the thirtieth anniversary of these symposia, which
began in November 1969 as one of several contributions to international naval co-
operation initiated by Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy, during his career.
Known within his own service as “Mr. International Navy,” his contributions in-
cluded key roles in founding both international courses here at the Naval War
College and the establishment of NATO’s standing Naval Force Atlantic.
The International Seapower Symposium was created as a forum where the lead-
ing professionals of the world’s navies could exchange views on common problems
under the mantel of academic freedom rather than as official negotiations among
governments. Since that beginning in 1969, these symposia have been organized
around plenary sessions that present broad issues of general international interest
and include both individual speakers from a variety of nations and panel discus-
sions that build on obtaining different perspectives, much as we’re going to do
today. These are complemented by seminar discussions for a detailed exchange of
views among participants, interspersed with opportunities for private discussions
between delegates and ample time for social events—for enjoying Newport and for
building new friendships. Following each symposium, the Naval War College has
edited and produced a volume that records the proceedings in plenary sessions
and summarizes the ideas expressed in seminar discussions. We shall do so again
after this event.
Over the years the achievements of these symposia have not been limited to or
even entirely expressed in the printed record of academic discussions. In over
thirty years devoted to building a global network among professional naval leaders,
the main achievements in these symposia have been those created through the
friendships made or revived between individuals, the quiet personal conversations
in the corridors, and the general ideas exchanged and only later turned into
concrete action in some other more specific context. We can, however, point to a
number of specific achievements that are related to or derived from this series
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of symposia. These include the growth of regional meetings such as the Inter-
American Naval Conference, the Western Pacific Naval Symposia, and the Black
Sea–Mediterranean Regional Symposia. As yet another example of ways progress
has been achieved here, the International Seapower Symposium XIII in 1995
played a key role in producing the first Multinational Maritime Operations Manual.
A review of the titles of past symposia gives some indication of the state of the
world over the decades. In 1973, delegates considered nonmilitary uses of naval
forces. In 1979, the focus was rather optimistically on the role of navies and a world
of peace. In 1985, we looked at traditional versus nontraditional views on maritime
security planning. And in 1995, Admiral Boorda led us in discussion of maritime
coalitions under the title of “Partnership from the Sea.” Participation has grown
steadily over the years, from seventy delegates representing forty-one nations in
the early 1970s to nearly a hundred and fifty participants representing seventy-
three nations at this year’s event.
The fact that we have a detailed record of the accomplishments of past ISS events
is in large part due to the outstanding work of Dr. John Hattendorf. He is chairman
of the College’s Maritime History Department and has served since 1984 as the
College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History. He earned his master’s de-
gree in history from Brown University and his doctorate in war history from Oxford
University in 1979. The National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England,
awarded him its Caird Medal in 2000 for his contributions to the field of maritime
history. John has attended twelve of the sixteen symposia, has edited four volumes
of ISS proceedings, and will soon publish a history of the ISS series. Thanks, John,
for your dedicated and continued support of these important events. Please stand
up and let us recognize you.
Throughout its history, the ISS has been a gathering of intellectual equals. For-
mer U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson said it well in closing the
1999 symposium when he noted, “It does not really matter whether you come from
a big navy or from a small navy or from an old navy or from a new navy. Here every-
body’s voice counts. This is the enduring strength of this symposium.”
Let me conclude by saying we are glad you are here. The Naval War College is
proud and privileged to play our role in support of ISS XVI.
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2Keynote Address:
Sea Power for Peace, Prosperity, and Security
Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Rear Admiral Route, United States:
It is now my pleasure to introduce our official host, Admiral Vern Clark. AdmiralClark was born in Sioux City, Iowa, and raised in our country’s Midwest. A grad-
uate of Evangel College, he went on to spend more than half his naval career in
command. Admiral Clark commanded a patrol gunboat when he was a lieutenant
and has had command in every grade thereafter. In addition to commanding USS
Spruance, the lead ship of the class, he also commanded Destroyer Squadrons Five
and Seventeen, Cruiser Destroyer Group Three, the U.S. Second Fleet, and the
U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
Joint service has figured prominently in Admiral Clark’s career. In the decade of
the 1990s, he spent seven years in joint assignments including service as the direc-
tor of the Joint Staff’s Crisis Action Team during Operations DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM, as well as Director of Operations, J-3 and Director of the Joint
Staff. Admiral Clark became the twenty-seventh Chief of Naval Operations on July
21, 2000. In July 2002, he chartered a clear and direct course for the navy to sail
into the twenty-first century with the publication of Sea Power 21. And, if you have
not already heard, I am pleased to inform you that last week President George W.
Bush nominated Admiral Clark for reappointment to the grade of Admiral and re-
appointment as the Chief of Naval Operations. As such, he is on track to becoming
the longest-serving CNO in U.S. history, since the Senate is being asked to confirm
his tour of duty until July 2006.
Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome our symposium host—and my boss—
Admiral Vern Clark.
Admiral Clark:
Good morning. Ron, thank you for that gracious introduction. Thank you for what
you and your staff have done to make this International Seapower Symposium pos-
sible. It takes a great deal of effort to bring a symposium like this together, and I am
very grateful to you, Admiral Route, and to your Naval War College team for help-
ing us make this event a reality.
I would interject here that it has been four years. Of course, the last time we had
this scheduled was within days after September 11, 2001, so many of you were
scheduled to attend that event and situations in the world caused us to cancel it. We
are so glad that you are all back here this year. The Naval War College is an
institution where we in the United States Navy grow and develop our officers, but as
Admiral Route said, this place, through the years, has not been just for officers in
the United States, but in fact for officers from all over the world. This is the very
best setting that we could think of to bring us all together to discuss important mari-
time issues, and this year to talk about the future of maritime cooperation in the
context of the world that we know of today and the world that we live in today.
I understand there are a large number of graduates of the Naval Command Col-
lege and the Naval Staff College who are back here for this symposium. Our words
to you are very, very simple: welcome back!
It is heartwarming for me as the Chief of the U.S. Navy to see so many nations
represented here today. In our initial planning figure yesterday we thought the
number was going to be about seventy-five. We have documented fifty-two chiefs,
but I know that some of you that I met this morning arrived very late last night and
that the number could grow to fifty-five—and, of course, as has been said, we have
here nine leaders and representatives of coast guards from around the world. I am
very thankful that we have with us Admiral Tom Collins, my partner down here on
the first row, the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. We welcome all of
you, and this is significant, because having this many nations’ leadership together
brings about real possibilities for us all. I am especially pleased that the coast
guards of the world are joining us navy types for this symposium. It reinforces that
interservice as well as international cooperation is required for a complete mari-
time security continuum.
I have great appreciation for my own coast guard. I say it is my own; I am wrap-
ping my arms around it. On 9/11, in the aftermath of the strike on the Pentagon
and the World Trade Center, I have told people around our country that the sec-
ond call that I made on that day was to the Commandant of the Coast Guard. We
had just signed a new memorandum of agreement just days before that event. That
agreement perpetuated an understanding that the coast guard would operate in
support of the United States Navy in time of crisis. On 9/11, in that telephone call to
the commandant, I offered to the commandant that the rules had changed and
asked him what I needed to do in support of him and the mission that he had to
protect our homeland. He took me up on that offer, I would tell you, and all he
asked was for all of our coastal patrols, and I gave them to him. I believe that this is
the model for the future—this kind of working together. And so to each of you, I ex-
tend my appreciation for taking time out of your busy schedules to attend this
symposium.
I would like to add that to me this reaffirms several things about where we come
from. First, it reaffirms to me our collective belief in the importance of getting to-
gether to discuss the challenges that we face in the world today; second, that we
understand the importance of sea power for facing the challenges of tomorrow;
third, that we understand that threats are evolving and will be difficult in our oper-
ating environment, where we live and work every day. Fourth, it reinforces to me
our belief that the world’s oceans should be safe and free, and that our nations will
in fact expect us—the leaders of navies and coast guards—to be able to deliver that
freedom and that safety. And [it reinforces] that technology will offer us opportuni-
ties in the future that can transform the way we develop capabilities to face
challenges that confront each of us in the future.
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So, to a person, to each and every one of you, I want you to know that I am hon-
ored by your presence and grateful that you have chosen to be here for this
symposium. Over the next two and a half days, you will have the opportunity to
share ideas and build relationships that will allow our navies and coast guards to op-
erate and, if necessary, to fight as one awesome force.
In our navy, I am fond of discussing the operating environment, our navy’s oper-
ating environment, in terms used by people who are part of the land warfare
scheme. If we all wore the uniforms of army officers—and, by the way, last night I
told my wife there would not all be admirals at this conference. There would be
generals and colonels, and there would be every different kind of rank, because we
all do it a little bit differently, but all of us are fundamentally officers from the mari-
time domain. But if we were army officers, the word “maneuver” would be a key
part of our discussions. I am telling my navy that we need to understand this term; if
we are to be truly joint, we must understand it. Then I like to say that we in the navy
operate in the largest maneuver space on the planet, and that is the world’s oceans.
They are the freeways of the world.
I believe that it is helpful for us to focus on a few facts: that 30 percent of the
world’s economy depends on trade. Our numbers suggest that 99.7 percent of all
intercontinental trade travels by sea, carried by over forty-six thousand vessels ser-
vicing nearly four thousand ports. Today, we are truly a global economy, and we
become more so every day. It follows then that the global economy depends on the
global security of the world’s oceans to make this global economy a reality.
As we live here in this period, beginning a new millennium, the peace and secu-
rity of the free world are challenged. This is reinforced by a cursory review of the head-
lines around the world today. This morning’s papers—pick up any one—reinforce this
claim. To defeat an enemy in the old Industrial Age required large standing ar-
mies, large standing navies, and a strong economy. The enemies of that era stood
out in the open for all to see.
Today, in the Information Age, our enemies are more likely to be widely dis-
persed, well-funded terrorist or criminal organizations, operating fundamentally
in the shadows. Not a single regime, not a single person, religion, or ideology—the
enemy is using terror as his method: premeditated, politically motivated violence,
oftentimes against innocent people. Terrorists are organized to use a nation’s
greatest strengths—including its freedom and openness—as weaknesses.
Terrorism takes many forms, and it has no borders: recently in Bali, Kenya, Tan-
zania, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, the United States, on the high seas, and I
could name many more. We know that terrorists can and have used our maneuver
space, the oceans, for terrorist activities. And just as the sea is being used to support
the global economy, it is also being used to smuggle weapons, drugs, and people. It
is being used to gain revenue from shipping to fund terrorist activities. It is being
used to operate vessels as weapons or as launch platforms. It is being used to con-
duct direct attacks on ships to inflict casualties and to disrupt trade.
An attack on one of our maritime areas can certainly affect us all. I would like to
offer one example. Just about a year ago now, the French super tanker Limberg was
attacked as it entered a Yemeni oil terminal. Limberg was preparing to load crude
prior to sailing to London. As it slowed to take on its pilot, a small boat carrying ex-
plosives rammed the ship, and the effects are now well documented—disastrous
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effects for that particular ship. One crew member was killed. Almost one hundred
thousand barrels of oil were spilled into the Gulf of Aden, affecting local fishermen
and polluting the coastline. Reports that we have viewed here suggest the following
economic impact: that insurance premiums tripled for ships entering Yemeni
ports. Some premiums rose to as high as $300,000 U.S., causing some shipping
lines to bypass that port. Container throughput, according to the reports that I
have seen, dropped by over 90 percent, and it is estimated that upwards of three
thousand jobs in the local economy were affected, due to the strain caused by the
environmental and economic impacts. And again, I am quoting a report that we
have seen on this that suggests that the Yemeni government estimated that it lost
15 million U.S. dollars per month in income, accounting for nearly 1 percent of its
gross domestic product. These are the effects from an attack on just one of the
thousands of ships that sail every day from ports around the world.
In a much broader context, all over the world, our sea lines of communications
are under attack. In the first half of this year alone, there were a record 234 re-
ported attacks against seafarers. This was the worst six-month period since the
International Maritime Bureau started compiling piracy statistics in 1991, and it
was a full 34-percent increase over the same time period last year. Most recently,
seven attacks occurred between the fourteenth and the twentieth of this month.
There is a growing concern among experts that the number of politically motivated
attacks against vessels is clearly on the rise. Pirates conducting premeditated, politi-
cally motivated violence against innocent seafarers—that is, using terror: that is
terrorism.
These events and the events of the last few years have caused us all to reassess the
changing world landscape and to look closely at how our navies and coast guards
operate in support of our national defense. It is clear that we, as leaders of navies
and coast guards of the world, have the shared responsibility to keep our oceans
free from terror and to allow our nations to prosper. So the question remains, how
do we do this effectively? How do we do this efficiently? Terrorists hide in our cities
planning to strike at our weaknesses. The battlefield is no longer the size of a coun-
try or just the deep oceans of the world. Today’s battlefield is in fact in the littorals,
the land-sea interface where over 70 percent of the earth’s populations reside, with
waterways teaming with merchant ships. That is the battleground. To win on this
twenty-first-century battlefield, we must be able to dominate the littorals, being—I
like to say—being out and about in the battlespace, ready to strike on a moment’s
notice, anywhere, anytime we are called.
Now this shift in paradigm has caused many of us, and I include myself when I
say many of us, to rethink our capabilities and the employment of our resources.
This is why I set my navy on the course of Sea Power 21. Now, rest assured, I do not
intend to use this time to give you a Sea Power 21 speech. But Sea Power 21 does re-
flect our collective assessment in the United States of the kind of navy we will need
to face the challenges that we expect to see in the twenty-first century. Sea Power
21 is about projecting joint and combined, decisive—and I underline “decisive”—
capabilities from the sea, operating in an information-rich environment. Sea Power
21 will include more precision, to be sure, more combat reach—one day soon, guns
that shoot one hundred miles with extraordinary precision; and Sea Power 21 in our
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future and the capabilities that we define and develop will include my favorite new
word: persistence—persistent combat capability.
All this [is] designed to meet the clear objective of our future Sea Power 21
force—and this is it: to maximize the joint and combined capability that we will
bring to a potential battle, designed from the ground up to operate in partnership
with our joint and combined partners. Designed because the war on terrorism is se-
rious business, and because I am convinced that this challenge is immense and it
can only be won, in my opinion, through partnership.
Our nations have made great strides in the global war through international
partnership. It is remarkable to note that since coalition operations began in 2001,
the number of maritime interventions in the Global War on Terrorism has in-
creased sevenfold—seven times. That statistic is indicative of the superb
seamanship and capability that every one of us, and the unique capabilities that
complement one another that we bring to the fight. Without a doubt, success in the
Global War on Terrorism takes international teamwork. This will be in my view a
long campaign, and we have already seen many examples of how teamwork and co-
operation will make a difference.
One powerful example is Operation SEA CUTLASS. SEA CUTLASS is a coalition op-
eration around the Horn of Africa to stop terrorist activity. The coalition is made
up of ships from five nations that represent the best capability available at the time.
This is a key point: the best capability available at the time. No navy has the capability or
the budget to address its military needs without limitation, but every navy can bene-
fit from the synergy of combining force structure, technology, intelligence, and
situational awareness that comes from operating together.
Each one of us faces the challenge of optimizing our navy, based on our national
military strategy and fiscal constraints. Some countries maintain coast guards or
have navies designed for special operations, riverine, or harbor defense. Some na-
vies are designed to operate in the littorals to patrol their economic exclusion zone.
And still other navies are designed for open ocean operations or power projection
from great distances. Every navy is different, but each brings critical capabilities to
the fight. By working together, our maritime partnerships have robust capability, and
that is what it is all about: building a partnership with the capability to defeat terror,
building a partnership whose capability is much greater than the sum of its parts.
For four months, Admiral Nielson from the German Navy commanded Opera-
tion SEA CUTLASS. His team performed superbly, showing the capability and the
flexibility of maritime coalitions designed to meet the challenges of terrorism. I
should note that Admiral Jacques Mezars from the French Navy relieved as coali-
tion commander on September 29 and is doing an equally superb job.
Let us look at NATO. Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR is an example of long-time
friends taking a stand against a new enemy: terrorism. Vice Admiral Di Monteforte
from the Italian Navy commands this operation. A task force composed of ships
from the NATO Standing Naval Forces, Mediterranean and Atlantic, are deployed
in the Straits of Gibraltar and the eastern Mediterranean to maintain security and
ensure the safe transit of allied shipping. Since the operation was started in Octo-
ber 2001, the force has monitored over thirty thousand ships and escorted over 340
of them through the Straits of Gibraltar.
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A newfound partnership against terrorism occurred mid-year in 2002 when my
nation relied upon the Indian Navy to escort ships through the Straits of Malacca.
The Sharda and the Sukanya worked with my logistics commander in Singapore to
escort military sealift ships through those straits. This vital contribution allowed
our Pacific commander, Admiral Walter Dorn, to focus his attention on other areas.
And I hear it from my commanders after they work with your navies and coast
guards, and I have witnessed it myself. Our navies accomplish more as a team than
we ever could individually.
These two examples, Operation SEA CUTLASS and ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, are only
two of many regional coalition operations underway today to thwart the advances of
terrorism. I believe that the next step is to join forces and form a worldwide coali-
tion of military and law enforcement organizations to keep our oceans free and
safe. This coalition would share information to track shipping around the world, to
end the illegal exploitation of our sea lines of communication, and to stop terror-
ism at its roots. In this coalition, just as we see today, actionable intelligence will be
just as important as, and in some cases, more important than, force structure. And I
ask you to discuss this during the symposium and to continue open dialogue when
you return home.
We have an opportunity of historic proportions to assemble a maritime partner-
ship the likes of which has never been seen or exercised or utilized before: a force
with unity of effort that can deter would-be aggressors in peacetime and overwhelm
an enemy in war, a global force operating as one to defeat terrorism wherever it
may fester, the greatest maritime force to ever set sail.
But our vision is certainly not without challenges. One might say that it is pretty
idealistic. So challenges do exist. Each of us has our own challenges, some shared,
some unique. One challenge that we all share, though, is interoperability.
Interoperability is hard enough to achieve among the forces of one’s own country,
and I am sure we all have humorous—and not so humorous—stories about working
with our respective army or air force or Marine Corps partners. Those stories are
out there. I have them, to be sure. The challenge is even more difficult across na-
tional boundaries. I believe that by working together we can solve the
interoperability challenges, but I acknowledge that it will not be easy. It will take all
of us to show some flexibility, but we can succeed. The speed of technology and
technological development can accentuate this challenge, but I believe that we can
use technology to our advantage and turn it into one of our asymmetric strengths.
We should use technology on our terms, to combat terror and to defeat our ene-
mies, or they will use it as their advantage.
Another challenge that we share is fiscal constraint. All of us and every chief in
the room has this challenge, I know. All of us are accustomed to the challenge of
balancing the readiness of the operating fleet with the investment in the future
fleet. While every navy cannot afford every capability, we recognize that each con-
tribution helps build a robust coalition. This brings me back to the theme of the
symposium: maritime coalitions against terrorism. By working together, we will
form the greatest coalition that has ever set sail.
I would like to end this by saying that we have been given the opportunity to lead
our nations’ maritime forces at what I believe is a historic period in the world’s his-
tory. We are combating an enemy that is willing to risk everything to drive a stake
10 Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium
between the nations of the world, pitting one friend against another, dismantling
partnerships that have stood the test of time. They know that international cooper-
ation is a powerful weapon, but so do we. And we must stand together
shoulder-to-shoulder to defend against this enemy.
This International Seapower Symposium is the way ahead to greater coopera-
tion, and my hope is that you will take the time and this wonderful opportunity to
build personal and professional bonds to form deeper trust and confidence in your
fellow mariners, because we have an opportunity of historic proportions. And so
the moment is upon us. I believe that we are living in a defining time in history, a
defining moment for navies. And when I address my navy, I always discuss the im-
portance of our service to our nation in such a critical time in history. As I look out
at this audience and see so many leaders entrusted with leading thousands of sailors
from around the world, I am struck by this very same thought: What a true honor it is
to serve at a moment like this.
So, the task for this great group assembled is this. By rolling up our sleeves and
working together, I believe that we can create partnerships that will help our na-
tions realize their fullest potential in so many ways and make it possible for our
children and our children’s children to live in a world that is safe and that is free of
terror. I thank each of you for your commitment, your decision to come to this sym-
posium. I thank each of you for your presence, and I stand before you ready to go to
work to help forge a powerful maritime partnership.
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3Panel Discussion One:
Maritime Coalitions at the Tactical Level
Moderated by Rear Admiral Richard B. Porterfield, U.S. Navy
Professor Lawrence Modisett, U.S. Naval War College, United States:
The goal of these panel discussions is to give you the opportunity to exchangeknowledge and experience about coalition operations and interoperability
and generally how our navies can work together dealing with common challenges.
Obviously, the War against Terrorism is a major challenge that we face, but there
are other tasks as well that we need to be able to do in common. That is what we are
hoping to accomplish here. We are trying to do this in several formats. We have
heard Admiral Clark’s keynote address. There will be a couple of other major ad-
dresses by Admiral Collins and Secretary of the Navy England, but we also have a
series of panel presentations for you over the next day and a half, and in these
panel presentations you will hear from over a dozen navies and coast guards ad-
dressing various issues at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
At the conclusion of each of these panels, there will be time for you to offer re-
marks from the floor, either questions about things the panelists have said or
comments of your own. We will have personnel to assist you in getting to a micro-
phone or getting the microphone to you and would ask that you use those in
making your comments after the panels. Another request: when speaking from the
floor, please bear in mind that it is a mark of great wisdom to take a great thought
and express it in just a few words. And that way we can assure the maximum number
of people the opportunity to speak.
We will be changing the format tomorrow afternoon, and you will be going to
our war gaming center, McCarty Little Hall, across the street, where you will break
up into seminar groups. You should each have received in your welcoming package
the number of the seminar to which you are assigned and the room number for that
as well. Each of the seminar groups will be dealing with a different scenario, an op-
erational situation that we’ve asked you to consider. And you will be playing the role
in the seminar of members of a multinational task force, so you will be asked to con-
duct your planning for the particular situation specified in that seminar and
identify the issues that need to be addressed and resolved for effective multina-
tional operations. You will be assisted in the seminars by two moderators from the
Naval War College faculty, and you’ll also have in each seminar a legal expert who
will be able to respond to questions on international law or rules of engagement.
The moderators will also be asking that one of you in each seminar serve as a
spokesman on the final day, when we will have our fourth panel, and at that panel,
each of the eight seminar groups will have a spokesman who will have ten minutes
to present the highlights of that group’s discussion.
There is a change in terms of the rules between here and McCarty Little Hall
when we do the seminars. Everything that we say in this auditorium, in Spruance
Auditorium, during the plenary sessions is considered to be on the record, and we
will be publishing a report, as Admiral Route mentioned this morning. Professor
Hattendorf will be preparing that, as he has done a number of times in the past. We
will be publishing a report on the proceedings, so everything that is said here in the
auditorium we consider on the record and for attribution. And we will try to identify
speakers from the floor, as well, of course, as the speakers on the panel. In the semi-
nar sessions tomorrow, the rules are a little bit different. We will have note takers to
record the issues discussed, but everything you say in the seminars is off the record.
It is not for attribution, and you will not be identified by name or country or in any
other way in the report on the seminar portion of this symposium. And with that, I
would like to turn things over to Rear Admiral Porterfield, the director of naval in-
telligence, who is the moderator for our first panel, “Maritime Coalitions at the
Tactical Level.”
Rear Admiral Porterfield, United States:
CNO Clark, Admiral Route, Admiral Stufflebeem, distinguished delegates to the
Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium, welcome to Panel One. This panel
is entitled “Maritime Coalitions at the Tactical Level.” I hope that over the next two
hours or so, we can engage in a productive discussion on the challenges facing our
navies that are particular to operating in the maritime coalition environment. It is
my pleasure to serve as the panel moderator and the timekeeper for this panel. I
am particularly pleased to do this because I share a widely held belief that success in
the Global War on Terrorism and in dealing with the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction will require that we take deliberate and sustained steps at the lead-
ership level to maximize the effectiveness of international coalitions. For our part,
successful maritime coalitions will be a key component in winning the Global War
on Terrorism.
Second, serving as moderator affords me the opportunity to express our sincere
thanks for the support you and the navies you represent have provided to the
United States during these challenging times since the attacks on September 11,
2001. As director of naval intelligence, I have had the privilege to visit with and host
many of my counterparts as part of our collective efforts to operate successfully in a
coalition environment. The support we have received from coalition partners has
been immense, and in a great many situations this support has been decisive in
achieving U.S. and coalition objectives. Each nation that has supported the United
States brings unique strengths and expertise to bear on the challenges we face
together.
Let me begin the substantive part of Panel One by introducing the other panel
members and their topics. I would also like to review the agenda as shown here in
the schedule for this session before turning the floor over to our first speaker. I am
joined on the panel today by Vice Admiral Klaver of the Royal Netherlands Navy,
Admiral de Donno of the Italian Navy, Vice Admiral De Leon of the Philippine
Navy, and Major General Al Mulla of Kuwait. I want to thank each of you for joining
me on the panel and for leading the discussions on your respective topics. As the
panel guidelines dictate, each speaker will have ten minutes to introduce and frame
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a topic. After all the speakers have concluded their introductions, I will open the
floor for discussion, comment, and questions. As you will note in the schedule, we
will take a lunch break at 11:30 and resume discussions for an additional thirty min-
utes beginning at 14:00. Vice Admiral Klaver, the floor is yours to address the first
topic, coordinating rules of engagement.
Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:
Thank you, Admiral Porterfield. Admirals, generals, ladies and gentlemen, I would
like to start with expressing my sincere gratitude to the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Vern Clark, in the first place for the flawless organization of this presti-
gious event and, in the second place, for the opportunity to address the distinguished
delegates to this symposium. The theme of my short presentation is the coordination
of rules of engagement in a maritime coalition at the technical level.
Before coordinating rules of engagement, there must be a basic agreement of
what rules of engagement are. The Royal Netherlands Navy experience, from
both operational missions and exercises—and that includes UN, NATO, and ad hoc
coalitions—is that there is, indeed, general agreement on what rules of engage-
ment are. They are directions to operational commanders that delineate the
parameters within which force may be used. They are not tasks. Tasks are derived
from missions and concepts of operations. Rules of engagement can be issued as a
prohibition, which means there are orders not to take specific actions. They can
also be used as permissions, in which case they are the authority for commanders to
take specific action, if necessary to achieve the aim of the mission. Rules of engage-
ment have to take the law of armed conflict into account. And rules of engagement
do not negate the right of self-defense. I think most, but perhaps not all of us, agree
on these principles.
However, if there is general agreement on what rules of engagement are, it does
not mean that there is general agreement on how they should be interpreted.
There is also wide difference in interpretation of some key definitions used with
rules, especially in multinational coalitions. For example, how far does self-defense
go? What entails minimum force? When do we have a hostile intent? But anyway,
rules of engagement have a direct influence on how we execute our mission, down
to the smallest unit. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to coordinate rules down
to the technical level.
Until some years ago, most relations were preplanned, and the participating
partners were based on the region in which they would be most likely to operate.
Coordination of rules of engagement could, at least to some degree, take place in
advance, based on scenarios that were not fundamentally different. These coali-
tions trained together using these rules of engagement. When actual deployment
of the force was imminent, only minor changes would have to be discussed amongst
coalition members. Legal and political differences between the participating na-
tions were known in advance and could be anticipated and smoothly
accommodated. A NATO task force operating in the North Atlantic was a good ex-
ample of such an operation. However, even then, most of the NATO commanders
present here have probably experienced some surprise at the reactions of partners
in war games and exercises. But in recent years, we have seen very different scenar-
ios. Out-of-region operations are no exception, but they are the rule. Ad hoc
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coalitions were formed with many different nations from all over the world. Opera-
tion ENDURING FREEDOM is a good example of such an operation.
Obviously the coordination of rules is a lot more complicated in such a scenario.
After discussing rules of coordination at the technical level, we have to take three
levels into account. I call them state level, force and component commander level,
and unit command and individual level. Let us first look at the state level. At the
state level, coordination must take place between nations, and each leader can face
two situations: There is already a common set of rules of engagement, or there is
not a common set. When, of course, there is a common set, coordination will be
based on the existing documents. I think the two most well known are UN-led mis-
sions, where the document is the UN standing rules of peace-enforcing operations
and where the main players are the director of peacekeeping operations and the
two contributing nations. An example was the UNMEE [United Nations Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea]. In NATO, rules of engagement are laid down in Military
Committee Document 362, and the main players are the North Atlantic Council
and the Military Committee. This document is frequently used as a baseline in
non-NATO coalitions with NATO partners.
These two documents, by the way, are quite different. There are probably more,
but these are the ones we actually work with.
When there is no initial common set of rules of engagement, the nations have to
start from scratch. A coalition of the willing is formed when the lead nation will
have to coordinate among the nations. Examples are ENDURING FREEDOM and se-
curity forces in Iraq. Quite often, plain text is a good compromise.
Let us now identify some of the problem areas when coordinating at the state
level. The problem areas can be legal, political, or operational issues. On the legal
side, some countries have to make national caveats based on their national law or
even their constitution. So we have to know what their restrictions are, for example,
when they draft a treaty. The antipersonnel mine prohibition in Ottawa is one of
the examples. Or they are prohibited means—for instance, riot control agents. On
the political side, we all know that each nation has a known agenda on each subject.
This interest can lead to reluctance to endorse certain rules. A good example is
boarding of merchant shipping, where, on the one hand, you have nations who are
very keen to protect freedom of the sea to all ends, while on the other hand, nations
use extended self-interest differences in a lot more ways. On the operational side
there can be troubles as well. It is hard to agree with certain actions when your units
do not possess certain weapons or sensors; for example, designation of targets with
laser is quite open in discussion. However, it is important that the political leader-
ship of a coalition agrees with rules of engagement and promulgates them to the
force commander with the national caveats.
Let us now turn to coordination of rules at force and component level. At the
component commander level, life seems simple again. The force command will co-
ordinate. But as I said, is he aware of all national caveats, and has he disseminated
this down the line? Is the force commander aware of all relevant political and oper-
ational issues at state level? And if so, do all component commanders have the same
frame of reference for the generic terms and definitions in the set of rules of en-
gagement? Each component commander will inform his subsequent commanders
about his interpretation of hostile intent. Its interpretation will be based on the
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environment and might well be different between the land component commander,
the maritime component commander, and the air component commander.
My personal experience in NATO exercises as Deputy CINC, EASTLANT, is
that there are still differences in interpretation among component commanders
and about rules of engagement. This was confirmed by lessons learned from Strong
Resource 2002. A maritime commander is more likely to remain flexible in delegat-
ing to or holding back from commanding officers. The land commander, who has
to use specific guards that cannot easily be changed, has less flexibility. So is there a
requirement for specific rules for the maritime, land, and air environments? The
NATO system allows for this, and in my experience, this distinction can be useful.
However, a lot of people disagree with me; so we perhaps might discuss that.
Let us now see the unit commander’s level. He will have to work with the rules of
interpretation of his component commander and, again, must take national cave-
ats into account. The example given: is one of his units allowed to board ships, or
not? And again as mentioned, where one component commander has delegated all
rules down to a unit, it might not be the same case in all environments. As I said,
warning shots allowed can be delegated at sea normally to the commanding officer,
while in the air, it is the pilot, while on land, it is the individual soldier. Very impor-
tant at this level is the national interpretation of self-defense that must be
understood. Some countries have more of those definitions than others, but the act
of one will always influence the other units. Coordination in the form of under-
standing each other’s interpretation is, therefore, vital. Although normally defined
in the rules and instructions, the same goes for hostile act and hostile intent.
To round off, without even pretending to have touched all the issues, it seems,
therefore, fair to draw four conclusions. Coordination is always needed at each level
and even when operating within the same set of rules of engagement. Rules of en-
gagement touch on so many issues that coordination should start at the earliest
opportunity and must be completed before deployment. Commanders at each level
should get together to discuss and explain their understanding of rules of engage-
ment, UN game play, or tabletop sessions. And finally, rules of engagement and
national caveats should be promulgated to the chain of command in a coalition. I
know we are not yet in the question time, but I just want to show you this picture of
our newest ship in this navy, because that is what we are all there for: ships.
Vice Admiral De Leon, Philippines:
Admiral Clark, gentlemen; good morning. Terrorism poses two significant chal-
lenges for traditional maritime strategies. First, it defies our concept of sea control,
since we are not confronted by an enemy with ships and controlled territory. Second,
it is always on the offensive, without us knowing when and where it will attack next.
Thus, it is imperative that our efforts and strategies of confronting the threat of
terrorism—maritime terrorism in particular—should be coordinated into one
seamless activity across national and regional borders. The advances in technology
offer a great deal of opportunity for the world’s navies to enhance command and
control of operations against terrorist groups. However, in the case of the ASEAN
region, there are evident significant challenges for the establishment of C4 connec-
tivity, as I am about to discuss with you this afternoon.
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Trends in Maritime Coalitions against Terrorism
Over the past century, we have seen a variety of maritime strategies at work. In re-
gional crises, such as in the Adriatic, the Gulf War, Vietnam, and the Korean War,
as well as in Afghanistan and Iraq, maritime strategy was largely unopposed. Mari-
time nations concentrated on using the sea for their own purposes in supporting
and getting out their military actions. The new context for maritime strategy today
involves adhering more closely to the ideas of collective security, as nations recog-
nize that international cooperation may allow more to be done with less, as earlier
stated by Admiral Clark. However, the new threats of maritime terrorism and trans-
national crimes require new approaches and methods that demand the use of ad-
vanced scientific information about the maritime and security environment. In an
era when the size and range of problems may well surpass the ability of any one na-
tion or of any one navy to deal adequately with these threats, multilateral naval co-
operation becomes increasingly common. Thus, the key problem that navies face
today is to develop the necessary common procedures in communication and op-
erational doctrine that will allow them to work together more effectively on a re-
gional basis.
ASEAN Response to Terrorism
In dealing with terrorism in and transnational crimes, the exchange of information
between countries is critically important, because terrorist organizations like
al-Qa’ida and Jemaah Islamiyah operate and cooperate across the state borders.
ASEAN cooperation has two aspects to it. One is political, and this is expressed
through various ASEAN declarations on terrorism that stressed the need to
strengthen cooperation at all levels—bilateral, regional, and international—to
combat terrorism in a comprehensive manner. The second is enforcing the politi-
cal will of member states in enforcing the declarations to keep up the fight against
terrorism.
At least four factors characterize ASEAN’s regional security environment that af-
fects a state’s capability to respond swiftly to acts of terrorism. These are (1) porous
borders and generally weak CIQ controls; (2) long-standing economic and trade
links between Southeast Asia and Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, many
of which operate outside normal financial channels and are not readily monitored
by governments; (3) widespread criminal activities, including drug trafficking in
the region, which in turn can facilitate the movement of resources by terrorists; and
(4) the availability of a large supply of indigenously produced and important weap-
ons in Southeast Asia.
Such conditions will dilute the effectiveness of multilateral security cooperation
against terror, so that regional security institutions suggest ASEAN would function
only at a moderate level—that is, confidence building. To address effectively the
threats facing the region, ASEAN needs to adopt a more proactive role in order to
embark on new security cooperation strategies.
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Maritime Coalition Concept: The ASEAN Maritime Coordination Center
In order to embark on new security cooperation strategies to deal with nontradi-
tional threats to regional security, more mechanisms for a collaboration and coor-
dination have to be established. Of great importance is the need for (1) the
facilitation of more exchanges, such as person to person or agency to agency; (2)
the establishment of common databases; and (3) the need to develop a multina-
tional task force. This is where connectivity between command and control, com-
munications, and computers plays an important part, as it will form the nucleus of
the three requirements I just mentioned.
The integration of forces, doctrine, technology, and information and a com-
mand and control system allows a commander to gain situational awareness, reach
decisions about courses of action, and implement those decisions by means of oper-
ational plans and orders. Thus, the multinational task force against terror that I
propose for the ASEAN is one that will function, through a system where command
and control, communications, and computers will interface, to coordinate all ef-
forts related to anti- and counterterrorism efforts of the countries in the region.
These activities should be coordinated under the auspices of an ASEAN Maritime
Coordination or Coordinating Center that could serve as the nucleus for fostering
closer regional cooperation in areas such as intelligence, extradition, and law
enforcement.
Information that will be processed by the center shall come from different
sources, but mainly with the contribution of naval intelligence agencies of ASEAN
countries. The private shipping sector shall also be tapped in information gather-
ing, through a system of reporting and communication of incidents at sea or any
unusual event in any of the maritime trade routes in the region. This coordinated
approach to intelligence and information gathering could provide for adequate
and real-time information on maritime security that is needed for the timely em-
ployment of anti- or counterterrorist forces. The Maritime Coordinating Center
could initially follow the concept of the Strategic Maritime Information System (or
SMIS), developed by the Information Technology Division of the Australian De-
fense Science and Technology Organization. The system was a database of
open-source maritime information covering Southeast Asian and Australian wa-
ters. This type of data is important for risk assessments and managing maritime
security, but, unfortunately, work on the SMIS was suspended several years ago due
to lack of sponsorship. However, this particular problem of sponsorship or leader-
ship of the Asian Maritime Coordinating Center could be addressed by rotating the
sponsorship among the ASEAN member countries. I believe that developed coun-
tries such as the United States, Japan, and China will be very keen in supporting
such initiatives, as this will foster a greater security and stability in the region where
the majority of the world’s maritime trade traffic occurs.
Challenges for C4 Connectivity
The development of common and interoperable command and control, communi-
cations, and computers or computer connectivity is a serious challenge for the
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region. Interoperability of ASEAN navies’ C4 equipment is only on a limited scale
and is normally achieved during small-scale activities or joint exercises.
On the other hand, whatever the arrangements for command and control, the
problem of doctrine remains a very difficult one, even for fairly routine operations.
Almost always, observers interpret doctrine as a political statement or as a
hard-and-fast directive that must always be obeyed. However, I believe that naval
doctrine for multinational naval operations must be viewed as providing a standard
approach for many different navies to work together effectively. But inasmuch as
there are challenges for the organization of a command and control system for re-
gional anti- and counterterrorism efforts, these same challenges could present
themselves as opportunities in the long run. More than the strengthening of the
diplomatic relationships between and among ASEAN countries, it will set the tone
for a broader alliance against terrorism for the whole of Asia. This could be done
through a regional framework that calls for the establishment of interoperable sys-
tems of communications and information technology equipment, necessary to
facilitate the efficient flow of information for effective command and control. The
establishment of the Maritime Coordinating Center will set a definite standard for
ASEAN navies to develop their capabilities for interoperable C4 equipment and op-
erate in mutually supportive doctrines against terrorism.
In closing, I do hope to have shared with you some insights as to how C4 connec-
tivity could be enhanced on the tactical level in the fight against terrorism and
transnational crimes in the ASEAN regional context. Indeed, I am deeply privi-
leged to be part of this multinational event that focuses on the global integration of
naval power to address the threats confronting our communities. Thank you very
much, and good morning.
Major General Al Mulla, Kuwait:
In the name of God, the most gracious and merciful. Admiral Clark, distinguished
guests, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to express my deep thanks for the invita-
tion to the Seapower Symposium here in Newport, Rhode Island, which reminds
me of my old days when I attended the Naval Staff College in 1984. It is an honor to
be here again. I think everybody looks very serious; I would like to start with a joke.
A kid asks his sister, “Why [have] Dad and Mom [been] in their room since five
days?” Sister said, “I don’t know, but why are you laughing?” The kid said, “Dad
asked me for Vaseline and I gave him Superglue.”
I would like to emphasize that this was the first time that GCC Maritime Forces
participated in a joint combat effort. In this operation, the Kuwait Navy was in com-
mand. This effort was in close coordination with the U.S.-led Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM coalition forces. Even though that was complex and difficult, we had the
advantage of twenty-two years’ work experience with GCC countries. Furthermore,
we had fifteen years of experience working with the U.S.-led coalition. This took us
through the liberation of Kuwait, then engaged in deterrence by enforcement of
UN Resolutions, and, finally, through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Kuwait was an
equal partner in the planning process that took equal participation, which took it
from the Free World [operations] all the way through to Kosovo. Common rules of
engagement were one of the important results of the planning process. Prevention
of Blue-to-Blue fires was achieved through detailed planning and execution.
20 Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium
The C4 was complex due to the number of nations participating in a confined litto-
ral environment. Hundreds of ships and many more aircraft were operating in close
proximity to each other. And we must not forget the political differences and restric-
tions of each nation in the coalition operation. Dedication and commitment of each
nation within the coalition were a key factor in achieving unity of effort and command
[Figure 1].
From the experience of my navy’s past years, I have developed several lessons
learned that I believe are applicable to other nations’ navies. A detailed C4 plan is
critical to the successful operation, and I would like to emphasize that an efficient
C4 plan needs time and effort from all participants. With all the high-tech equip-
ment we had, the human element had to be exercised for the C4 to be successful.
Exchange of liaison officers will help overcome deficiencies in equipment or over-
sights in planning. With respect to communication, the highest priority is the
ability to talk securely by voice; and others follow in priority.
I quote from the Multinational Maritime Operations document: “Ideally, relation-
ships for and during multinational maritime operations should be maintained after
its conclusion. It facilitates future cooperation, staff talks, doctrine exchange, and
new or revised standardization programs, exercises of opportunity for visits and
personnel exchange for professional education: all contribute to preserving of and
improving the capabilities for future interaction.”
Admiral de Donno, Italy:
Thank you very much. I wish also to thank Admiral Clark and the U.S. Navy for
having put together this important gathering in a time when being side by side at
sea has become probably the most important aspect of our fight, our war, against
terrorists. I would just start by making two considerations regarding the impor-
tance of a coalition in general—the first, which includes the intrinsic advantages
that are not achievable by one country alone, even by the most powerful, and the
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Figure 1. Numerous C4 Challenges
second, which refers to the additional value that force packages operating under a
multinational flag, such as the experience we had with UNMARFOR, can bring to
coalition operations.
For the first point, three aspects must be underlined:
• Strong support from the international community as well as from the world’s
public opinion, given that the force is more easily perceived as the willingness
of a group of countries rather than as the manifestation of some conceived in-
terest or intent pursued by a single nation
• Reduced costs to participants, since considerable force packages can be assem-
bled without putting an excessive financial burden on individual countries
• Availability of a wider range of military and nonmilitary capabilities, whereby
contributing nations can more effectively focus efforts in their respective areas
of excellence and expertise.
For the second aspect, when added to the force packages, there is higher ability
to integrate our other forces, as shown by the many multinational assets that effec-
tively operated under COMEUROMARFOR inside Task Force 150, and stronger
attraction exerted toward other countries—even an improved integration process
and professional conduct of the operation. As a consequence, interoperability be-
comes the most critical driver to success at the tactical level, thereby requiring
support by both hard and soft elements, such as compatible C4I systems, as we just
heard, and common doctrines and procedures.
A key role in this last category of elements is played by force protection mea-
sures, which, being strongly integrated with survivability of our own forces, have a
direct impact on national public opinion and on mission success. Force protection,
as you all know, involves the protection of our own personnel and equipment in all
locations and situations. In the new operating scenarios, our forces are even more
exposed and vulnerable to a new type of threat. The force protection concept has
seen its relevance grow to counter these new threats, characterized by an interna-
tional connotation, geographical delocalization, ease of ability of high technology,
and effective adoption of the surprise factor, without any limit to the fantasy or cre-
ativity of the adversary. The need for increased force protection is also deriving
from the deeper involvement of maritime forces in the littoral environment.
All these call for an increase in safety awareness on behalf of our men and
women, both on and off duty. In brief, force protection is everybody’s job. It re-
quires awareness and understanding by all involved. Furthermore, applied to the
context of today’s discussion, it is a theme event, which must be properly analyzed
and developed by all the participants in a maritime coalition, and by which all
should benefit from the efforts of those around them. To that end, force protection
is an issue that tactical commanders need to address at all times and places, becom-
ing increasingly difficult when operating far from the homeland, especially in the
world’s hot spots. This difficulty is accentuated in the case of a coalition force, when
tactical commanders need to have full awareness of the different force protection
assets and procedures adopted by each country, in order to harmonize them and
move the force’s overall defensive posture. Besides this, it must be considered that
force protection is often connected to the adoption of measures implying the use of
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force, in which case the relationship with the rules of engagement also needs to be
taken into account. Indeed, in maritime operations, similarities between rules of
engagement and force protection issues can be observed in terms of diversity of ap-
proach, need for harmonization, and capability of selective management.
As has happened in the past, the experience gained inside structured alliances,
such as NATO, could help in this effort for standardization in doctrinal develop-
ment. As a matter of fact, the tactical commanders must provide the depending
forces with detailed directives. For instance, in the form of operational task force
protection, they are to take into account the direction and guidance issued by supe-
rior commanders while at the same time avoiding conflicts with the national
regulations of the contributing countries. Overall tactical directives must, therefore,
be harmonized in a way that makes them compatible with the relevant dimensional
views, possibly representing the common denominator to all forces operating under
the same tactical commander. Moreover, adequate leeway should be left to individ-
ual unit commanders, since they hold the final responsibility for the safety of their
forces, while at the same time aiding the most immediate perception of the situation
in progress. There are several force protection focus areas that I deem of key interest
and relevance for tactical maritime commanders, in particular:
• Risk reduction, achieved by increasing the mobility and unpredictability of
movement of own forces, intelligence, and counterintelligence, whereby in-
formation must be managed to gain the best knowledge of potential opposing
forces, while at the same time negating the details on the characteristics and
movements of own forces. These not only involve doctrinal aspects, such as
OPSEC and INFOSEC, but also crew’s behavior during liberty, both abroad
and at home.
• Culture, not only training, in terms of internalization of the importance of
force protection at all levels, from senior officers to the last sailor.
• Standardization and thorough execution of procedures, for maximization of
all possible synergy by better utilizing global resources and legal frameworks.
An example can be provided by two ships moored alongside, whereby a rota-
tion program can be developed for the utilization of lifeboats for area patrol.
• Prevention of mutual interference—first of all, fratricide engagement.
• Respect of host nation regulations and culture, albeit accounting for the possi-
ble incapability of local governments to create a stable environment around
our force.
• Coordination of forces operating under different commanders and in the vi-
cinity of other units under control of the land component commander.
In conclusion, I wish to underline the critical importance of coalitions for the
success of modern military operations and for the establishment and preserva-
tion of stability in the world. I also wish to highlight the crucial need for
standardized procedures and doctrine in the specific field of force protection,
which I believe to be one of the most sensitive areas, especially for its direct impact
on the survivability of own forces and, therefore, on the effective development and
success of the mission. We were trained to face at sea a well-known and visible en-
emy, relying mainly on the power of our weapons. Terrorism has changed the
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perception of our safety, making the harbor—once a grand place of rest—a place of
concern and, sometimes, of fear. Thank you.
Rear Admiral Porterfield:
Thank you very much, Admiral de Donno and fellow panelists. It is my privilege
now to spend a few moments talking about ISR collaboration in a tactical coalition.
I want to frame the discussion surrounding these two major areas. First is what we
have all discussed this morning, the Global War on Terrorism that affects all of us,
and, secondly, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD], their deliv-
ery systems, and related materials. I believe that maritime coalitions will play a criti-
cal role in combating terrorism and the spread of WMD. To further focus your
thoughts on our discussion, I would like to use the coalition postured in the Persian
Gulf and northern Arabian Sea to examine ISR collaboration as it was two years
ago, how it is improved and is operating today, and finally transition to a discussion
on what it should look like in the future if we make the proper investments in tech-
nology and the requisite changes to policy training tactics and procedures.
This slide [Figure 2] shows how the United States and coalition members looked
on September 11, 2001.
By mid-February of 2002, the maritime coalition in the Gulf region had certainly
changed, as evidenced on the next slide [Figure 3], and had grown to over one hun-
dred ships, seventy-five of which were from nations other than the United States.
The hundred and six ships assembled in the region in early 2002 represented a
high-water mark of recent maritime coalition activity and a monumental challenge
in terms of ISR collaboration [Figure 4]. The situation these ships found themselves
24 Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium
Figure 2. Coalition Naval Order of Battle, 11 September 2001
in during that period leads me to a set of issues to guide our discussions on maxi-
mizing the effectiveness of maritime coalition.
The usual representation of ISR collaboration in late 2001 and early last year in
the Gulf region might look something like this.
2002 Coalition ISR Collaboration Attributes
• Multiple baselines based on choices made years ago
• Redundant hardware and software performing below capability
• No end-to-end connectivity
• Manual information fusion
• Numerous national information processing/reporting systems
• No real-time coalition collaboration.
The characteristics of this timeframe—and, in large part, today as well—were
the use of multiple communications architectures and technology baselines, for the
most part based on national or fleet choices made years ago—redundant hardware
and software, afloat and shore, performing well below advertised capability, with
virtually no end-to-end connectivity. Fusion of information was often accomplished
manually, and a high degree of information processing was conducted by way of na-
tional analysis in the reporting system. The result was that little real-time ISR
collaboration capability across the coalition was in place. Indications and warning
information were disseminated almost exclusively on voice circuits. Platforms such
as the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft passed contact information to other plat-
forms by voice. Reports or queries of a less time-sensitive nature were passed via sat-
ellite communication systems to national intelligence or operation centers. These
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Figure 3. Coalition Naval Order of Battle, 16 February 2002
national centers then turned around the reports to coalition partners by various
means. Daily ops and intelligence summaries were passed by exchanges of floppy
disks, moved by helicopter from unit to unit. In summary, although some
work-arounds were devised and wide-area networks were used to a limited extent,
meaningful rapid ISR collaboration was hindered by technical and procedural bar-
riers that could not be overcome by all units already in place.
Today, the architecture for coalition intelligence and ISR collaboration is usu-
ally established to fit the specific theater operational environment, to assign
mission communications ISR infrastructures that each national element brings for-
ward, and by external factors such as national policy regarding intelligence sharing
and reporting change [Figure 5]. Common to each coalition operation is the fact
that we start with the lowest common denominator in connectivity, interoperability,
and integration and then apply a wide range of measures to overcome the limita-
tions. Coalition tactical elements report intelligence via a number of stovepipe
communication paths and technologies, including voice recording networks, data
links, and unclassified and classified broadcast and Internet protocol base networks;
and increasingly via chat sessions and, in some sessions, Web sites and portals.
Today’s Coalition ISR Collaboration Attributes
• Network integration through guards, gateways, tunneling
• Increasingly common hardware and software
• Digital production standards emerging
• Policy limits access to some data sets
• Rudimentary ISR collaboration.
26 Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium
Figure 4. 2002 Coalition ISR Collaboration
These reporting-in data exchange paths are further differentiated by classification
level, releasability, and time latency from data persistence in many reporting formats.
As a result, coalition ISR data and intelligence must be fused by time-consuming, man-
ual means. This makes it near-impossible to build a common synchronized picture,
and very difficult to conduct ISR collaboration in real time among dispersed coalition
units. That said, we have evolved a number of methods and procedures over the past
decade to overcome these limitations and to obtain a workable level of coalition-
wide battle space awareness [Figure 6].
As depicted here, these methods and procedures range from highly structured
turnaround of ISR data from national headquarters to gateways and providing ac-
cess to remote servers, such as collaboration-at-sea replication servers, to the
tried-and-true sneakernet. Today’s architecture and operating procedures have
been refined through a remarkable level of task force cooperation and collabora-
tion among intelligence professionals and war fighters.
Future Coalition ISR Collaboration Attributes
• Multilevel security network
• Unlimited bandwidth
• Optimized national niche expertise
• Shared data fusion and visualization tools
• Full ISR collaboration services
• Rehearsed combined tactics, techniques, and procedures.
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Figure 5. Today’s Coalition ISR Collaboration
Before closing, I would like to focus for a minute on a much more integrated and
synchronized coalition architecture of the future that would enable us to exchange
ISR and intelligence in real time, collaborate in real time in the conduct of ISR
functions and activities, use multilevel security systems, assess ample bandwidth for
communicating with all coalition members, and enable seamless plug-in of multi-
national force packages that bring unique ISR niche expertise and capabilities to
the fight. Above all, this future ISR architecture must have the flexibility to provide
ISR support for maritime coalitions formed on short notice to respond to a wide
range of missions and tasks.
Let me conclude with this slide on maritime coalitions.
Maritime Coalitions
• Commitment to making maritime coalitions work
• Cooperation, collaboration, trust
• Unique capabilities and strengths
• Central role for maritime coalitions.
I would offer that most of what we have heard this morning and what has been
said about the United States and partner navies at the tactical level is that, first,
there is a tremendous commitment to making maritime coalitions work at the na-
tional, service, and tactical levels. Second, cooperation, collaboration, and trust are
essential parts of all effective coalitions and are best achieved through practice,
training, a common language, and a clear sense of purpose. Third, each partner of
a coalition has a unique strength or capability to bring to its partners, and coalition
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Figure 6. Future Coalition ISR Collaboration
leaders must adopt strategies to maximize the contribution of each nation repre-
sented. And finally, I am convinced that maritime coalitions will play a central role
in achieving a number of shared national objectives, most notably the successful
prosecution of the War on Terrorism and the prevention of proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction.
With that, I look forward to hearing your views on maritime coalitions today and
in the future, and what we can do to make those coalitions more effective. The floor
is now open for discussion, comments, and questions. Thank you very much.
Discussion
Rear Admiral Stufflebeem, United States:
First of all, I would like to thank the general and the admirals for your thoughtful
presentations—very forcefully put, in terms of interoperability, across all subjects.
It has been my experience as a recent tactical commander that we all seem to appre-
ciate the requirement for standards of interoperability, particularly in command
and control. My experience has been that in the realm of ROE [rules of engage-
ment] we have not necessarily gone down the same path of standardization. In fact,
my experiences have been as to build placemats of our national ROE, so that we
could deconflict, in some cases, what force we could project or, in other areas, sub-
stitute strengths of rules of engagement where others might not have the same
standardization. So my question is, should we also not, as a maritime body, be de-
manding of our national leaders that we have a parallel effort of standardization
and interoperability for rules of engagement in our coalitions?
All the panelists spoke to interoperability standards, and, of course, Admiral
Klaver spoke specifically to ROE. But I think that with the experiences that you
have had in your operations, as well as many of those in the audience, we can relate
that we work very hard and want to know what are the requirements for command
and control interoperability, but we have not yet necessarily laid down the said de-
mands for how we achieve the same interoperability for ROE within a coalition.
Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:
If I might start off, there are two things which are quite different. One is the proce-
dural one, which I think we can solve if we want to. The other one will always remain
a political one, and I am afraid, at our level, we cannot solve that problem. I talked
about national caveats. Basically, ideally, if you are a force commander, you should
have no national caveats. You should have the same rules for everybody, and every-
body understands exactly what you mean. In my opinion, and [from] what we have
seen over the last ten, twelve years with all sorts of peacekeeping and peace enforcing
—whatever you want to call it—this will never happen, because politicians will not
agree, and they will certainly not agree beforehand on any operation. If you look at
the present operation in Iraq, there are national caveats in force. If you look at the
politics involved, you would understand why. So I think the political problem can-
not be solved by us, and it will not be solved by politicians, in my honest opinion.
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Admiral de Donno, Italy:
I agree. I think that the rules of engagement are a specific problem of a political de-
cision, because from the behavior of a ship or a military unit in facing a certain type
of situation, certainly, comes a certain type of a consequence in the international re-
lationship of the country. So this is the reason why we have this problem—and we
had during the same operation: ships working under different lists of rules of en-
gagement. Some of them were common—the most general, if I can say, because
there are some aspects that are good for everybody. But when you enter in certain
specific evaluation, at that point the problem rises at the political level and reflects
the intention—the perspective—that each country has toward this very sensitive
situation.
So I think that what we can do is to ask our political leaders for direction to re-
ceive and to discuss, in the widest way possible, the particular rules of engagement
which are necessary for each type of operation, and then to bring [into the discus-
sion] our participation with all these aspects that [make], if I can say, another aspect
of what the characteristics [of the ROE] will be. Some can add a certain type of oper-
ational requirement or operational capability, and with that type of operational
capability is also the availability to do a certain type of operation or not. And this is
something that we cannot avoid in any case, according to my personal idea and
experience.
Commodore Arshad Hussain, Pakistan:
I am the commandant of the Pakistan Naval War College in Lahore. While my
question is focused toward Vice Admiral De Leon of the Philippines, regarding the
terrorist challenges, it also refers to the speech of Admiral Clark at the outset. And
the question is that there was a time that there were different alliances, like the War-
saw Pact Alliance or the NATO alliance, but different perceptions trying to sort out
the problems through negotiations, and eventually we see that we are in a world [in
which] those problems are sorted out. Today, we sit together not only as a maritime
audience, but also the land audience, when you talk about terrorism and the men-
ace which it is creating. We all see this menace, which has got no territory, which has
got no language, which has got just one motivation. After all, what is this enemy,
that the entire world as one alliance is taking it on and taking it so seriously and try-
ing to take it on when it has picked our towns? Why not harness the same efforts and
see that the enemy that has got no territory, the enemy which has got no expensive
designs, the enemy that has got no language, the enemy that has got no religion—how
and why has it become so powerful that it has become a threat to the world? Why
not harness our efforts to see why it has picked up arms? Why not see the root
cause of an enemy, which is, as a matter of fact, not as great, not as strong as we
think, that the entire efforts of the world may, in terms of land or maritime
power, not be able to tackle it. So why not go into the root cause as to why this
happened? Is it because of the difference being increased between the haves and
the have-nots? Is it because the people are being deprived of privileges and rights?
Is it because freedom movements are being misinterpreted as terrorist activities?
What is the cause of it? Why not use and harness our efforts toward identifying the
cause of this political menace and then attack it? Then, to let them pick up their
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arms and do it—after all, when the terrorist does that, we all know that is so very
well motivated.
Vice Admiral De Leon, Philippines:
Yes, thank you very much. If I understand your question right, you are talking of
the whole spectrum of trying to analyze the development of such problems for just
terrorism: the root causes. But I believe that you will have the opportunity to ad-
dress that tomorrow in Syndicate Number Four, where naval support to civil au-
thorities will be discussed.
Now, as far as trying to address the naval aspect of that particular situation, I be-
lieve that the establishment of a regional, coordinating center would partly solve
the problem. But of course, each and every navy should be aware of, at least, the na-
tional development in its own country, and possibly even a regional development
within porous border areas of concern. Each and every navy would know how to in-
teract with one another in solving a particular problem. But we have to start
somewhere, and we should know what our objectives are. We know, for a fact, the
wide spectrum of a problem, including poverty or deprivation, but we would not be
able to solve that as a whole. But we should start somewhere in terms of naval coop-
eration at the outset, and, thereafter, find out our own civil authority and use our
own capabilities to support their effort—just like what happened between Malaysia
and us [the Philippines] one year ago, when the Area Two commander of the Royal
Malaysian Navy and myself as naval commander in Southern Mindanao had to co-
operate directly to take care of Filipino refugees: All we did was call each other by
mobile phone and we were able to make it. Thank you.
Vice Admiral Feldt, Germany:
I want to come back to the rules of engagement business with one question. I think
the technical problem of connectivity is something we can solve in time, and I think
it is very necessary to find an answer to the question: Do we need to extend our rules
of engagement understanding? I agree with what you have said, Ruurt [Klaver] and
Marcello [de Donno], as well. I think it is not achievable to get something which is a
standard set of rules of engagement. What we have to achieve is to develop a com-
mon understanding—not only in the maritime family, but a common understand-
ing on the political side as well, and this is something which we have to start. We
have to ask our political masters to do that, and we have to continue to ask them. I
think for the NATO side, the NATO Response Force will be a test for that. I think a
lot of governments agree to this NATO Response Force, and I think maybe that
they are aware of the fact that now they have to think about rules of engagement
and how to engage this NATO Response Force in a quite different way than they
have done all the years before. I think this is a good test bed for answering the ques-
tion. And my question to you is, do you agree to that? And do you think that per-
haps the NATO Response Force could be an example for other similar forces in
other parts of the world as well? Thank you.
Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:
I must say I fully agree; I think the NATO Response Force—let’s say the political
side of it—will actually cause a lot more action amongst our politicians. We see it in
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the Netherlands; we see it develop in a discussion in parliament which didn’t hap-
pen, about three or four months ago, when we actually started discussing the NRF
over there. They are now certainly very interested in what they are actually commit-
ted to, and that also means what are the rules of engagement in which the NRF
have to operate. So I think that will certainly give some dynamics to the situation.
I would like to add one more thing to my last remark. When I said that politi-
cians will always have their own caveats, I think it is very important to point
out—and I tried to make the point when I made my presentation—that I still think
that the politicians should actually decide on what the common rules of engage-
ment are, including national caveats. And they should send those rules of
engagement, in whatever form and for whatever coalition, to the force commander,
and he will have to disseminate that down. What I think is actually wrong, and what
sometimes happens, is if individual units get national rules of engagement that are
not coordinated at the top level—and which should be coordinated at the top level,
with the exceptions nations have to make, because otherwise the end will be total
confusion.
Vice Admiral Buck, Canada:
I’d just like to make a comment on the ROE discussion, and actually I have a ques-
tion for Admiral Porterfield. The ROE concept clearly is in the hands of our politi-
cal masters. However, I do not think [that] should abrogate our responsibilities to
advise our political masters on the implications of varied ROE on force command-
ers in the field. I would also—at a technical level, though—suggest that there is
something that we can do, because it is still true in various coalition opera-
tions—because the point that Admiral Klaver made that often there are ROEs ex-
tant in various units that the force commander is not aware of, is still true in various
coalition operations. There is absolute need to share at the force commander level
all of the ROEs, so that the force commander can make the appropriate opera-
tional decisions he needs to make.
My question, however, for Admiral Porterfield, is [about] your vision of the fu-
ture of technical interoperability, which by and large I absolutely agree with.
However, I noticed you had one particular observation which implied the need for
unlimited bandwidth. I believe fundamentally, not only does the United States
Navy clearly have challenges as we move forward in technical interoperability, but
all of your coalition partners, to a lesser or greater extent, have the same chal-
lenges. To assume that we can work on the basis that we will all require unlimited
bandwidth in the future, I would suggest, certainly from most nations’ perspec-
tive—my own included—is not realistic. So, I also suggest that there is a need that
we collectively take an approach to assess the true needs of bandwidth and to work
from a premise that there will not be unlimited bandwidth, because it is just not
there; because to a lesser or greater extent, we all will have to work within the re-
sources available to us, and they will not—either fiscal or bandwidth—be unlimited.
I think if we are working forward on the premise that we will all need unlimited
bandwidth, we will not be able to get there. I would be interested to hear a response
to that.
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Rear Admiral Porterfield, United States:
Admiral, I could not agree more with you. My boss, Admiral Clark, stated it very
clearly in his remarks about physical realities and fiscal discipline. One consider-
ation, though, in that comment was whether you could use the Internet as part of
your unlimited coalition architecture, with the proper commercially available front
ends: the laptops, for instance, to use the Internet and public key encryptions. You
could do a great service to come-as-you-are coalitions that may form.
I would tell you that I used to work in the Pacific command and was very actively
involved in the operations and the planning for the operations in East Timor. This
was certainly a coalition of nations that came together for a specific reason that
we really had not planned for, and so we were looking for a way of establishing
an architecture that would allow command and control and, to some degree, intel-
ligence information to be shared among that coalition. That is principally what I
was talking about, but you are absolutely right about the realities of our bandwidth
constraints.
Brigadier General Daria Alzben, Jordan:
My question is to Admiral de Donno, please. You mentioned on force protection,
the importance of respecting a host nation’s culture. If you could please elaborate
on that a little bit more, if you may. Thank you.
Admiral de Donno, Italy:
As I said, the problem of force protection is a problem related to the need to assure
the survivability of the assets and the personnel, whether they are ashore or in ser-
vice aboard the ship. So, in the many aspects that must be taken into consideration
by the tactical commander in providing direction and the application of a certain
number of initiatives, certainly the geographical and social environment in which it
is, at that point, must also be taken into consideration, because we will know that in
different locations, there are different ways to consider a certain kind of behavior.
So a certain type of behavior which in a part of the world means a certain thing, in
another part of the world can be offensive and can be considered in a completely
different way. Therefore, of the many aspects that a commanding officer at the tac-
tical level has to take into consideration when he is providing all the directions to
the forces on how to defend themselves or how to assure their survivability in a par-
ticular situation, one thing that cannot be left without consideration is the fact of
the geographical and social environment in which the particular situation is taking
place. This is what I was saying. The same behavior cannot always be standardized
in every place in the world, because, as I said, some things in different places can
produce different reactions. So it is very, very important, because also a favorable
and good relationship with the social environment is something that can help very
much in assuring force protection. This was what I meant.
[Two-hour break in the discussion for the delegates’ luncheon, followed by the
address by Admiral Collins, U.S. Coast Guard.]
Rear Admiral Porterfield, United States:
Thank you very much, and welcome back, everybody; this is the concluding thirty
minutes of our Panel One discussion on maritime coalitions. It is interesting that we
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all probably hear things at a different level, depending on what your job or experi-
ence is. I clearly heard that people in my business need to get busy, because it seems
that intelligence and information—especially the sharing of that information—will
be critical to our future endeavors together, whether they be in coalitions or as a
unilateral force, but much more effectively as coalition partners.
From an intelligence professional’s perspective, we often talk about ISR only in
the sharing or the collection of that information, but I would like to suggest that it
also means collaboration in the analysis of the information. There are many differ-
ent organizations in your navies and in your nations that can certainly contribute
analysis of data to make our overall force much more effective. So, that said, please
recall that the rules are to use the microphone, state where you are from and to
which panel member you have a question or comment, and please keep your ques-
tions brief. We will take the first question or comment.
Admiral Dorn, United States:
I am the Pacific Fleet Commander, and I have a question for Admiral De Leon. Ad-
miral, you talked about the establishment of a regional maritime coordinating cen-
ter. I would be interested in your thoughts as to what role the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium may have in bringing that to fruition, and also if you think it might be
time to, perhaps, take our CARAT [Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training]
series of exercises in Southeast Asia and put a certain flavor in those exercises that
supports the problem that we are talking about this morning.
Vice Admiral De Leon, Philippines:
Thank you very much, Admiral, for the very interesting question. Actually, we are,
in the Philippines and, I would assume, even in that part of the world in ASEAN,
seeing how active the Western Pacific Naval Symposium has become in various co-
ordinated activities. To my mind, we would welcome the active participation of the
WPNS, so that we can jump-start the development of this regional maritime coordi-
nating center among our countries that are involved in that part of the world in
counter- and antiterrorism. Trying to phase in that particular activity will be very,
very interesting for the navies, because we are actually looking at, even in the inter-
national city limits with Malaysia, exchanging wardrooms with the Malaysian Navy.
And a CARAT would be a very, very good vehicle to be able to undertake
that—much more proactive. Thank you very much, sir.
Admiral Jonathan Band, United Kingdom:
I am UK Fleet Commander. On that issue of regional focus, it seems to me that if
one takes as one’s starting point that these are intelligence-led operations—or that
is the challenge—[and] therefore you must have regional engagement, there is
quite a good little model already present actually, down in Key West, which the
U.S., UK, Netherlands, French, and agencies use, not on the terrorist game, but on
the drugs war. That seems to offer a model, which I have certainly had clearer ex-
posure to in the last four or five years, which was really quite effective. Because it is
regionally based, it does get the national, local buy-in; and over time, then the in-
telligence agencies concerned actually start to trust themselves (which is not the
starting position of any intelligence agency, one has to be frankly fair about [that]).
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I think that sort of model there, which happens to be drugs, is one that I certainly
would promote in various regions of the world, because it seems to work. Of course,
the setup in Key West, also in a way politically, has the attraction that it is led by the
coast guard and not by the military, which may be attractive in parts of the world.
Vice Admiral De Leon, Philippines:
Basically that is the advantage of the WPNS; you will be able to access most of the
experience that is already available within the United States Navy. If you remember
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM–PHILIPPINES, the intelligence fusion that we tried
to undertake with the United States armed forces has helped us a lot in neutralizing
the local terrorist group that we have had in the Philippines.
Admiral Fallon, United States:
Fleet Forces Command in the Atlantic Fleet. If I could take us back to the issue of
rules of engagement—Admiral Klaver, maybe you might have an opinion, but it
seems to me that it is not the right thing to do, to push this off and say, well, it is a
political issue, just the politicians can deal with this. I think the ROE issue is funda-
mental to undertaking any coalition operations, and so I think it is our responsibil-
ity as uniformed people to get to the politicians, to approach them and to get them
engaged in this business. Admiral Klaver, any suggestions on how we might facili-
tate this? Are there things that we can do collectively that might expose our people,
our political leadership, to these issues so that they would have a better understand-
ing? Or do you see any other ways that we can engage collectively that might help
this problem?
Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:
Well, first of all, I fully agree with you that it is an operational commander’s issue.
And what I wanted to say when I said the politicians will always have the end respon-
sibility [is that], I think that will not change, but we, as operational commanders or
fleet commanders or whatever—we have to explain to them what it actually means.
I think that it is a bit of a shame that there are no exercises anymore. We used to
have the NATO Command Post exercise, where we actually drew governments in
and had them discussing things like rules of engagement. I think, on average, if we
could actually set up these sorts of exercises again, it will be very beneficial, because
quite often—or at least in my experience—politicians just do not want to be both-
ered until it is actually happening, and then they do not have a clue how it is actu-
ally working. But how can you actually attract the politicians to do that? I think what
has happened in Colorado Springs with the ministers of defense was a good start,
where they were actually being forced, more or less, by the Secretary-General (I am
talking NATO now, of course) to actually get engaged in these things. I hope that
they have been woken up there a bit, because they do not realize the issue and all
the implications. The only thing is, as I said, with commanders they have to table-
talk; they have to talk to these rules of engagement. The only thing is trying to set
up some form of synthetic exercise again—perhaps starting off with NATO again,
because that is actually how we used to do it, so why not try it again? I think that
would be very beneficial, but it is certainly something [on] which we, as operational
commanders, have to educate the politicians; I fully agree with that.
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Major Jones, Belize:
My question is for Admiral Klaver. During your presentation, sir, you had men-
tioned self-defense and the fact that it is an inherent right, both at the individual
and at the state level. I think we all can agree that it is in fact an inherent right. Re-
cently, we have seen the emergence of this concept of preemptive self-defense. I
was wondering if you would be so kind as to share with us your views on that concept
and how you see it influencing customary international law, future coalition opera-
tions, and, subsequently, rules of engagement?
Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:
I will try to take this question, I think. Self-defense, of course, is always the right of
an individual, of nations, of ships, et cetera, and that is why I said it is not actually
part of the rules of engagement. You always will retain the right of self-defense.
What is very important in the coalition is that you know how somebody else in an-
other nation, in another ship, in another unit will actually use the right of self-
defense, and that is where you get into interpretation by different nations. I am not
saying that we should all have exactly the same meaning of self-defense. That will
not happen, I think. But we must be absolutely sure what the reactions of somebody
else will be who is actually working with us. Whether preemptive self-defense is a
right thing or a wrong thing, it is something nations have to decide for themselves.
Whether it is legal? This is bringing me too far in the legal world, where I do not
want to go actually. I would like to stress again that rules of engagement are not just
a legal problem. It is an operational commander’s working tool, problem, or what-
ever you want to call it, so we do not leave that to the lawyers. But we have to leave
something to the lawyers, and I step out of the question.
Vice Admiral Hellemans, Belgium:
I have a question for Admiral De Leon with regard to C4I and exchange of informa-
tion. We have a lot of problems on exchange of information, because many differ-
ent departments are dealing with that. I am speaking in particular of Justice and
Foreign Affairs, in the ASEAN region. Do you have any particular arrangements
between the different departments, or do you have any problems on the exchange
of information?
Vice Admiral De Leon, Philippines:
In my local experience in the Philippines, what we have right now is what we term a
Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, and it involves identified cabi-
net ministers having regular, coordinated meetings. In my experience, it happens
once in two weeks. And as far as this Cabinet oversight committee and internal se-
curity are concerned, they are able to thresh out the questions and thresh out coor-
dination so that respective operating agencies are able to exchange information
very quickly. We still have yet to do that at the ASEAN level—and not necessarily
even ASEAN, but maybe with contiguous countries like the Philippines, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Brunei. We have a grouping of what we call BIMP (Brunei, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Philippines), where we try to develop common customs, immigration,
and quarantine procedures that would make it much easier for us to coordinate the
different agencies that are involved in CIQ, and this is done on a regular basis.
36 Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium
Colonel Joharie [from Brunei] would bear me out on this. Just last month there was
the lower-level meeting of the BIMP Conference, and we are making way, as far as
that particular coordination is concerned.
Admiral Vergara, Chile:
I am going to make my question in Spanish to Admiral Porterfield; please use your
translator. This was, I think, a technological surprise, and I am going to talk about
technology. [Translation.]
More than a question, but an observation: This morning we have spoken of the
strategic importance of maritime cooperation of naval forces. There is a fundamen-
tal aspect in bringing about that cooperation that should result from our meeting
here at Newport. In this sense, I am from a South American country, and I have the
impression that the leadership of powerful and developed forces speaks as though
there exists a unified block of interests. In the case of South America, we have much
in common, but we also have a distinct reality. There is, for example, the interest of
CONOSUL, an Atlantic reality, a Pacific reality, and a Caribbean reality. Firstly, to
speak of a Latin American reality is not easy. In this sense, the more we understand
that there are many realities, [the more we understand that the Latin American]
maritime reality is divided into three.
Rear Admiral Porterfield, United States:
Admiral, we totally agree. And, in fact, that is one of the principles that we find so
attractive about discussing coalitions, because there are many important contribu-
tions that smaller navies and coast guards can make to the greater whole, and this is
precisely what we would like to see. It is incumbent upon a coalition to bring all
members of the coalition into the information sharing. If it is, as I mentioned be-
fore, a coalition for a specific purpose that was quickly formed, perhaps you could
use commercially available laptops and software that is resident on those laptops,
through some kind of encryption device for security, and make it available to you by
using such things as the Internet. There needs to be an outreach to the smaller co-
alition members that have important roles to play in surveillance. But again, I know
that your country has some outstanding analysts, and we need to take advantage of
them. I think it was mentioned earlier that the training and establishment of tactics,
techniques, and procedures, which can be examined and rehearsed and perfected
in exercises such as UNITAS, would go a long way in the South American region to
make sure that if we had to call upon a coalition such as Admiral Band [of the
United Kingdom] was talking about, we would have already worked through some
of these things. But you make an excellent point.
I would like to share with the audience one of the problems that I face as a guy in
charge of naval intelligence in the United States [Figure 7].
Despite the coalitions that we form, my analysts want to write at the highest level,
which typically is not for release. And you find yourself in a constant battle with peo-
ple to understand the nature of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and
what they mean and therefore having to write their analysis and provide the infor-
mation at the beginning to the coalition members. So this is an intelligence policy
that I need to continue to work on, to make sure that we do not unnecessarily
shortchange the coalition. I also show some other languages, because I suspect that
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we all have this common issue, and we all have certain things that are held at the
unilateral, national level. But for me, we have to ensure that we write for release.
This is the policy that we talk about, so that we ensure that everybody has the com-
mon picture of the battlespace. This is so important, and it begins with training our
analysts and the people that are involved in the entire ISR process.
Vice Admiral Roughead, United States:
A question for General Al Mulla. As coalitions come together—and we have seen it
in various places around the world—in your opinion, what are the three most im-
portant areas to most rapidly address to bring the coalitions together most effi-
ciently and most quickly, as you form your coalition for operation?
Major General Al Mullah, Kuwait:
Thank you very much for this question. I think I would like to answer you by ex-
pressing some of my experience during the last IF operation. A very important
point to be really looked at is the connectivity of C4I to start with. It really begins
with the initiative of commanders to build up trustworthy relations with their coun-
terparts to start with. And this is really the [the fundamental basis for] all the prob-
lems that come along in later stages.
Let us talk about, first, the way we supported all the marines and army—transpor-
tation and support to bring them to the area of operation. Of course, we do not have
the huge command and control facilities within Kuwait to be able to conduct such co-
ordination between the forces that attended this operation. So what we did, we really
emphasized so much the liaison of such exchange. And from the Kuwait Navy, I can
tell you we had about sixty officers dispatched to several ships and units within
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Figure 7. Nondisclosure Notice
Kuwait and within the NOAG (the Northern Operation Area), so they could really
get this connectivity. Some of them were carrying our equipment with them, to make
sure that they could really provide secure communication through such operations.
At the end of the day, it was working out, and it was not only from Kuwait it could be
seen, but from U.S., UAE, Bahrain. So we had different material and different peo-
ple just being dispatched in various ships. We had to level it out in certain command
levels, as we had to make sure that we did not get mixed up between the staff and di-
rect command within the area of operation. This is a very important factor.
The other factor which is very important is the understanding of the culture that
is there, so people would really have this trust between them, so they can really get
them to exchange information, develop their thoughts—having as well, in some
cases, the need to transfer boats and people at sea for more analysis and discussion,
to get the right posture for everybody for what action is next to be taken. It all comes
to personnel, teamwork, and then the task that you are trying to accomplish.
Admiral Dumontet, France:
My question is to Admiral Klaver, about the ROEs in a joint framework. Today it is
very different to act at sea or ashore, or in air and space. How can we imagine hav-
ing the same approach on this issue in a joint framework for the ROE in an action
against terrorism, which is obviously a joint action?
Vice Admiral Klaver, Netherlands:
Well, generally speaking, I think we should have the same rules of engagement. As I
said in my presentation, there is a possibility for certain areas that you actually de-
sign the specific maritime rules of engagement—for instance, for boarding ships.
That is a good example. What I found—and I am talking about my experience over
the last three years in NATO—is that, if you have the same rules of engagement,
you will find that the interpretation by the land component commander and the
maritime component commander, and I think these are the two major distinctions,
are often quite big. The problem arises once you start sending marines ashore, that
you actually have to do this overlap type of thing. I found, surprisingly in NATO,
that there are still different interpretations of these rules of engagement. I found
that the only way to solve this rules of engagement problem is, beforehand—before
you start an operation, before you start an exercise—to talk together with the com-
manders and actually play a few situations where you have to use these rules of en-
gagement, so that you understand from each other how they would actually
interpret it. But even then, I found—and I am not talking about exercise type of
things—that we were having problems. I think it is more complicated; it is a bit of
the way the mindset works. Dare I say this in the situation where we are all very
joint, but we still find that it is not as smooth as it should go. It is certainly some-
thing we should work on, and it is recognized in NATO circles and it is being
worked on, but it is still not solved. I hope I answered your question.
Rear Admiral Porterfield, United States:
Okay, gentlemen, it is time. I want to thank my fellow panelists for your excellent
presentations and active participation in the dialogue, and I want to thank the audi-
ence also for making this a good opening panel for this Sixteenth ISS.
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4Luncheon Address:
Maritime Power for the Twenty-First Century
Admiral Thomas H. Collins
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
Rear Admiral Route, United States:
I f this morning is any indication of what this conference is going to be like, we arein for a real treat. I was very happy with the panel discussion this morning and
look forward to reconvening here this afternoon. Also, if the discussion at the table
is any indication, you are in for a real treat here with Admiral Collins, as we kick off
his speech after lunch. As you know, he is the Commandant of the United States
Coast Guard. He is a 1968 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy, where he later
served as a faculty member within the Humanities Department. His shipboard
tours have included service aboard the cutter Vigilant and command of the cutter
Cape Morgan. Ashore, he successfully completed leadership and command tours on
the Atlantic Coast and in Hawaii. From 1998 to 2000, he served as Commander, Pa-
cific Area in the Eleventh Coast Guard District, where he developed a successful
coast guard response to increased illegal drug and migrant smuggling traffic on the
Eastern Pacific. From 2000 to 2002 he served as the vice commandant, where he
spearheaded service-wide process improvement initiatives and directed system en-
hancements as a coast guard acquisition executive. He became the twenty-second
commandant in May 2002 and now heads the leading federal agency for maritime
homeland security. Securing the nation’s maritime border is nothing new for the
U.S. Coast Guard; they have been doing it since 1790. Admiral Collins has agreed
to take questions after he concludes his remarks, and I ask you to please join me in
welcoming Admiral Tom Collins.
Admiral Collins:
Thank you for that very, very kind welcome. Admiral Clark, fellow service chiefs,
distinguished guests and supporters of the Naval War College and this great sym-
posium, it is an incredible pleasure to be with you, to be able to address you at this
great setting, great venue, a college that is so richly steeped in naval tradition and
history and so highly regarded throughout the world for the significant contribu-
tions it makes to critical security thinking, strategic studies, and war gaming. It is
really one of those jewels, I think, in the navy’s crown.
I must also add that it is an honor for the United States Coast Guard to be with
you here at this symposium, and I thank Admiral Vern Clark for the opportunity to
address such a premier forum. It is a wonderful opportunity for us to discuss the
important issues concerning security and our collective security interests.
Earlier this morning, we heard from Admiral Clark. He began this event with his
keynote address and his thoughts on implementing a vision that suggests a power-
ful, forward-looking, collaborative-thinking, twenty-first-century view of naval power.
We are lucky in our nation to have Vern Clark continue on another couple of years
at the helm, and from my perspective in the coast guard, we are very, very fortunate
to have him as a partner, as I cannot think of a closer relationship between agencies
in our government than the coast guard and the navy [have], and I thank Vern
Clark a lot for that development. I would like to continue on Admiral Clark’s theme
of sea power, with some additional comments and insights of my own, and I think
they will dovetail very, very closely.
Environment and New Thinking
As many of you recall from your studies here, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s definition of sea
power rested upon the means needed to defeat organized military threats—nation-
state threats. From his seminal work, naval power was the key element in sea power.
Since classical times, the establishment and maintenance of naval power have been
the focus of most seagoing nations.
I propose today, in today’s security environment, that this classical view needs
some reshaping and some variation. As stressed by Admiral Clark and others in
Panel One today, the most dangerous threats of today, to all of our nations, are not
entirely traditional, state issues with organized armies and organized navies. The
threats that concern us most today are transnational issues—criminal organizations
undermining the very fabric of our societies; resource thieves stealing from the
greater good of all; environmental menaces, who would destroy the future of our
children; pirates, who would in certain parts of our oceans bring legitimate com-
merce to a halt; human traffickers, who reflect the worst in mankind; and, the most
dangerous of all, of course, as we have discussed: terrorists—religious extremist
terrorists, state-sponsored terrorists, narco-terrorists—unfortunately, all techni-
cally advanced and well armed. Increasingly, as underscored by Admiral Clark, the
seas are serving as the highways for this bewildering variety of transnational threats
and challenges that honor no traditional frontier. Many of these threats are con-
veyed in ways that are not effectively countered by naval forces. They look [like] and
mingle with legitimate commerce and recreational traffic. You cannot launch
cruise missiles or conduct air strikes against them. You must engage them—up
close and personal—to determine their intentions and sort the suspicious from the
innocent: a much different ballgame.
Now accordingly, in today’s and tomorrow’s world, I would suggest true sea
power must be a broader and more expansive concept than naval power alone. Sea
power in the twenty-first century is the ability of a nation to use the seas safely, se-
curely, fully, and wisely, to achieve national objectives. In this new security
environment, we need new thinking, new partnerships, and a new construct to pro-
vide the sea power we all want, to ensure the safety and freedom of the seas for all
and, clearly, the security of our respective nations. I suggest that today we need to
think about a broad complement to twenty-first-century naval power and to think
in the context of maritime power.
42 Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium
Twenty-first-century maritime power speaks to a nation’s needs beyond purely
military capabilities needed for war fighting. You have to include it, but you have to
think beyond it. It includes, for each of us, the use of the seas to preserve marine re-
sources, to ensure the safe transit and passage of cargoes and people on its waters,
to protect maritime borders from intrusion, to uphold its maritime sovereignty, to
rescue the distressed who ply the ocean in ships, and to prevent misuse of the
oceans. These are timeless national interests, which are more relevant than ever,
that collectively can be described as a nation’s maritime security and safety
interests.
In the United States, the tragic events of 9/11 have forced us to think anew about
the approach to maritime power in the context of maritime security. Prior to 9/11,
the United States was a fairly wide-open country. Our borders were relatively unen-
cumbered. International commerce moved freely, and our nation relied on superb
armed forces in the broad expanse of the oceans surrounding North America to
maintain our national security—or the perception of national security. But terror-
ists, as mentioned by Admiral Clark so well this morning, were able to use this free
flow of people, money, and products to strike at the very core of our nation, just as
they have at other countries in this world. In this new security environment, effec-
tive integration of both civil law enforcement authorities, private sector maritime
stakeholders’ knowledge and competencies, and military might have to be part of
the security solution. Accordingly, the United States Coast Guard, in extremely
close cooperation with the U.S. Navy, figures significantly in the maritime home-
land security component of our overall homeland security strategy.
Today, the United States Coast Guard’s unique capabilities help enhance home-
land security, protect critical infrastructures, safeguard our sovereignty, and
defend American citizens. The “power” inherent in these coast guard capabilities is
the key component of the nation’s overall maritime power. To maintain sea power,
the United States must be aware of and control what takes place in its own sovereign
waters and exercise influence in international waters of vital concern to the United
States interests, oftentimes working in an environment that can only be character-
ized as commercial maritime, with no clear enemy.
As a military, multimission maritime service with civil law enforcement and regu-
latory authorities, the United States Coast Guard operates in concert with, and I
think in great complement to, the United States Navy, other government agencies,
the private sector, and the international community, in the risk mitigation business
across the entire spectrum of homeland security.
What is going on here, I would suggest, is not revolutionary, but it is
transformational. Yes, the terrorist threat is new and dangerous. But the powerful
precursor asymmetric threats, such as drug and human traffickers and interna-
tional criminal organizations, have been evolving for decades. Concurrently, a
critical body of international law was put in place to deal with the broader issues of
maritime security. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea created new
maritime law and extended maritime jurisdiction that presented all nations with
new challenges. To exercise these challenges, maritime strategic thinking is chang-
ing, with today’s coast guards emerging as important national institutions with a
potential to make major contributions to regional order and security.
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Our Approach to Maritime Homeland Security
Today, maritime security in the United States is a concerted effort that encom-
passes more than just protecting the nation’s national interest against hostile
nations, clearly. It includes protection against terrorist attacks; protection of
our sovereign natural resources, environment, and the like. To reduce these risks
in this new security environment, it requires a special application, I think, of con-
certed, integrated maritime power at four major areas of emphasis: to (1) increase
our awareness of all activities and events in the maritime environment; (2) very
importantly, build and administer an effective maritime security regime both do-
mestically and internationally; (3) increase military and civil operational pres-
ence—persistent presence—in our ports and coastal zones and beyond, for a
layered security posture; and (4) improve our response posture in the event a
security incident does occur. To be successful here—to reduce vulnerabilities and
to mitigate risk—our navies and coast guards require the right mix of authorities,
capabilities, capacities, and partnerships.
Applying this strategy of maritime power collaboratively, in an integrated way,
to navies and coast guards and other maritime interests in the world is a powerful
notion. We heard it expressed again and again this morning, and I think before the
conference is over we will hear it many, many times more. We must leverage new
technologies and must obtain capability that provides coordinated, systematic,
fused intelligence that provides a detailed in-depth knowledge of the sea space.
In-depth knowledge of the sea space: for us, the key concept is something we have
labeled Maritime Domain Awareness [MDA].
From a risk-mitigation perspective, MDA is perhaps the highest return element
of our application of maritime power. Simply put, MDA is processing comprehen-
sive awareness of the vulnerabilities, threats, and all matters of interest on the
water. It means having extensive knowledge of geography, weather, position of
friendly vessels and potential threats, trends, key indicators, anomalies, intent, and
the activities of all vessels in an area of concern, including the innocent.
Maritime power is all about awareness, leveraging and synthesizing large
amounts of information and specific data from many disparate sources to gain
knowledge of the entire maritime [spectrum]. If knowledge is power, and MDA
provides us the requisite knowledge of the maritime, then MDA is the key to
maritime power. MDA, and the knowledge it will bring, will allow maritime
forces to respond with measured and appropriate force to meet any threat on,
below, or above the sea and, taken to an ultimate state, will provide the necessary
awareness to create “nonevents,” proactively preventing incidents, challenges, and
devastation.
Partnerships
In Panel Three of this symposium, I will talk in greater detail and specificity about
MDA and some of the “peace parts” that are included in this concept, but I
think this is the highest payoff ingredient, and I would not be surprised if we
see this dominate discussion in most of the panels. The second-highest payoff
of our strategy is the development, maintenance, and enhancement of security
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partnerships. Intergovernmental, public-private, regional, and international part-
nerships are absolutely essential if we are to enhance the security and safety of re-
spective nations and the world. We are dealing with international global systems.
They require an international approach—not only partnerships of nations, but
partnerships of navies and partnerships of coast guards, and commercial shipping
interests between and among all of us.
It is a much broader definition of coalition. It is a much broader definition of
partnership, and it is all about gaining the right ingredients, the right information
to be fully aware of the threats and vulnerabilities in our environment. What I am
talking about here is a new, expanded concept of jointness to fit with the concept of
maritime power, a new jointness model—jointness squared or cubed. I have been
stressing, here today, that existing threats require the effective integration of mili-
tary power and civil authority. To deal effectively with these threats, we must blend
our respective national elements of maritime military power and maritime civil au-
thority in a collaborative way nationally, between our navies and coast guards,
between our maritime administrations, between our transport ministries and mari-
time private-sector elements.
We need robust interconnectivity amongst these (we heard the interconnectivity
word a bunch of times this morning, and we will probably hear it some more in the
other panels)—real-time, protected communication across all involved agencies, to
enable us to share threat information and to coordinate both preventative and re-
sponsive measures; automated access to other agencies’ databases to allow for rapid
cross-checking of people, cargo, and vessels in the maritime domain.
We need robust interoperability, including:
• Units that can function seamlessly together, whether they are military units or
nonmilitary units in this action
• A common operation picture that all will hold, both civil and military
• And even coordinated acquisition processes, so that our hardware systems are
compatible.
I would like to think that the United States Navy and the United States Coast
Guard National Fleet Concept, which allows for joint interoperability, joint devel-
opment and management of our fleets across homeland defense and homeland
security continues as a possible model for the appropriate level of interoperability
among agencies.
Overall, we need an effective interagency strategy between our civil maritime
and naval authorities. In addition to traditional military responses, nations must
be able to provide coordinated solutions using law enforcement authorities that
often spread across several agencies in terms of our government and several
departments.
At the international level, an integrated approach among all international mari-
time partners can improve dramatically the security and safety of all nations and
protect their economies. Strong international regulations through the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization [IMO] and steadfast compliance efforts by all classifi-
cation societies will help harden individual ships from terrorist activity—programs
like the Proliferation Security Initiative and related, long-range ship-tracking and
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surveillance initiatives that are now underway in IMO. I will be in London in Novem-
ber turning up the flames on this issue in a robust way. But these programs and
surveillance initiatives will help reduce security risk in the risk-mitigation business.
Sharing of security, safety, commercial, and law enforcement information can cre-
ate this global Maritime Domain Awareness that allows nations to create layered,
multiagency, integrated maritime security defenses to combat the threats of terror-
ists and transnational criminals.
Partnerships begin or are reinforced in gatherings like this; they continue
through joint and combined training and education; through exercises, coopera-
tion, [and] operations; and through the development of joint systems. They
continue in other venues, such as the United Nations and, an organization in which
we have put incredible energy over the years, the International Maritime Organiza-
tion, where collaborative rule-making is significantly impacting the international
maritime security regime. As we gather here, in all of your nations, some of your
services, but more often other agencies of your government, are hard at work en-
forcing new standards that call for specific security plans for vessels, for ports, and
for port facilities. These internationally agreed-to protocols will have significant
and positive impact on each of your nations’ maritime security. The navies and
coast guards of the world must be intimately linked to these “civil authority” regula-
tory security initiatives.
Conclusion
Let me close today by again stressing that we are engaged in an “all hands” evolu-
tion. Today’s nontraditional, transnational, and unpredictable range of threats
that each of our countries faces demands teamwork, demands partnerships; and, as
Admiral Clark said this morning, we are going to win this thing only through part-
nerships. An integrated approach among all international maritime partners can
improve the safety and security of all our nations. Sharing of security, safety, com-
mercial, and law enforcement information can truly create Maritime Domain
Awareness that allows us to create that layered, multiagency, integrated approach.
An integrated approach is not a threat to sovereignty but should be viewed as a pos-
itive force that will help promote harmony and stabilization that meet the needs of
member navies and coast guard organizations.
Forums like this are an ideal way to begin and to further that partnership, and
once again I thank Admiral Clark for hosting this collaborative forum. I look for-
ward to the rest of the symposium and getting a chance to work with all of you not
only here in Newport, but also after our meetings when we have gone back to our
respective worlds of work. But when you do, think in the broadest terms about
jointness; think about a new construct for jointness that merges civil authority and
military authority in a powerful maritime coalition that was referred to this
morning.
Thanks very much for your attention, and I will be glad to answer a question or
two.
46 Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium
Discussion
Admiral Band, United Kingdom:
Are you convinced that we have got the shipowners and the cargo-owners on side
with this coalition of the willing? Because my experience is certainly, in a number of
areas of the world where my ships operate, that they, I don’t think, are on the side. I
think they drive past people they know are illegal; they do not report them, in a way
which would be inconceivable ashore. It would be inconceivable in the air. How do
we bring them on side?
Admiral Collins, United States:
Well, I think, again, [by] the international regulatory regime that is put in place.
Did you hear the question? It is the question, what about the shipowners, ship-
ping companies—can we rely on them to have a security culture, and a safety
culture, and do the things that they need to do to ensure the right goods are flow-
ing in the places they are supposed to. That is what the new regulatory
regime—the international regime, it is called[—addresses]. The International
Shipping Port Security Code [ISPS Code] that has been passed through IMO goes
into effect 1 July.
In the United States, we have passed a domestic regime that is similar, because
we could have had a heavy hand at the pen writing both. We have our own regula-
tory approach we have taken: trust but verify, to steal a phrase from the past. I think
what you need to have is a strong combination of what is referred to as port-state
control. Those port states, those states that are receiving foreign bottoms in their
ports, need to be very aggressive in their ports and holding people accountable. We
have been very successful in the safety and the environmental front. We initiated
something called the black list—you are going to be measured by your perfor-
mance. And we quarterly publish [the names of] classification societies, shipowners,
operators, and all the major players that had safety and environmental discrepan-
cies, and they were on the bad list. No one wanted to be on that list, by the way. And
we also publish a white list. Those were above standards. So, it is holding account-
ability—a wonderful word: to try to hold people accountable.
You can do that also with port-state control boarding. When ships come in 1
July, they are going to have to adhere to the new security regime, promulgated
through IMO. They are going to have a security certificate on board, issued by their
flag state, that says “We comply with all international standards.” We are going to
trust, but verify. We are going to board those vessels. We are going to meet with the
security officers. We are going to ask them about their security plan: do you just
have one on paper, or are you really practicing security on this ship? So, it is being
out there in a very, very aggressive way. On our own ships, we are reviewing and ap-
proving all the vessel security plans in the United States and all the port plans.
There are ten thousand vessel plans and five thousand facility plans that we will be
reviewing.
The other thing is a strong auditing mechanism. That has happened in the avia-
tion industry but has not happened in the maritime. That is the second thing that I
am pushing at IMO next month: to incorporate a strong, mandatory audit mecha-
nism on flag states, with sanctions. So a flag state has a responsibility of ensuring the
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right security protocols, the right safety protocols, and the right standards in its
shipping fleet. If it does not, it should be held accountable. We do not have a man-
datory audit mechanism, and we should have. That is another way to have
accountability in the system. So we have a number of accountabilities: at the
flag-state level, [through] international organizations, and through port-state con-
trol. I think those are the three ways to ensure accountability.
We have, for example, in our domestic legislation the Maritime Transportation
Security Act, passed in 2002, which mandated that we conduct foreign port security
assessment and that we go to other nations of the world, to their ports, with a secu-
rity team and audit their security protocols within their ports. If they do not adhere
to the international standards that everyone has agreed to, then we will put control
mechanisms in place, including denying entry into our country of any ship that de-
parts from that port that is not following the standard. So there is some huge
leverage here on driving a security culture through this international system, and
that is what we are all about: driving a security culture, security protocols, through
the port infrastructure to the vessel infrastructure to enhance security—and, oh, by
the way, [practice] MDA while you are doing this.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
How far do the new regulations talk about regulation on the high sea? Because
compared to the aviation industry, the seas are practically unregulated.
Admiral Collins, United States:
Right, I could not agree with you more. The question is, how about on the high
seas? What kind of accountability and regulatory scheme [is there] for ships on the
high seas, in that sort of Wild West [situation] you were describing, with less control
on the high sea?
Part of what we are able to get through the IMO is the short-range tracking re-
quirement. Ships have to broadcast a VHF-FM automatic identification system as
they are approaching the coast of any nation, and that is effective next July, work-
ing up through all ships to comply by next December. We have got, from a tracking
and surveillance perspective, a short-range answer, but we do not have the
long-range answer. Part of the control is having an MDA, a Maritime Domain
Awareness, relative to ship and long-range tracking. That is step number one, and
that is something that we are trying to drive through IMO next month, to be con-
sidered by their various committees that work through the next six months or
so—to ensure long-range tracking, mandatory long-range tracking, so we will have
position information and other information on all ships that are plying the ocean.
That is a step forward.
The other thing is having transparency. Shipping is one of the oldest businesses
in the world, and it is secretive. There are all kinds of crazy organizational net-
works, financial and otherwise, used by shipping companies. One of the things that
was built into the new code was to build in greater transparency on ships. So, every
ship, now effective in July, has to carry on the bridge what is called a synopsis re-
cord, which is a complete detailed history of owner, cargoes, where it has called, et
cetera—the whole history of that vessel. There are a number of things like that, that
build in greater visibility, greater transparency, and greater accountability. We are
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trying to control the port regime, the arrival regime, where the coastal regime comes
into it; and long-range tracking will fill in some of the void on the ocean voyage.
There is more to be done, but again, I think strong flag-state accountability is one
of the magic ingredients, and we are working hard on that.
Commander Sidney Innis, Jamaica:
Part of the problem with all these new regulations that are being enforced—and
they are absolutely needed—is the fiscal burden they place on small countries, like
most Caribbean countries, because you have to have controls in your country to en-
force these laws, and I think many of us are at a loss. Where is this money going to
come from? I think this is going to put a major gap in the architecture which is be-
ing developed. How do you, or anyone else here, see a way around this?
Admiral Collins, United States:
There is certainly a fiscal issue to this. Part of the regulation was identifying in the
United States, for domestic legislation, the billions of dollars that the private sector
would have to invest in the security apparatus. I think there are two important com-
ponents of this. It is not like the aviation scheme, where the government has funded
and underwritten a lot of the security mechanisms through the Transportation Se-
curity Administration and all the security regimes in airports—both bag checking,
people checking, and the overall security profile on the airport. That has been
up-front funded by the federal government. But if you have ever traveled through
our airports these days, take a look at your ticket. Compare it to a ticket of about two
and a half years ago. You will see immense charges in there, so the user of the sys-
tem is paying for it and also paying for security. The regulation that we rolled out
domestically that is consistent with the international regulation is having the pri-
vate sector underwrite the security for their facility. It is like Gordon England—who
is now Secretary of the Navy, and you will hear him tomorrow, but who was Deputy
Secretary of the new Department of Homeland Security—when he went out to Los
Angeles to talk about security in that metropolitan area. The question was, “Mr.
Secretary, how are you going to protect Disneyland, and what kind of security are
you going to provide for Disneyland?” He said, “I’m not going to provide any. That
is the fiscal fiduciary responsibility of the company, to provide that.” So the thrust
of our regulation is that the private sector has a responsibility to come to the table
and to underwrite security as a good business practice. If it is a level playing field,
the market should take that consideration; everyone is going to have to play in that
game. So our reliance is on the private sector.
You can also “incentivize” good behavior, by the way, in terms of how you deal
with cargoes, how you deal with containers, those that practice good security and
those that do not, in terms of how you deal with them in system. Our approach to
the maritime has been, in this present administration, that this is a private-sector
underwrite for the security requirements in a port facility, for example, and the re-
sponsibility of the corporate entity that oversees that facility. We, in turn, at the
federal level, will invest in security systems that will help augment in the crisis situa-
tion, i.e., greater presence in our ports, boats, ships, planes, people, inspectors, all
of which fall into the United States Coast Guard’s bailiwick. Our budget has gone
up in the last two years by 30 percent, and in people growth by 10 percent, to
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address that need. So, that is the investment from the government side, and the pri-
vate sector has to come forward to take care of their facilities, where they are
making business; that is the approach.
Admiral Johnson, United States:
I think you hit on it; but I think you were talking about the partnership between
military power and civil authority, but the most powerful tool that you have is the
tool in the marketplace, the market incentives here to get the private sector, the
shipping companies and what have you, in line. And so, to the extent that through
the IMO you can get nations to come aboard with agreed-upon regulations, I think
this is, with your white list and your black list, how you are going to be able to
achieve this. I don’t know what your expectations are at the IMO, and how willing it
is going to be and how much clout it has to go back to the nations?
Admiral Collins, United States:
I think we have got security squarely on the top agenda of IMO. I mean, just think:
you can count how many international protocols we have, comprehensive proto-
cols; there is not an exhaustive list. We have attained one of the most comprehen-
sive protocols in a number of years, and we did it in less than a year. We got a
hundred and eight nations to say: we sign up to this; we are going to enforce secu-
rity in our ports and security in our ships. That is pretty amazing, and that is un-
precedented, so that gives us a lot of cause for hope.
Have we solved everything? No. I think I mentioned the next thing to put on the
agenda is long-range tracking, get it sooner rather than later; and quite frankly my
expectation is that if we cannot get IMO to act fast enough on long-range tracking,
we will act unilaterally. That is how strongly we feel as a nation: we will act unilater-
ally. If you want to do business in the United States, you will comply with long-range
tracking—period. I think Congress wouldn’t take a lot of jawboning to act on that.
So we are going to push a multilateral approach, but we are going to be prepared to
go unilateral if we can’t get there.
The other strong thing is, again, flag-state accountability. There are two parts of
this equation to enforce good security, safety, environmental standards, and ships.
One is an accountable, proactive flag state that has a registry, such as number of
ships, that ensures a ship cannot get into its registry unless it is a quality ship, from
security, safety, and other perspectives. That is one approach: to have a mandatory
auditing scheme that requires them to do their job.
The other is a port-state control in which the receiving nation is aggressive. If
you go to Rotterdam, which I just visited, they are aggressive; they are into control.
They are into MDA, and Rotterdam has MDA. We are going to learn Rotterdam;
they have MDA. That is what it is all about: being at the strong, port-state control
posture, where there is nowhere to run and nowhere to hide. We are going to in-
clude it, as I said, in our mechanisms. We are going to go overseas with audit. The
United States is going to be auditing other nations so that they comply, so that
there is accountability in the system.
Part of the whole philosophy for our homeland security is a preemptive strategy.
It is very much the national security strategy: The best defense is a good offense.
The Global War on Terrorism is all about carrying it to them. Now, I would submit
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that homeland security is a very close parallel. You do not want to be thinking of
your border in a linear way—in other words, they come to your border, you inspect
them, and everything is hunky-dory. If that is the way you think, you have lost. You
cannot possibly physically screen, winnow, and determine threat at your border. By
that way, it is too late. I do not want to find a weapon of mass destruction in a tank
ship in Port Elizabeth. That is not where I want to find it. You have got to be pre-
emptive all the way up the supply chain with security measures. That is part of our
philosophy—certainly the philosophy of the Department of Homeland Security.
United States Customs, for example, is having container security teams all around
the mega-ports of the world, prescreening cargo before it comes to the United
States. That is a wide spectrum: push borders out, go up the supply chain, and un-
derstand the threat as early as you can. These are all accountability, protective
measures.
Admiral Dorn, United States:
I am the Pacific Fleet Commander. Enforcement would appear to be key-critical to
what you are talking about. I would just be interested in what effect enforcement of
these new regulations has had on your resources and on your manning of the U.S.
Coast Guard.
Admiral Collins, United States:
Great question! This sounds like a people-intensive endeavor, reviewing vessel se-
curity plans, doing inspections, control mechanisms, and so forth. We have 361
ports in the United States and ninety-five thousand miles of coastline, and the
United States Coast Guard is the size of the New York City Police Department. We
are about forty thousand uniformed and six thousand civilian personnel, and we
have not yet been resources for the implementation of the Maritime Transporta-
tion Security Act or the ISPS Code. The check is in the mail, supposedly in the ’05
budget. We have a bridging strategy that we are engaging in (like rearranging the
deck chairs on the Titanic, a little bit)—we are rearranging our base of resources.
We are drawing upon our selected reserve, the talented group of folks we will call
up in the reserve force, to help us. We will also use a blend of contractors as support
for screening of some of the security plans, and we are going to use that to get
through ’04. Like I said, we have been fortunate; our budget has gone up 30 per-
cent in two years. We have grown in head count by 10 percent. We have added addi-
tional ships, additional planes, and additional units. We have the things called
Maritime Safety and Security Teams, which are hundred-person units around the
country. So the light, I think, is at the end of the tunnel on it. Thanks for the ques-
tion. Thank you.
Admiral Clark, United States:
Tom, thank you. Well, Admiral, we are very grateful for your coming and being
part of this symposium this year. I would think that the takeaway might go some-
thing like this: When I listen to Tom Collins talk about all the things that are going
on in his world, it is instructional to me, and if I try to get a lead angle on what I am
going to have to be focusing on in the future, it is very important for me to know
what he is thinking. In some of your navies, you are not just integrated; if you are
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the navy chief, you are also the coast guard chief, and you own all of this responsi-
bility. In other nations, the coast guard is first and foremost, and then, second, it is
the navy, and you own these responsibilities. In other nations, you have, like we do,
a navy and you have a coast guard. In times past, it might have been “never the
twain shall meet” kind of discussions; those days are over. It is very clear to me that
the future for me is about operating in support of him, as he does, sometimes, in
support of me.
I think of it like this. In the last few years, I have realized how quickly you can
wear out an airplane looking for things. Any of you had that problem? I have these
wonderful airplanes called P3s. They want them for everything now; even the land
forces now want them. In fact, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM they flew almost exclu-
sively over land, for the first time in history. I am thinking about the tremendous
demand on this resource stream of mine, called overwater surveillance capability. I
think about the many times when I have been in an at-sea operation and here comes
a contact. First of all, an airplane got the contact on it, and he reported who it was,
and then we lost it in the system. Then we sent a ship off to go identify that contact:
who was that? And we spend more resources going over and identifying this same
platform that we found yesterday, and here they are again. And then a few hours
later, the watch turns, and we’ve lost identification on this unit again. So we have a
submarine over in that area, or somebody is there, and we go through this process
[again]. Now I know this probably does not happen in any of your navies.
The reality is, we talk today about forty thousand units being underway on the
world’s oceans. We talk about all these ports. We talk about the people. We talk
about the importance of international commerce to our own nations and what this
means to our own ability to sustain our economies and, thus, our own operations.
What is going to be required of us? It strikes me that the message here is very clear.
If you are a country—and your question, what does it mean for you in Jamaica and
how are you going to deal with the resource implications? I am sitting here asking
myself the same question: how am I going to deal with the resource implications
that are here? It drives home this issue to me. We cannot do this without partner-
ship. We cannot do this without partnership, and sometimes the partnerships we
are talking about are internal to our own governments in ways that we never clearly
understood before. And so I need to know what Tom Collins is thinking about. He
needs to know what Vern’s resource dreams look like. And we need to figure out
how we can put together systems that we can make work in an international domain
for the scheme of things in the future that will work for him, and for me, and for
you, and you, and you, and how we are going to do this. We talked about the
Internet this morning and things that can possibly be done, what the message is.
The challenge for the future is immense. You know we have an agreement here in
North America with Canada (where is Ron Buck?), called NORAD [North Ameri-
can Air Defense] System. I absolutely believe that the future on the global scale is
like a maritime NORAD; we cannot afford to be going and identifying a particular
unknown contact seven, eight, or ten times—or even twice. We need to be able to
conduct our operations in a smarter way than that. That sort of encapsulates Admi-
ral Collins’s address here today at lunch—encapsulates and gives us a sense of what
the future is about for us.
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I want to close with this thought and then go back to the symposium and to the
other building. You see, I am convinced that this is, as I said this morning, an in-
credible time in our history; I truly believe that. Let us just say that we are not even
talking about military matters at all, but that we are talking about something that is
vital to our nations: that is, the health of economies. Let us say that we stop right
there, and we are not talking about anything other than the health of economies. I
would like to suggest to a group like this that the importance of the institutions we
lead is going to multiply in the days and months ahead. I believe that the focus on
items maritime is going to grow immensely, given the circumstances that we find
ourselves in in the world today—[given] the willingness to use the kind of tools that
potential enemies have demonstrated that they are willing to use to attack econo-
mies and to gain advantage for the cause that they are supporting. [And I believe]
that for each of us, that means there is going to be a focus on our activity and what
we provide for our nations that is unlike anything we have seen in the time I have
been serving, and that is since 1968. I won’t go back too far; I am not sure that there
is value in that. What I am convinced of is that the future is about a world that has
much more focus on the kinds of capabilities we will be able to bring to bear and
that will focus on this key point first: How will it protect and sustain the economies
of our nations? Then the second-order steps are how you deal with enemies, [with]
those that are trying to impact the economies of our nations.
Well, we have much to do, and thank you for helping us set the stage for follow-on
discussions here. And, of course, we look forward to your involvement in sessions
again tomorrow. Ladies and gentlemen, it is time for us to move to the next venue.
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5Panel Discussion Two:
New Operational Challenges of
Maritime Security
Moderated by Rear Admiral Jan Eirik Finseth, Norway
Professor Lawrence Modisett, U.S. Naval War College, United States:
We can continue with our program. I am chairman of the Warfare Analysis andResearch Department at the Naval War College and the program coordinator
for the symposium. We now move on to our second panel. The title of this panel is
“New Operational Challenges of Maritime Security,” and our panel moderator is
Rear Admiral Jan Eirik Finseth, who is chief of staff of the Royal Norwegian Navy.
Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:
Thank you. Admiral Clark, President of the Naval War College, dear colleagues, we
on the panel are all honored and delighted to address a group of such distin-
guished officers as are gathered here today. Admiral Clark, I thank you for the invi-
tation; thank you for creating this excellent opportunity for professional
discussions, and, not least, I want to thank you for inviting us to beautiful Newport
and allowing us to socialize in such a scenic and maritime place.
I know how difficult it may be at the end of the day, with jet lag and after a deli-
cious meal, to follow lectures and listen to discussions; but you will be an active part
of the debate, after approximately fifty minutes’ time from now, and may I also
urge you all to actively challenge the panel with good comments and questions.
It is said that it is easier to control five hundred sailors than four officers. Coinci-
dentally, the panel consists of four distinguished officers, whom I will try to guide
through upcoming comments and questions from the audience and comments also
within the panel itself. They are Vice Admiral Buck from Canada, Rear Admiral
Tay from Singapore, Vice Admiral Ya’ari from Israel, Admiral Vergara from Chile,
and myself. As an introduction to the debate, we will now each give a short, ten-minute
lead-in—and may I underline that questions and comments from the floor will fol-
low after all five speakers have finished. We now start with Vice Admiral Buck, who
will talk about the maritime interception. Admiral, the floor is yours.
Vice Admiral Buck, Canada:
Thank you, Admiral. Admiral Clark, Admiral Route, colleagues, it is a great plea-
sure to address this Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium on the subject of
emerging new operational challenges and, specifically, coalition maritime inter-
ception or interdiction operations. We all have been active participants in naval op-
erations since the First Gulf War, but this has been especially true during both
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. I believe that each
and every nation has learned very significant national lessons in this area, but we, as
members in the coalition, as we have been discussing this morning, must heed these
lessons collectively if we are able to deal with future threats, effectively building on
the strengths of each of our navies and nations.
By way of background, this is but just an example, over the last few years, of a
number of emerging coalitions of the like-minded in the Middle East area [Figure 1].
What is significant about this slide is that virtually every navy, in some form or an-
other, in this room has been involved at some point in doing a series of different
missions and different operations. Because maritime interdiction is often looked at
as a specific, today-warfare area—which indeed it might be, but it very often is not
alone in the activities that any coalition is performing at that time.
As you can see on this slide [Figure 2], this is but a snapshot in time that was
taken up to the end of June of this year [2003], where, in fact, there was a specific
coalition of forces, and in the various boxes, differing activities were occurring
throughout.
Put in words, this is another way of [showing] examples of some of the roles that
my navy—but not just my navy, each and every navy—was performing at the same
time in the area [Figure 3]. You would often transition from one operation into an-
other; and, particularly interesting at the time, transition from maritime
interdiction to leadership interdiction was but one example.
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Year Units Deployed Operation Partners Mission
1998–
2001
5 FFH OP
AUGMENTATION
US CVBG Integration—
Arabian Gulf—
Enforcement UNSCRs
Oct
2001
1 DDG/3 FFH/
1 AOR
1 CTG and Staff
OEF 11 UNSCRs IRAQ
MIO/LIO
2002 2 DDG/8 FFH/
2 AOR
2 CTG and Staff
OEF 15+
8
nations
UNSCRs IRAQ MIO/LIO
Force Sector Cdr—GOO
2003 1 DDG/5 FFH/1
AOR
1 CTG Staff
OEF during OIF 11
7
nations
MIO/LIO
CTF 151—
GOO/SAG/CAG Cdr
Figure 1. Recent Operations
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Figure 2. Theatre of Operations
Figure 3. Canadian Roles in Theatre
Now, focusing more sharply on maritime interception operation, I believe we
have spoken a lot this morning about the elements of interoperability. We tend,
however, often to focus on the pure technical aspects. But there is much more, as
this slide [Figure 4] goes to show.
One of the key points, I think, in addition to all of the other issues that come into
play, whether it be complementary doctrine—and I do not just mean U.S. and
NATO, et cetera—is the ability of our highly trained sailors. They can make virtu-
ally anything work, if we set them free to do so. Two other things are mutual
experience and mutual understanding, which are often facilitated, as was men-
tioned this morning, by the presence of liaison officers. My navy has found it very
effective throughout ENDURING FREEDOM to have liaison officers both in carrier bat-
tle groups and ashore in various headquarters, and I would commend that to us all.
There is, however, of course, the technical piece in C4I, which is a major piece
[Figure 5]. We had some significant discussion about that this morning, but I would
suggest it is not just an issue for the allies; it is also an issue for the United States Navy,
whether it is the bandwidth issue that I raised earlier [or] whether it is a releasability
issue. The fact of the matter is, for us collectively to work with the USN, there must be
an effort on the USN’s part to make sure that we can actually have that access.
Battle force e-mail [BFEM] is in use and is quite effective today, but I would sub-
mit to each and every one of you that from a U.S. perspective, battle force e-mail is
the lowest common denominator, and it is a system that the USN does not use for
war fighting. It is an incremental system the USN has to populate to feed us. It is
good, but it is not the full answer.
I would just note the last point on this slide about some navies—I use my own as
an example, but it could be any other navy, actually—could, in fact, in some cases
perform the role of a gateway into the United States Navy for some coalition part-
ners, who might not have as great a spectrum of capability to do that.
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Figure 4. Elements of Interoperability
Now, nations joining a coalition need, each and individually, to strive to have the
ability to achieve tactical exchange of information, while ensuring that that infor-
mation is as real-time as possible [Figure 6]. These are some of the tools that are
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Figure 5. C4I Issues
Figure 6. COWAN & BFEM
currently in use, and Admiral Porterfield touched on some of these this morning. A
coalition-wide area network can be done using a commercial satellite, battle force
e-mail, obviously, and on it goes, but all of these types of systems and data need to
be available in our ships to get the picture and to do the job.
We have also talked a fair bit this morning on rules of engagement. Here is a par-
ticular snapshot [Figure 7] of some of the key challenges experienced in the area of
rules of engagement through ENDURING FREEDOM. As can be seen from this slide,
there is a tremendous variance in the rules of engagement that individuals bring to
the table. As a minimum, they need to be clear to the operational commander, but
we all take the point that, where possible, we must also try and influence our na-
tional leaders in each country to ensure that there is as much synergy,
commonality, and complementariness as possible in this particular area, because it
hugely complicates the operational- and tactical-level commanders’ jobs.
Now, in terms of boarding operations per se, we do not live in a benign world
anymore, where, in fact, every vessel is going to willingly stop and be boarded [Fig-
ure 8]. There are the two extremes, where in fact it is a fully compliant boarding, of
course, to where it is a fully opposed boarding; but there is, in the middle, this area
of noncompliance, where vessels make it difficult to be boarded, by often passive
means or, in fact, just noncooperation. Those are a challenge to us all and require
very significant training, both at the boarding party level and, indeed, in the ship
coordination level. It is a level far beyond that which we were doing previously, but
it is not a level necessarily that is reserved to Special Operations.
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Figure 7. Differing Nations’ ROE:
Within Coalition This Created Challenges for TFC/CTGs
Coming back to technical interoperability, real-time information on what is hap-
pening when you are attempting an interception and a boarding operation is essential,
so that the information the tactical-level commander has makes sure that he is apply-
ing the right tools to do the job and is safely executing the operation [Figure 9].
Of course, that means, from a boarding-team perspective, they must be highly
trained [Figure 10]. With all due respect to the Canadian Commissioner of the
Coast Guard here [Commissioner John L. Adams], there is great debate in my
country about who can do boardings, but the truth of the matter is, to do boardings
efficiently and effectively requires significant, ongoing training. It is not something
that can be learned quickly or then put aside for a while.
Lessons Learned
• Netcentric warfare concept
º Not standardized across coalition spectrum
º Establish baseline capability
• Make ROE as consistent or complementary as possible
• Provide as common as possible doctrine training and procedures
• Continue to develop common MIO–naval boarding doctrine and procedures.
Some of the lessons learned, I believe, are in the area that you see here on this
slide, and I would suggest as we move to the future in our area of coalition and
like-minded nations that these are four issues we need to seriously ponder and fo-
cus upon, because, in fact, if we are to succeed collectively it must be upon the basis
of our mutual strengths.
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Figure 8. Challenges of Boardings
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Figure 9. Modern Boarding Operations—Keys to Success
Figure 10. Very Highly Trained Boarding Teams
Conclusion
What to Prepare For and Bring to a Coalition Task Force
• Mutual training opportunities (JTFEXs) [Joint Task Force Exercises]
• Mutual experiences/relationships
• Ability to exchange information
• Effective MIO capability
• As common as possible ROE.
In conclusion, then, what do we need to do to prepare for the future and to bring
our strengths to the coalition task force table? We need to identify mutual training
opportunities. We need mutual experiences and relationships. We must under-
stand each other, trust each other—we touched on this continuously today—and we
must have the ability to exchange information, and, of course, coming back to the
issue of ROE, which we have heard a lot about, as common a set as possible. Mr.
Chairman, thank you for your indulgence, and on that note, I will close and hope to
take questions later. Thank you.
Rear Admiral Tay, Singapore:
Thank you. Admiral Vern Clark, distinguished delegates of the various navies and
coast guards that are represented here, I would like to first express my appreciation
to Admiral Clark and the U.S. Navy for your very warm hospitality in hosting this
Sixteenth ISS and for this opportunity to make some remarks on the subject of
antipiracy.
Maritime piracy is as old as maritime commerce. Across the world, a few hun-
dred cases of piracy are reported each year. Exact statistics vary, but according to
data from the International Maritime Bureau, there were 370 incidents reported
last year, and about 230 cases have thus far been reported for the year 2003. Be-
sides the cost to global maritime commerce due to losses of personal valuables and
cargo, maritime piracy also poses a threat to the safety of navigation, the environ-
ment, and even to human life. This is particularly so in the narrower channels of the
world, such as those found in Southeast Asia. In the Malacca and Singapore Straits,
650 ships pass through those waters daily, half of them being major ships: the
LCCs, LNG, LPG, chemical tankers, or large container ships. There are also nu-
merous passenger cruise liners and ferries that transit these waters. The danger of
piracy attacks, resulting in the accidental grounding or collision of such ships, is
clear, not to mention the consequent environmental damage and the threat to hu-
man life. This could come about when ships being attacked are left unattended for
periods of time, because the crews are either being held down while the crime is
taking place or bogged down trying to resist the pirate attacks.
Ironically, technological advances today result in smaller crews on very large
merchant ships, making them more vulnerable to attacks, since the smaller crew
may find it harder to keep a good lookout on its deck and maintain sustained vigi-
lance or to fend off attackers. Also, in an effort to reduce the risk of pirate attacks,
some ship captains may well be tempted to charge through pirate-infested areas,
inevitably predisposing the ships to collisions or groundings, especially in waters
where there are narrow stretches and dense shipping traffic.
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What, perhaps, is of greater concern these days is the thin line that separates pi-
racy from maritime terrorism. Analysts have postulated scenarios of a packed cruise
ship being rammed by small craft laden with explosives, or LNG tankers being hi-
jacked and crashed into densely populated ports. The methods used by pirates or
terrorists are strikingly similar—using small boats to intercept significant vessels,
or boarding merchant ships for the purpose of carrying out their criminal intent.
But the impact of pirate or terrorist actions could be very different.
Challenges
• Large legitimate small-boat presence.
• Traffic density.
• Difficult to compile coherent radar picture.
• Pirates choose time, place, and target.
• Antipiracy measures are resource intensive.
• Pirates exploit resource constraints of policing agencies.
One of the challenges in tackling piracy is that numerous small boats legiti-
mately operate in littoral waters, providing an ideal cover for pirate operations.
Sometimes local folks even decide to help themselves to the opportunities to make
a quick buck. Compiling a coherent sea-situation picture of these shipping straits
and understanding small-craft movements and their operating patterns are, there-
fore, a resource-intensive affair, requiring much effort. Even if we can have a radar
picture of the coastal waters, identifying the many small contacts from the mass of
radar echoes, seeking out the potential pirate craft for closer monitoring, is a
daunting task. The recent IMO efforts to get ships and small craft equipped with
transponders so that they can be identified and checked would help to clarify the
sea picture.
Another challenge in tackling the piracy problem is that the initiative is on the
side of the perpetrators, who have the liberty to choose the time, place, and target
for their attacks. Meeting this challenge requires significant maritime resources,
such as surface ships, maritime air patrol assets, trained personnel, good intelli-
gence, and so on. For many littoral countries, such resource demands can only be
partially met, given the myriad of tasks which navies, security, and government
agencies are charged with, such as safeguarding the extensive territorial waters,
EEZ protection, as well as deployments to fulfill training requirements.
The resulting prioritization of assets for deployment often means that piracy in-
cidents merely move away from areas of intense policing to those where security is
reduced. Ironically, the best place to tackle piracy is ashore, in terms of prevention
through law enforcement action or in addressing social issues like poverty, to re-
duce the lure of piracy as a livelihood.
Countries recognize the piracy problem, and they have done much to try and
tackle it, either working unilaterally or cooperatively with one another. Within
many countries, intelligence[-based] sea cooperation has also been the approach
taken, especially post 9/11, in the face of the increased maritime terrorist threat.
Such international and interagency attention is crucial, given the transnational and
similar nature of piracy and maritime terrorism.
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For example, Singapore has taken a very proactive stance toward ensuring secu-
rity in the Singapore Strait. Our maritime security agencies, namely the Maritime
and Port Authority [MPA], Police Coast Guard [PCG], and the Republic of Singa-
pore Navy [RSN], work closely in an integrated manner to maintain a tight
surveillance of Singapore’s port waters and the Strait. The MPA’s Port Operations
Control Center manages the Vessel Traffic Information System [VTIS], which cov-
ers the Singapore Straits. It regularly communicates with ships transmitting
through Singapore’s VTIS sectors, checking on their onboard situation, providing
them with updates of the piracy threat situation, as well as reminding them to keep
piracy watches. In fact, even the small act of ships providing timely reports on acts
of piracy against them at some point of the passage can help in reducing the occur-
rence of more incidents. The MPA can quickly send out a broadcast about threats to
ships. The PCG and RSN conduct patrols in the Singapore Straits and maintain a
strong and regular presence there.
There are also several bilateral efforts between the navies and police forces of
countries in Southeast Asia to combat piracy in the Malacca Straits and in the South
China Sea. For example, Indonesia and Singapore have a coordinated patrol ar-
rangement called INDOSIN Coordinated Patrols [ISCP] in the Singapore Straits,
which was started in 1992. This has proven to be very effective, for the number of
incidents of piracy in the ISCP area of operations has been reduced to zero since its
inception. I am sure that there are many other similar examples of coordinated pa-
trols in other parts of the world where there is an incidence of piracy.
There has also been a range of other multilateral efforts to combat piracy. Two
years ago, Japan initiated the development of a framework for regional coopera-
tion among the fifteen countries of South and East Asia, called the Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Anti Piracy in Asia [ReCAAP]. This multilateral effort is
aimed to forge cooperation in a few areas, such as the exchange of information re-
lating to piracy and armed robbery against ships, research and best practices, and
the strengthening of the capacity of national agencies to tackle piracy.
Other ReCAAP discussions are still ongoing. The potential benefits of such an
initiative are clear, not only as it will improve the quality of information exchanged,
but because it would involve the various enforcement agencies to also pave the way
for the multiagency and multinational cooperation to deal with a problem that is
transnational in nature.
Another set of efforts is that initiated by the International Maritime Organiza-
tion [IMO]. Since 1998, IMO has organized a series of expert missions and
seminars around the world to discuss the prevention and suppression of piracy
and armed robbery in ships. In December 2002, the IMO also initiated the Interna-
tional Shipment Port Security Code [ISPS], which will come into force on the first of
July next year. This calls for both port and ship security measures to be increased.
Lastly, to deal with the post-9/11 maritime security situation, some of the ISPS
core requirements for ships include the appointment and training of ship security
officers, and the development of ship security assessments and ship security plans,
as well as the installation of ship security alert systems. These measures would en-
hance security levels on merchant ships, thereby contributing to the ability to guard
against the piracy threat.
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At sea, some of the measures that some in the Maritime Committee have already
taken have proven to be effective in preventing piracies. These measures include
antipiracy watches, lighting of the deck, or running fire hoses to deter boarding, as
well as involving the use of technological devices, such as installing closed-circuit
cameras or checking devices, on the ships themselves. There have been a number
of cases where such self-protective measures have successfully thwarted piracy at-
tempts. For example, on 18 August 2003, pirates in three boats attempted to board
the container ship Gisiang 2, which was under way in the Malacca Strait. However,
the ship’s antipiracy watch crew detected the attempt, activated the fire hoses, in-
creased speed, and took evasive maneuvers, and shook off the pirates after a while.
On 29 August, in the South China Sea, six armed pirates attempted to board the
bulk carrier Vitali from the stern but were deterred after the antipiracy watch
alerted the rest of the crew to muster astern.
Some authors have romanticized piracy in their writings. The reality is that there
is nothing noble about this menace to the freedom and safety of navigation and
maritime commerce. Piracy continues to thrive, partly because there are many op-
erational and other challenges that make piracy difficult to tackle, let alone to
totally eradicate. But act we must. Especially when a distinction between the pirate
and the maritime terrorist is extremely fine on the ground, and because they both
do not respect any functional or territorial boundaries, there is an even greater im-
petus for us to maintain our continuous vigilance and work together more
effectively to deal with this scourge of the seas. Thank you.
Vice Admiral Ya’ari, Israel:
Good afternoon. Admiral Clark, co-officers, I was asked to speak about port secu-
rity, and my first thought was, there goes yet another tautology, just as Admiral de
Donno mentioned in his last remark. For us, port is security: port is home; port is
shelter; port is rest. Well, apparently, not anymore.
Now, most of what I had to say was said much better by Admiral Tom Collins
during the lunchtime, so I had to improvise and maneuver in order to not bore you
to death. I will try to develop the argument that Tom was trying to make so elo-
quently, this time through the microvantage point, if you like. Think about the
following scenario.
A container full of explosives with a GPS-controlled fuse and a false manifest—say,
used machine spare parts—can be prepared in Somalia, shipped to Khartoum, then
sent, say, to Singapore, change carrier to Rotterdam, and continue its journey until
its final destination, either in Europe, in America, or the Middle East. As of now, at
no point along this deadly odyssey does there exist any effective mechanism to alert
us of the coming catastrophe. That is how bad it is.
Or another one: a ship carrying a toxic substance, or say a gas tanker, can be
taken over by some crew—to make the case even more difficult—practically any-
where around the globe, be driven to a port of choice, and detonated there. How
much of that can be prevented?
I would try to take this to threat motives, as a means for gauging port security ex-
posure. It is just one vantage point, but it might be illuminating to look at it from
the microlevel. Now, generally speaking, there is, of course, nothing new about
threats to ports and harbor in wartime. The fortification of one’s harbors for
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wartime is a centuries-old concept for navies throughout history. To this very day,
actually, we invest heavily in it, from air defense and antiair down to missiles and
frogmen, and with everything in between.
Yet the wartime harbor defense paradigm will not do. It consists of means de-
ployed against enemy forces, assuming very few ambiguities: you know an enemy
when you see one; it is, by and large, anybody who is not one of ours. In peacetime,
a harbor defense system is designed essentially as a hibernating system, built to be
awakened with full strength only during the short outbreaks of war. In short, what
we have now is hardly what is needed to confront international terrorism, and this is
definitely not the way to stop either that container or the ship.
So the challenge at hand is to devise an effective defense system for ports and
harbors against [the] terror of mass destruction, and, indeed, it is a task of gigantic
proportion, as was very clear from this afternoon’s address by the Commandant of
the U.S. Coast Guard. But we do have to start somewhere. So let me leave out the
question of guarding the port perimeter on land as too trivial for this forum, and
try to look at where the main exposure, the main and critical exposure, is.
A 9/11-style operation, an airborne one, definitely can be intercepted using our
wartime systems. Generally speaking—and this again was something that was men-
tioned already—the numerous attacks on airways brought the flight security
regime to a much higher level than we have at sea. So, basically, a no-fly zone for
ports’ airspace, with varying degrees of active reaction, can be established. Re-
sponse policy is indeed an issue here, but at least we do have a reliable answer here,
whenever we wish to use it. In fact, these measures are already at work for some mil-
itary ports and, in principal, can be extended for all ports with not too many
difficulties. Our pushing of seaways practices in a similar direction is a little bit
more difficult. Yet I would say that it is definitely doable. It will probably require us
to establish gated sea areas in harbor entrances to help isolate potential penetra-
tion attempts. What is done, practically, now for customs purposes can be extended
to cover security angles as well. For that, port authorities will have to be aware in ad-
vance of every detail concerning personnel and cargo, for each and every vessel,
and provide for controlled crossing into the harbor. To be effective, however, this
monitoring regime must span over the entire globe and include all segments of ci-
vilian shipping, commercial and pleasure. I regret to say that at the present state of
affairs, even with full international cooperation and under the most optimistic as-
sumptions, we cannot hope to do better than we currently do on drug smuggling or
illegal immigration. Let us be frank about it: that is not good enough. And that is to
put it as simply as possible.
The main area of exposure for port security is the fact that we know much too lit-
tle about who enters our harbors and what they carry with them. Where should we
begin? I think we can start by following these two key questions, having the stan-
dards already in place and flight security as our reference. First off, we should do
much better in terms of monitoring who enters our harbors. For example, no air-
plane can take off and fly without asking the permission or drawing the attention of
some air controller. Yet, for most seaports, small-boat trafficking within the harbor
water is permitted and free for all. If you are serious about it, I see no choice but to
adopt air traffic standards in this case as well. An option for a terror attack like the
one against USS Cole, for example, would certainly be much less easy. Second, and
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as mentioned already, we need to regard port entrances as fully fledged gates. We
need to develop a system capable of performing effective security clearing of any
vessel entering these gates. We do not do this today effectively enough.
Ship crew and passenger monitoring is another issue. This area is indeed a much
bigger problem. Generally speaking, I think the closer we get to flight passenger
screening standards, the better, but that is not good enough. It is monitoring the
multinational crews of vessels around the globe which is the real problem and the
really tough challenge, and this is also where the more serious vulnerability lies. We
must develop a system that is redefined and come up with a completely new form
for a ship ID. It has to include a full and comprehensive profile of the vessel, with all
the required data about the crew, the company, the port entry history, et cetera.
Again, Admiral Collins was much better in portraying what we need here, but let
me tell you from my own experience that most of the past interceptions were based
on indications that popped up from this type of information. Now, what is essential
about the system is that it must be able to respond to the continuous, real-time in-
quiry and should be an ongoing, netcentric process that actually monitors and
reports positions, crew members, cargo, et cetera, et cetera. The critical asset and
the necessary condition for this is a true multinational and multidisciplinary intelli-
gence effort to create the required, relevant database. Some of us are already jointly
working to make it operationally available, but it requires all of us to join in if you
want to be effective.
Now, the other question, as to what they are carrying, is probably more critical.
Intercepting the container is much more difficult than stopping the ship. Here no
such indications can help, for there are no indications to begin with. It is one of tens
of millions that move around the globe every day. Basically, I think we have two op-
tions here.
The first one again, already mentioned, is international cooperation in and re-
sponsibility for container shipping. The IMO’s last decisions are certainly moving
in the right direction, but it has still a long way to go, and, indeed, eventually states
will have to be held responsible for the cargo they send and ship. It is a prerequisite
for a new security regime at sea. However, I submit to you that, in order to make
this happen, we must have technology that enables us essentially to see through any
existing packaging.
Now, the current bottlenecks of huge screening machines through which hun-
dreds of containers should pass every day will not do; it just will not work. What we
need is a much lighter and simpler solution, something that can be carried on
board and put on the piers and give us an instant picture of what is inside of the
container, visual and chemical. Technology must enable us to have shipping com-
panies and vessel skippers as a continuous part of the screening process. They have
the container in their possession longer than anybody else, and if you want their co-
operation, we should give them the means to clear it, because eventually they, too,
will have to be held accountable for what they are carrying.
Regarding the question that was raised about resources, let me say that, in my
opinion, states should collaborate in developing the technology. The private sec-
tors will have to pay the rest, but if we give them the technology, that is one of the
incentives that can bring us partners, who are now, as mentioned in the lunchtime
address, still a little bit dubious as to their incentive.
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Finally, let me say that in the current situation in port security, as in any other is-
sue concerning what we do against international terrorism, it is very, very hard to
differentiate between the military aspects and the civilian ones. We simply cannot
leave it to coast guards and police. That is my echo to Tom Collins’s request. From
our standpoint, we simply cannot leave it to them and stay afloat—and so here I am,
a naval officer, talking about containers and commercial shipping, port clearance
procedures, and so on and so forth. Believe me, before September 11, you would
probably wonder what did I have to drink last night. But that is where we are criti-
cally exposed and unprepared. It is not a case of breaching the system; there is no
system as yet. If you want this process to be systematic and professional, rather than
a jerky, evolutionary process driven by traumas, we had better hurry. Thank you
very much.
Admiral Vergara, Chile:
Admiral Vern Clark, ladies and gentlemen, I am honored to present to such a dis-
tinguished audience the new operational challenges of the maritime security, fo-
cusing on controlling contraband and within the framework of what we have called
“The Three Vectors of Maritime Strategy of the Chilean Navy.”
My apologies to switch now into Spanish, but my English skills are not at the level
of this esteemed audience. So, please, if you want, use your headphones. Thanks.
[Translation.]
Globalization and economic interdependence have facilitated new threats to
arise. States have been urged to accept the new scenario of globalization and its
consequences, but at the same time, they have had to incorporate new mechanisms
of protection to counter those threats, due to the permeability of frontiers. Within
these threats, we will focus on contraband at sea.
Armed forces, with police forces and other governmental agencies, such as cus-
toms, have been obliged to create internal interoperability, mainly because the
criminal and terrorist organizations have increased their offensive and lethal capa-
bilities. This situation urges us to review our current governmental infrastructure
and adapt doctrines and procedures in order to establish sound and effective
grounds for internal cooperation and interoperability, as well as with other navies
and international agencies.
Thus, at the end of this presentation, I will explain to you the Chilean case, and
consequently the Three-Vector Maritime Strategy, designed as a means through
which the Chilean Navy is planning to solve such a diversity of threats. Now I will
refer to new threats and their neutralization.
It is a fact that new threats or new versions of old threats have emerged. These
threats have affected all states, regardless of their defense potential. The new
threats mentioned above are as follows:
• Terrorism
• Contraband, within which we must mention illegal traffic of drugs, conven-
tional weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and illegal goods
• Traffic in any kind of persons, which includes worker-slaves, uncontrolled im-
migrations, and prostitution
• Piracy
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• Armed political action, with its version of rural guerrillas and urban terrorism
• Finally, environmental destruction, with its respective pollution, and illegal or
irresponsible exploitation of renewable and nonrenewable natural resources.
For countries highly dependent on maritime communications, such as Chile,
this is a relevant problem. From a maritime point of view, the neutralization of
these threats requires the coordinated participation of means provided by different
forces and governmental agencies, such as:
• Naval assets
• Coast Guard assets
• Maritime authorities
• Port authorities
• Customs
• Police
• Counterdrug agencies and others.
We establish, particularly in the contraband case, a double interoperability: inter-
nal and international.
Now I will review some aspects related to internal interoperability, which is the
capability to operate in a coordinated way among Chilean state agencies. What has
been explained so far requires from the state a capability to neutralize the near
threats in the national sphere and, thus, prevent effects on an international scale.
In order to accomplish this responsibility, the states have armed forces and police
forces trained to operate where their interests demand it. In the case of the Chilean
Navy, the maritime authority has the faculty to enforce law within its jurisdiction,
and its staff becomes law enforcement personnel.
This system, which promotes the strict control of the state in relation to the
sphere of competence of each force, can fail when the criminal’s technical capabili-
ties or weaponry overcome those of the police force or other governmental
agencies. A way to settle this problem is to differentiate the forces, not by their or-
ganic dependence, but through the capabilities of the groups against whom they
are fighting. To do this, it is proposed to apply the concept of “equivalent military
capability,” which means that if a criminal threat has enough capability to chal-
lenge a police force and other governmental agencies and eventually defeat them,
it becomes a military threat. On the contrary, when that threat can be controlled by
the police systems or other agencies, it is treated just as a criminal threat.
Conveying this situation into the maritime sphere, the struggle against the new
threats at sea—among these, contraband—is a problem of coordination and inter-
action between maritime authority and naval forces. Applying the concept
mentioned above, the struggle will be under the control of one or other force, ac-
cording to the threat intensity. In Chile this has been solved by our constitution and
laws, where it is said that the maritime authority—which is responsive to a particu-
lar law—is inserted into the navy. This significantly facilitates the solution of the
problem.
As I have already said, when the threat goes beyond the state’s frontiers, and if it
is convenient, one can resort to the neutralization capabilities of other friendly
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states. To do this, interoperability is required between the forces and the agencies
involved, both national and international.
Now I will convey this general concept into the reality of the Chilean case. The
state of Chile uses all its naval assets to accomplish its mission, within the maritime
areas of responsibility. In order to operate in coastal and interior waters, the mar-
itime authority uses helicopters, patrol boats, and small vessels. The assets which
are employed in the exclusive economic zone and high seas are provided by the
fleet. This mechanism of defense is particularly efficient in the control of contra-
band by sea.
In this frame, one of the first barriers that allows us to detect vessels which do not
comply with the security provisions stipulated by international conventions is the
inspection of vessels by the respective port state control, in addition to the timely
and effective information delivered by port and channel pilots to the maritime au-
thority. The slide shows some statistics to this respect.
Port State Control: Actions Performed by the Port State Control during the
Inspection of Vessels in 2002
• 1,531 foreign vessels called at port
• 906 foreign vessels subject to inspection
• 750 foreign vessels inspected
• 366 vessels with deficiencies rectified
• 52 detained vessels.
The Code for Shipping and Port Facilities Protection will be enforced as from
July 2004, which means the implementation of twelve stations with the automatic
ship identification system installed in different ports of our country. This method
will accelerate the reconnaissance of the ships according to their characteristics and
activities.
The following list presents statistics related to vessel-port interface protection
and the struggle against drug traffic.
Control of Contraband at Sea (Drugs)
• Actions performed during 2000
º 6,750 man hours in 139 rummages
• Actions performed during 2001
º 6,930 man hours in 145 rummages
• Actions performed during 2002
º 6,376 man hours in 105 rummages
º 8.9 tons of cocaine seized.
It is worth mentioning that since the year 2000 up to now, nearly 9 tons of cocaine
in Chilean ports has been seized. These activities are usually performed in coordi-
nation with customs and police services.
From a strategic perspective to face global threats, the Chilean Navy has de-
signed what we have called the Three-Vector Maritime Strategy [Figure 11].
Now I will briefly review its fundamentals. Sea power fulfills military, diplomatic,
and socioeconomic functions:
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• Its military function comprises activities such as sea control, projection, and
coastal defense. To carry these out, it acts in combination with the other ser-
vices of the Chilean National Defense.
• The diplomatic function of sea power is reflected by deterrence activities, na-
val presence, and crisis management, acting in a combined as well as a joint
environment.
• Finally, the socioeconomic function of sea power embraces activities of secu-
rity, surveillance, control, and development, being executed in a cooperative
environment.
Those three functions of sea power, acting in a combined, joint, and cooperative
way, conform to what has been called the Three-Vector Maritime Strategy. As seen
before, the three mission areas of our navy correspond to the three strategic vec-
tors, all of which relate in a way to sea control, against all the threats, including
contraband.
• First, the defense vector, which acts in conjunction with the other services of
the Chilean armed forces and is employed to safeguard our sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
• Secondly, the maritime vector, which operates with other national organiza-
tions, such as customs, police, and so forth. This vector accounts for protection
and promotion of national maritime interests within, which includes the con-
trolling of contraband.
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Figure 11. Seapower Functions (Chilean Defense Policy)
• And lastly, the international vector, which acts in conjunction with other
friendly countries, generally under a United Nations authority, and operates
in support of the state’s foreign policy.
The defense vector accounts for national security. It is deterrent and is based on
joint action. It comprises specialized means, such as submarines, fast patrol boats,
and coastal defense. Furthermore, it shares with other vectors the marine amphibi-
ous forces and the fleet.
The international vector has the mission of international security. It is based on
combined action and acts by presence. It includes peace operations, international
naval exercises, and humanitarian assistance operations. In an overlapping zone
between both vectors, defense and international, the fleet and the marine and am-
phibious forces are included.
The maritime vector is based on the principle of human security: it is against
pollution and defends maritime interests, acting through cooperative action and
law enforcement. This vector plays the main role in the neutralization of contra-
band through coastal patrol vessels. Other means, such as off-shore patrol
vessels [OPVs], whose normal use goes directly to safeguard maritime interests,
include the control of contraband, which is out of the scope of coastal forces.
They can also operate internationally, given their blue-ocean capability, with
other friendly nations and, if needed, be incorporated into the fleet as escorts in
the defense vector.
As you can see in this chart [Figure 12], the surface combat elements of the fleet
are present in the three vectors of our maritime strategy, being the core of our
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Figure 12. The Three Vectors of Chilean Maritime Strategy
naval assets, and represent the last stand in the struggle against contraband. For
this reason, and given the average old age of the current platforms, my main con-
cern as commander in chief is to promote their urgent renewal.
Conclusions
1. We are facing new operational challenges to maritime security, in terms of
new threats, among them controlling contraband. We face a difficult chal-
lenge in the neutralization of these new threats, within which we highlight the
control of contraband, because the enemy has a large adaptation capacity, fi-
nancial resources availability, and the flexibility that globalization gives.
2. Combating the new threats requires appropriate national management that
will affect positively the international environment. To effectively neutralize
these threats, we must have first a nationwide management capability, with
the purpose to prevent their effects [from] expanding to the international
level.
3. We have to be able to interoperate, not only with national but also with inter-
national naval forces, coast guards, police, and other civilian agencies. We
have to be able to cooperate not only with other naval forces, but also with
maritime security forces and civilian agencies of different types, either from
their own country or other states, observing the interests and laws of each
country, developing common doctrines and procedures that will allow an effi-
cient internal and international interoperability.
The Chilean Navy’s Three-Vector Maritime Strategy is a tool that satisfies the
national interests to deal with contraband and other new threats. We think that in
the Chilean case we are providing, with our Three-Vector Maritime Strategy, ele-
ments to support, in an efficient and effective way, the control of these and other
new threats that globalization imposes on us. All this is to contribute to safe shipping,
clean waters, and capabilities against unlawful activities. All these must give a better
level of global security for the development and welfare of peoples. Thank you.
Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:
Thank you. The moderator is breaking all rules and regulations here, so after I
have given you a short, ten-minute lead-in about humanitarian assistance, nation-
building, and peacekeeping, we will go directly to a thirty-minute break.
The World Order of Today
The Cold War provided a cover for much of the domestic unrest and hatred in the
world. It held a kind of umbrella over domestic and intrastate conflict. You might
say it was a period of high threat and high stability. The new world is, in many
ways, more open and democratic, but its character has changed to low threat and
high instability. Military force and statecraft have always been intertwined in for-
eign policy, but never have the principles for their choice been so much in debate
as today.
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As of September 2003, the number of so-called significant armed conflicts in the
world was twenty-three.1 While the number of low-intensity conflicts or domestic
disturbance is far higher, some research establishments and NGOs [non-
governmental organizations] report as many as three hundred ongoing conflicts.2
Political leaders around the world are acknowledging that intervention into these
conflicts is necessary, although the means of intervention remain debated from
time to time. We have seen that the collective conscience of the international com-
munity has been awakened when people are suffering, as we did in the Balkan
conflict. The sense of moral obligation to help is perhaps the noblest case for inter-
vention policies. The realist school of international relations may suggest another
rationale for intervention into conflicts. Here the mathematics is simple. People
that are well fed, well educated, and live in stable states or democracies are less
likely to become terrorists. On the contrary, positive development in one country
or region will have positive extended effects on economical growth in other coun-
tries. Thus, there is a self-interest in intervention, including humanitarian
assistance, nation-building, and peacekeeping.
The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically over the years. Some key
statistics are:
Increasingly wars are fought in precisely those countries that can least afford
them [Figure 13]. Of more than 150 major conflicts since the Second World War,
130 have been fought in the worlds of developing countries. Since the 1950s, more
wars have started than have stopped. Some nations have experienced ongoing wars
for more than thirty years.
Civilian fatalities [as a percentage of total fatalities] in wartime climbed from 5
percent at the turn of the century, to 15 percent during World War I, to 65 percent
by the end of World War II, to more than 90 percent in the wars of the 1990s [Fig-
ure 14].
The global case load of refugees and displaced persons is growing at alarming
speed [Figure 15]. The number of refugees from armed conflicts worldwide in-
creased from 2.4 million in 1974 to more than 20 million today, including a
growing number of internally displaced persons. Women and children make up an
estimated 80 percent of displaced populations. Even humanitarian activities that
were once safe from attack are now treated as legitimate military objectives. Relief
convoys, health clinics, and feeding centers have all become targets.
The mobility of ethnic, cultural, and religious conflicts is a direct effect of ongo-
ing globalization. So is an increasing interstate and interregional economical
dependability. The only answer to this is a reinforced multinational cooperation.
We need to work together to solve future crises, because the crises themselves see
no borders. All in all, it seems more and more likely that our navies will be involved
in intervention operations of all kinds, all over the world. It is likely that a growing
part of this will be humanitarian assistance and peace support operations. For that
reason, I believe the topic of this discussion to be highly relevant.
The utilization of naval forces in operations other than war is nothing new.
UN-led peacekeeping operations number fifty-five since the establishment of the
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1. Center for Defense Information.
2. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [UNTSO] in the Middle East in
1948.3 We have seen navies involved in embargo operations like SHARP GUARD in
the Adriatic. Fleet forces have been used to aid the distribution of food and relief
supplies, like in Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia in 1992. In 1998, the U.S.
Navy was involved in a massive sealift operation to bring humanitarian relief to the
victims of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. As we know,
some 75 percent of the world’s population lives in the vicinity of the coastlines. Any
large-scale movement of personnel, equipment, or goods in the world today must
be transported on keel.
The Strengths and Weaknesses of Sea Power
Naval forces are, above all, recognized for readiness, flexibility, mobility, poise, and
self-sustainment. These are ground characteristics for response to many types of
situations. Navies are highly relevant political tools. Naval forces are trained in
command, control, and coordination. This is a valuable competence in a variety of
situations. Furthermore, we carry with us complication structures, intelligence, and
large lift capabilities. We often have the strategic plans to mobilize necessary re-
sources and the general ability to act in a crisis environment, or even in humanitar-
ian disasters.
To be a bit more specific, allow me to point out some examples of the type of op-
erations we are talking about:
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Figure 13. Wars Are Fought in Countries That Can Least Afford Them
3. The UNTSO was established in 1948 to oversee the truce between Israel and neighboring states of
Lebanon and Syria.
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Figure 14. Civilian Fatalities Are Increasing
Figure 15. Number of Refugees and Displaced Persons Is Growing
• Within humanitarian assistance, the characteristics of maritime forces can be
utilized for crisis management, evacuation, and transport, et cetera.
• For peacekeeping, navies can help normalize the situation in an area of un-
rest. A maritime contribution may be or can be transport to the area, logistic
support, surveillance, and control of shipping.
• In maritime diplomacy, our forces can, by their presence, signalize the will
and ability in a number of dimensions. This includes exercises, demonstra-
tions, port visits.
Some NGOs and aid organizations have raised important questions [about] the
increase in military interventions in various crises. Deploying military forces to aid
humanitarian victims or solve internal conflicts may raise important ethical and le-
gal issues. There is, of course, a thin line—or should we say a gray zone—between
politically motivated actions and humanitarian assistance. We have seen refugee
camps turned into military targets because military forces ran them. The NGOs
working closely with NATO in Serbia argued that their ability to work effectively was
severely curtailed. These are important issues that have to be addressed before any
deployment. We know the importance of a well-defined mission, with a clear objec-
tive and end state, when we involve our units. We owe our commanders and sailors
clear and robust mandates. The ethical ambiguities of humanitarian interventions
are more of a political question than a military one. However, if they are not prop-
erly resolved ahead of deployments, the consequences are ours to cope with.
The Road Ahead
One thing is certain: these kinds of operations are with us to stay. Isn’t it obvious,
then, that the changes in use of naval power will have to affect the way we organize,
equip, educate, and train our forces? Perhaps the inherent capabilities of our fleets
are enough and will enable us to answer the future call for all kinds of conven-
tional operations. In discussions at home and abroad, I have sensed a general
skepticism toward allocation of training resources in this direction. Some may say
that our always-limited resources should be utilized in training and exercising com-
bat missions alone.
I think this in many ways is wrong. I am a firm believer in the principle “train as
you fight; fight as you train.” Operations that include an interface between naval
forces and civilian authorities, NGOs, aid workers, et cetera, create other chal-
lenges. Misled operations in a low-intensity conflict may escalate the situation. This
needs to be trained at all levels.
Conclusion
My conclusion to this short introduction is that military operations other than war
are likely to occupy naval forces also in the future. Committed as we are to transfor-
mation and operational effectiveness, we cannot ignore this development. Peace
support, nation-building, and humanitarian assistance have a natural place in our
education, training, and force generation programs.
Thank you.
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Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:
We are very excited up here and waiting for a lot of comments and questions, so
please go on.
Admiral Dorn, United States:
I am the Pacific Fleet Commander, and I would like to direct a comment or actually
get some discussion from Admiral Buck, to go back and pursue some of your
thoughts on interoperability. We have made a commitment to CENTREX, to
COAN, and all of the deploying battle groups now go out not only COAN-
equipped, CENTREX-equipped, but we also work them up during their JTFEX.
We are making a large commitment right now, next month, with the JMSDF and
the annual X exercise, to really help bring them along in the same interoperability
area. I would like to go back and just kind of pursue your thoughts, sir, and see if
you had any additional thoughts on interoperability that would be helpful or that
we could discuss.
Vice Admiral Buck, Canada:
Thank you, Admiral Dorn; I do, actually. There is a number of areas, I think, where
you need to focus. Not all nations, of course, can avail themselves of participating in
the USJTFEX, but for those that can and have the opportunity to do that, we cer-
tainly find that is a very, very valuable training ground, both in terms of procedural
and doctrinal issues ensuring commonality. The emphasis that a number of nations
have made on COAN, now called CENTREX, is hugely effective and, I think,
points the way where other partners actually could participate much more fully, in a
technical connectivity perspective. And again, speaking from my own navy as an ex-
ample, while we do use access to both NATO satellite systems, and to an extent
USN satellite systems, by and large the bulk of our bandwidth, which is currently
128K, is actually using commercial satellite systems. We buy bandwidth. We do not
do dialup; we buy pipes, and it works very effectively. So there are commercial ca-
pabilities out there that you can apply to military encryption capability that actually
can help very significantly in the bandwidth issue, the transfer of information area.
One of the areas that we touched upon, of course, as well is access to information,
and the right information at the right time. There are a number of issues in this
area, and I think Admiral Porterfield started to touch on it this morning when he
put a slide up on the screen, because the U.S. to a certain extent, from a national
security perspective, approaches security somewhat, I think, differently than
many of our other nations do. A blank sheet of paper, because it does not have
REL-something on it, is in fact not releasable, whereas I think most of us work the
other schema, where if it does not say it is not releasable, we will release it. And that
is with full understanding that there is information that is unique to each nation.
That may sound like a small thing, but in some mindsets, that is a huge thing in
terms of getting the right information around.
The other area that I would also suggest is that we focused on the connectivity of
a specific mission. I was talking about maritime interdiction, but each of us does
have capabilities that we can bring. If I could just focus for a moment on the
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excellent work being done by the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, in the
context of operations in the Gulf–North Arabian Sea, in terms of assisting other na-
tions, in terms of provision of fuel, and certain things like that. Those are very, very
important to the coalition activity, and I think, as we look internal to ourselves,
there are areas like that that we could collectively do much better at. I threw up a
slide, when I was speaking, about the significant differences in the ROE, and we dis-
cussed this extensively, but if you look closely at where the major variances are,
some of them, yes, are driven by political decision; some of them are driven by, in
some cases, constitutional issues; but many of them are actually driven by training
issues and procedural issues inside our navies. I think there are areas there where
we could actually, ourselves, make it significantly better.
Finally, relating to the Middle East Theater of Operations, there is an effort by
an NAVCENT to leave in place a coalition, coordination capability, on an ongoing
basis, and similar discussions have actually been held in the Pacific. And that is very,
very important, because if there is a framework that is there, you do not have to
start from scratch every time. That, in many ways, is one of our problems. Every
time we have come together, we have [had] to build it from the ground up. So estab-
lishing some skeletons, some framework, some architectures, I think, also has a
significant role to play, because the good news is, we are getting better. We just
need to keep improving and moving the yardsticks. Thank you.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
When we look at the new operational challenges for maritime security and we talk
about interception, policy, security, port security, contraband, whatever—when
you talk to people in government, they seem to have taken on a notion that they are
the only jobs that exist. And with the notion of technology, as it applies to navies,
there seems to be a growing perception that the high-end, war-fighting capability is
becoming less necessary, because these are the sorts of things that we do. I do not
deny that all of those things are part of the broad spectrum, but does anybody on
the panel have any experience with that sort of effect from those who hold the dol-
lars in their hand? And what sort of arguments have you used to counter that sort of
thing, if you have found it?
Vice Admiral Buck, Canada:
Not wishing to be the only speaker, but I do have a bit of experience with govern-
ments who tend to have that view: my own. The interesting thing, I believe, is, we in
Canada will shortly go through a change of leader, and ultimately we will go into a
defense review, but the telling thing is not what the politicians want, but it is what
the public wants, what society wants. It is very clear in the Canadian context that Ca-
nadians now understand they need an armed force. They expect it to be used, and
they understand that there is a cost to using it. They also understand that they need
to put some money into it and, indeed, that they have to provide the upper-end ca-
pability in the context of ensuring that you do not put sailors, soldiers, and airmen
at undue risk.
In our own case, I often articulate our needs to ensure that whatever capability
we have relates to the direct threat to Canada, which is—all of you would under-
stand—there is no direct military threat to Canada; but that being said, there are
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some significant asymmetric threats. For example, theater missile defense: we need
a capability to deal with that, not just in deployed theaters, but in theaters closer to
home. So I believe you need to make articulations around some of those areas. Each
nation is different, very clearly, but I have found that being able to key on what your
public now perceives, in explaining to government why we need various things, is in
fact a slightly easier sell. Thank you.
Admiral Vergara, Chile: [Speaking Spanish]
Admiral Finseth, Norway:
Hang on for a second. I think there’s something wrong here with the interpreta-
tion. Is that okay now? [No;] while we wait for things to be sorted out, [a comment]
from the back, please?
Unidentified Speaker:
I think one of the key messages that we need to deliver is that you fight the war that
there is, not the wars that are not out there, and right now this is the war that you
have to fight. The investment that needs to be put into it is an investment, the way I
look at it, that eventually will be useful for other purposes as well. Sensors, commu-
nications, intelligence systems are flexible assets, and the fact that we are now pre-
paring and adapting to a certain threat, a new one, does not mean that this will
prevent us later on to adapt back to war fighting, whatever it is going to be. This is
an evolving process and a changing world, and it just might be that this is the type
of war that we will have to fight in the next few decades. But I do not think this is the
real issue; I think politicians do understand that the threats that we are facing now
are not the less serious than the ones that are connected to war fighting of the old
type. It is just the same war, but different in many, many ways, and I do not think
this is the real problem here. The real problem is that we have not been focused
enough in requirements, in the sense that we make logic to politicians and to bud-
getary czars—that is the problem, in my view.
Admiral Vergara, Chile:
I want to complement the response of Vice Admiral Ritchie from Australia. We have
the same preoccupations in Chile. There are new threats that confound the roles.
These have led to the maritime armed forces taking a police role and, from these,
political developments in that these new threats may lead some to assume there is
no longer a necessity for naval forces and that we should change to what is primarily
a police force, but what rather would lead to a multifaceted force for the traditional
role of protection of national sovereignty, projection, humanitarian assistance, and
countering the new threats. I believe we have to develop, but not in roles—only in
policing.
Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:
Thank you. May I also give a short comment? There is a shift in the way small na-
vies, as it goes for my own navy, are run and structured, and that is politically de-
cided, so that we see a big change, actually, in all ways we are going to handle future
challenges. Weaponry, how we educate soldiers, how we educate sailors, and so
forth: there is a change happening now, also for small navies.
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Rear Admiral Tay, Singapore:
Maybe I should just add a couple of comments. I think after 9/11 many navies, in-
cluding the Singapore Navy, had to deal with two [sets of issues]. One is the conven-
tional war-fighting requirements and the other one being some security [postures]
we are talking about today. I think the stress put on us is to be able to do not one or
the other, but to do both. I think the resulting load is a lot on the people, and, of
course, on the operating budget as well, to meet those requirements. I guess gov-
ernments will also have to keep both in mind rather than just to cater to the more
prevalent threat for the immediate future. In terms of technology, I think a lot of
technologies can be used also for current security requirements, and I guess it is an
adjustment of where the money needs to be put, because investments in the tradi-
tional war-fighting [means] in communications or weapons can have the applica-
tions in dealing with [this new] level type of threats.
Major General Awitta, Kenya:
The security issue is crucial in the whole of Africa; it is one that provides for chal-
lenges that I am sure this symposium is good to address. The first one is terrorism.
The one I want maybe Rear Admiral Tay to address is the issue of piracy. In the
state of Somalia, where there is no central government, this threat now exists and
shifts, traversing the territorial water of Somalia, [which] gets pirated now and
again. Now my question is, what are the legal implications for, first of all, providing
security in a situation where the country concerned is a failed state? Is it the respon-
sibility of the United Nations or the states that are within that region? In other
words, can the states within that region provide for security or patrols within those
waters to address the piracy issue?
Rear Admiral Tay, Singapore:
Sorry; if you could repeat the question again?
Major General Awitta, Kenya:
The question I was asking is the [treatment] of piracy in a situation like Somalia,
which is a failed state and there is no government, but the nationals belong to vari-
ous warlords’ pirate ships, once in a while. Whose responsibility is it to provide for
security for ships traversing the waters of that state?
Rear Admiral Tay, Singapore:
I get the question, but I am not sure I have the answer to that! I guess when it comes
to piracy, I guess the message is that different agencies, various government, or the
owners of the ship have a part to play, as I have mentioned in my remarks. The lit-
toral states, I think, will take action. In a case of failed states, I guess it is a little
harder, but, nevertheless, for ships transiting through, [if] the ships them-
selves—the merchant ships—could take self-protective measures, that would help
in terms of deterring, in terms of increasing the level of protection against pirates. I
know in tomorrow’s seminar, there is a scenario that is set up that perhaps talks
about the situation. I think you may also be alluding to an international force or
something, so I guess in the [Seminar] Group Two, the one on piracy, there will be
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the issue of international forces dealing with this, and I think that may be another
time to address this sort of rights and obligations issue.
Admiral Vergara, Chile: [Translation.]
I would clarify one fundamental aspect of the neutralization of the threats and that
is the issue of national sovereignty. It seems to me that the first steps to neutralize
the threats, whether drugs or terrorism, are that countries have effective control of
their own national territory, that the police function in such a way to avoid internal
problems, that problems do not develop from third countries, and that problems
affecting international communities would include the United Nations.
Admiral de Donno, Italy:
From what we have said today, it seems to me there are two sets of problems related
with the new situation around the world. One is terrorism and war against terror-
ism, wherever it is formed and wherever it can be a menace for everybody. It is
something that is felt in an equal way from all the countries around the world, and it
is something that requires, as we have said, a lot of initiatives at the civil organiza-
tion level—particularly what the Commandant of the [U.S.] Coast Guard said
today—and problems for the defense of each country, and that goes to the organi-
zation of the ports or the defense of the territory against the possibility of having
such a type of situations.
Another set of problems are those related with what we have talked [about] this
afternoon, like piracy or specific problems of international illegality, if I can say,
which are characteristics of different places around the world and different regions.
So my question is, while the problem of the fight against the terrorist is certainly
something which involves all the navies as a military force, because they must be
ready to counter the terrorism even on the high seas far from our coasts, the prob-
lem of those other aspects could most probably [be] better faced by regional
organizations, which are capable of cooperating among them and trying to find the
best solution—probably with the support of the international community, but
reaching the best possible cooperative effort in terms of military and police organi-
zation in that specific area. [For example in those areas where the] problem of piracy
is principally concentrated: in the Malaccan Straits or, as it was said by our col-
league from Kenya, on the coast of the Horn of Africa, or Somalia, or whatever. For
instance, illegal immigration is a problem now strongly present in the Mediterra-
nean, and perhaps is the same in the Caribbean. So, all these are aspects that I
think cannot be countered with an international solution all over the world, be-
cause the first need is just, regionally, to reach the best cooperation possible, in
order to organize the force available to counter this. So what I want to ask is this: Do
you see that, in effect, these two aspects of the problem that we have discussed today
have to be faced in different ways, or can we face, at a global international level, all
the aspects of the new threats which have been described today?
Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:
Thank you. Just giving a short comment myself, I think what you are saying now is
actually two things, which have probably the same solution, in a way. It depends
where it is, where it happens: if it is regional, it is local, or if it is global. In my part of
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the world, if I may, we have managed to cope with problems like you are referring
to, either by creating coalitions of the willing, by using the UN, [or] by using other
institutions like NATO and the WEU, which has been reorganized, as you know. I
do not think that there are any defined and clear answers to the question, but I may
have other comments from the panel up here.
Vice Admiral Ya’ari, Israel:
The system of systems, in my view, should be focused on terrorism. There are sub-
systems that can be linked into it, but the main focus should be on the more danger-
ous threat that will require more effort. The tool that eventually will be at our hand
will enable solving some of the “secondary” ones, but if we optimize for the subsys-
tems, we will never come up with the systems that we need now for the real threat,
and the real threat is terrorism of mass destruction, and that is more serious than
anything else.
Captain Lambert, United Kingdom:
I have done a quick bit of research this afternoon from the Web into the IMO and
note that the chief concerns of the IMO are safety and prevention of pollution. The
Web site reports that, over the last twenty or thirty years, the IMO has been very
successful improving safety of shipping at sea and preventing all pollution. None of
the things that we have discussed during the course of the day appear in the Web
site of the IMO at the moment—terrorism, piracy, et cetera, et cetera. We are all
members of a global coalition, along the lines of the one that Admiral Clark and
Admiral Collins referred to in their keynote speeches, and that is the UN. I wonder
whether we ought to be reporting to our political masters that perhaps it is time to
expand the mandate of the UN and, through it, the IMO. Would the panel [have a]
view on that?
Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:
I think that is a very valid and good comment. We have a huge problem regarding
the area you are mentioning now, and close to my own border, we have a really
tough one to solve. Anyone have comments?
Admiral Vergara, Chile: [Translation.]
I would clarify one fundamental aspect of the neutralization of the threats, and that
is the issue of national sovereignty. It seems to me that the first step to neutralize
the threats (whatever, drugs, terrorism), that countries must have effective control
of their own national territory, that the police function in such a way as to avoid in-
ternal problems, that problems do not develop from third countries, that the prob-
lems avoid affecting international communities and would include the United
Nations.
Rear Admiral Finseth, Norway:
Thank you. That was Panel Discussion 2. Thank you to the audience for good ques-
tions and comments, and to the panelists for excellent answers.
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6Panel Discussion Three:
Maritime Coalitions at the Tactical Level
Moderated by Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, Australia
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
Thank you. Admiral Clark, colleagues, could I start by echoing the sentiments of
those who spoke yesterday and adding my thanks to Admiral Clark and to the Na-
val War College for the priceless opportunity to be at this particularly important
symposium. I think that, overall, the theme is not only topical, but it is essential to
the safety and the well-being of the countries that we have the privilege to repre-
sent. This morning is rather a long panel session; in fact, it takes us all the way
through until lunchtime. There will be a break from 9:45 to 10:15, and then we fin-
ish at 11:30. I am asked to remind you that when we eventually get to the business of
asking questions from the floor that you take the time to introduce yourself for the
purposes of the record later on. The speakers today are Admiral Karimullah from
Pakistan, Admiral Collins from the United States, Admiral Furusho from Japan,
Admiral Johnson from the United States, Vice Admiral Retief from South Africa,
Vice Admiral Godoy from Argentina, Admiral Krzyelewski from Poland, and, fi-
nally, myself. So there are eight speakers to get through before we get to questions.
In Australia the government in addressing the War on Terror has adopted a slogan,
and that slogan is: “Be alert, but not alarmed.” I would ask you this morning to be
alert, but not alarmed, because we are going to reverse the procedure at the end of
all this; we are going to ask you questions.
Could I ask Admiral Karimullah to lead off, please, by talking about enhanced
military readiness?
Admiral Karimullah, Pakistan:
Thank you. BSIM-ALLAH AR RAHMAAN AR RAHIM. [In the name of Allah, the
compassionate, the merciful.] Admiral Clark, Chief of the U.S. Navy, colleague del-
egates, gentlemen, good morning. At the outset, let me thank the CNO, U.S. Navy,
for arranging this symposium and inviting me, thus providing this excellent oppor-
tunity to associate and exchange talks and views with so many eminent civil and mil-
itary authorities who have distinguished themselves in maritime and naval affairs.
For me it is a singular honor to be back to my alma mater after a lapse of more than
a decade. The theme of the Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium, “Sea
Power for Peace, Prosperity, and Security,” is well suited to the present-day envi-
ronment. In these uncertain times, it is indeed appropriate to focus on the positive
and constructive elements of sea power, rather than its exploitative and coercive
use. Yesterday, we all had the pleasure of listening to a very inspiring and
thought-provoking keynote address by Admiral Clark. I must felicitate the CNO
for his candid and enlightening discourse. I must also thank the first two panels for
the in-depth presentation on maritime coalitions at the tactical level and new oper-
ational challenges for maritime security. These presentations have set the stage for
our panel to focus on the strategic value of maritime cooperation. My talk will pri-
marily cover the enhanced military readiness that is so essential for effective mari-
time cooperation. So, when I shall be referring to the term maritime cooperation in
my talk, it will primarily be in this context.
Gentlemen, the sea is the common heritage of mankind, a bond that has joined
different civilizations since time immemorial. With time, the significance of the sea
has only increased, not just as a means of transport and trade, but also as a link be-
tween humanity spread all across the globe. The strategic value of maritime
cooperation is well described in the annals of history. It was maritime cooperation
across the Atlantic that assured the success of allies in World War II. During the
Cold War, it was maritime cooperation amongst NATO allies and Warsaw Pact
countries to strengthen their respective alliances. After the end of the Cold War,
maritime cooperation has allowed multinational coalitions to operate in the nar-
rows of the Gulf and to wage successful peace enforcement and peacekeeping
campaigns in the littorals. Even in the present-day scenario, campaigns in Afghani-
stan and Iraq are examples of successful coalition operations made possible due to
maritime cooperation of member nations.
The tragic events of September 11 have illustrated that the twenty-first century
will be characterized by dangerous uncertainty and conflict. It is important to form
long-term strategy relationships necessary to plan and execute operations to eradi-
cate terrorism. Maritime forces, due to their inherent flexibility, reach, and
sustainability, have a vital role to play in the ongoing war against terrorism.
Another important characteristic that makes maritime forces a preferable means
of military cooperation is the ability to quickly blend with and support other mari-
time forces. This is because of the unique character of maritime forces, as they
routinely operate beyond the bounds of territorial seas in close coordination with
each other. No wonder that all major campaigns in the last decade have been char-
acterized by the creation of coalitions comprising primarily multinational maritime
elements. This is where the strategic value of maritime cooperation in the military
context becomes more obvious. There are many strategic concerns that warrant
global maritime cooperation. These have been discussed yesterday by Panel 2, but
to refresh, I shall only mention them briefly: global terrorism, drug trafficking, pi-
racy, national disasters and accidents, peace and stability operations.
Gentlemen, to deal with increasingly violent international maritime offenses, it
is necessary to step up broad-based, regional cooperative efforts. This will necessi-
tate coordination among all institutions concerned, such as naval units, coastal
patrols, law enforcement organizations, shipping companies, crew and port au-
thorities, as well as maritime security agencies. However, in this regard, the major
players would have to play a significant role by extending material support to
smaller nations in the form of the necessary equipment and training.
The challenges faced by the world community can be met by combined efforts
and enhanced military readiness of professional maritime forces around the world.
We shall seek to improve the military readiness of these forces through various
forms of peacetime engagements between the armed forces of various nations, and
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seek to improve the capacity of appropriate global and regional security institu-
tions to sponsor and coordinate multinational efforts, especially peacekeeping and
other stability operations.
Peacetime multilateral exercises and common operating procedures can facili-
tate sure transition of various forces into a more responsive unified coalition. These
are inexpensive and powerful ways to develop the capabilities to work effectively as
coalitions in complex contingencies, as partners in countering terrorism, drug traf-
ficking, piracy; in managing the consequences of weapons of mass destruction,
national disasters, and accidents; in evacuating citizens caught in the path of vio-
lence and certain rescue of mariners and airmen in distress; and in providing
humanitarian assistance.
A coalition develops a cadre of competent partners able to contribute when
called upon. The ongoing Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is a manifestation of the
strategic advantages that may accrue from maritime cooperation [Figure 1]. The
U.S.-led coalition operation against terrorists has been ably supported by regional
countries and the navies, which has facilitated substantial enhancement in the op-
erational capability of the coalition.
In our case, the Pakistan Navy facilitated the beach landing operation by U.S.
marines on the Makran coast and provided logistic support and security cover,
which was essentially needed to follow on operations in Afghanistan. Similarly, con-
tributions by other coalition partners have been instrumental in the success of the
operation thus far. Having seen the strategic value of maritime cooperation and the
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Figure 1. Operation Enduring Freedom
need for enhanced military readiness, let us now see what would be the biggest hur-
dle in the way of achieving this goal.
Gentlemen, the end of the Cold War led to proliferation of interregional con-
flicts in many parts of the world that denied many nations the perceived dividend
of peace that was to accrue due to the end of superpower rivalry. These interre-
gional conflicts included many maritime disputes that even today stand in the path
of global cooperation to deal with the menace of terrorism. Regional disputes can
block the efforts of global maritime cooperation. The only effective solution to
overcome this impediment is the resolution of regional disputes through the mech-
anism of the United Nations, with strong support from major maritime powers and
the international community. In particular, the major players need to play a
proactive role to resolve intraregional conflicts for the sake of international peace
and cooperation.
South Asia has lately been the focus of world concern due to unresolved issues,
causing sporadic tensions and fear of full-scale war. Last year the Arabian Sea wit-
nessed a flurry of activity as naval forces were mobilized in anticipation of an
impending conflict. Thus, for an enduring regional cooperation, [organized] inter-
national effort, where necessary backed by world power mediation, may be the only
answer to offer a unified and cohesive response for maritime interests or threats.
Pakistan, being a peace-loving, moderate, and progressive country, will fully sup-
port any maritime and naval cooperation initiative which is just and for the right
purpose to maintain peace and stability in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf region.
During the ongoing Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, we not only made a maxi-
mum contribution in global efforts against terrorism, but also assured utmost
restraint under difficult circumstances to uphold regional stability. The United
States Navy’s coalition maritime campaign plan provides a forum for maritime
cooperation without prejudice to the interests of the regional participants. We are
ready to extend further support to the coalition, as it has been formed for a just
cause.
In the end, I urge all my colleagues present here today to employ sea power at
their disposal for world peace, harmony, and greater prosperity of the nations.
Consequently, we need to open a new page in our relations, aimed at enhancing
our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together
against common threats and risk to our security. We need to observe in good faith
our obligations under international law, including the provisions and principles
contained in the UN charter. Commanders of the world’s navies should take the
lead in imposing peace on the oceans to blaze a trail for our counterparts on land,
or in seamanship jargon, we say, make others to follow our wake.
The following are some of the important principles that, in my opinion, can
make the sea more secure and safer:
• Major powers must play a due role to resolve regional disputes; a sine qua non
for maritime cooperation.
• Joint exercises between coalition partners on a durable basis to facilitate ease
of interoperability and provide swift response to maritime threats.
• Collective measures to beef up security at principal ports of embarkation and
disembarkation must be ensured.
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• Study of emerging environment and sharing of information is the need of
the hour.
• Cooperation of private sectors is vital in addition to the collaboration between
governments of each related country.
• Concerned countries must agree to launch unified policies [inaudible].
Lastly, once again I thank Admiral Clark for affording me the opportunity to be
present here and share some of my thoughts with you all. I would also like to thank
all the distinguished delegates for the participation in this symposium which has
made this event truly worthwhile. Thank you.
Admiral Collins, United States:
Thank you. Admiral Clark, delegates, it is a pleasure to be on this panel and be with
you this morning. The panel topic, “Strategic Value of Maritime Cooperation,” is
obviously very, very germane to this symposium, a concept that I strongly stressed
during my talk at lunch yesterday, and clearly the crosscutting theme to every
panel. If you recall in yesterday’s discussion, both Admiral Clark and I made the
case for a vision of a collaborative twenty-first-century sea power, a robust blending
of naval power and maritime power, geared to a new and very challenging security
environment—thus allowing us to reach our national and regional objectives and
then enabling, as the CNO put it, the robust development and sustainment of our
economies.
In pursuit of these objectives and to mitigate security risk, I spoke of the need for
a maritime security strategy that had four overarching precepts: (1) to enhance
awareness; (2) to create and oversee an effective maritime security regime; (3) to in-
crease military and civilian maritime law enforcement presence; and (4) to improve
response posture, in the case that incidents do occur.
I emphasized awareness as the critical foundation piece in building maritime do-
main awareness, which we call MDA. I stressed the need for an effective integration
of both civil law enforcement authorities, private maritime stakeholders, and mili-
tary might. I suggested that the classic notions of strategic partnerships must
change if we are to be successful collectively and individually. MDA, intelligence,
information-sharing is the glue here. I would like to spend a few minutes providing
you some food for thought on this issue. To gain a true and effective integrated ap-
proach to MDA is a difficult challenge.
As I discuss my own thoughts on this issue and how we have approached it in the
United States, let me ask you to be thinking about the same challenge in the context
of your own professional situation. For example, who do you share information
with today? With what organizations inside your country, outside your country: mil-
itary organizations, civilian law enforcement agencies, private-sector companies? If
you are a CNO in your country’s navy, do you have a personal relationship with the
head of your country’s lead law enforcement investigative agency? I think you
should, because in today’s security environment, those kinds of agencies and coast
guards and maritime administrations and port authorities and maritime industry
are very likely to hold some of the essential information you need to do your job for
your country.
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I would like to outline some of the initiatives we have taken in the United States
to enhance security awareness capabilities, in the hope it may be instructional to all
of us as we collectively build worldwide MDA and its subset, maritime intelligence,
in sort of a description of the MDA building blocks that we are trying to put in
place. The core of any MDA program is accurate information, intelligence, and
knowledge of vessels, cargo, crews, passengers, and extending this well beyond our
traditional maritime boundaries. We are building our MDA program to specifically
address the conflicting interests of security, on one hand, and the flow of commerce
in our ports and waterways. The goal is to know the difference between friend and
foe so that legitimate commerce can move through our coastal and port areas un-
impeded while we interdict contraband cargo and illegal activities of all types.
Our approach is an interagency approach. It leverages information technology
and multiple information sources, and it includes active involvement of the private
sector. Our ability to achieve better MDA will, again, allow us to better focus our se-
curity efforts on those contacts and activities of real interest. Within the United
States Coast Guard, we had actually started to work on this MDA concept in late
2000, in very strong partnership with Vern Clark’s United States Navy. Although
the problems we were anticipating were less extreme at that point, the nature of the
asymmetric threats was indicative of what we face today.
Since 9/11 we have had an increased sense of urgency about the steps to increase
MDA. For example, within thirty days of those attacks we amended our regulations
so that oceangoing vessels approaching the United States were required to provide
ninety-six-hour advance notice of arrival at our ports, with additional information
on last-port-of-call information of the ship, the manifest, and the crew. We also cen-
tralized reporting, from our individual forty-seven captains of the port to a single
location, enabling better coordination analysis of information and more rapid dis-
semination to other agencies. Both military and civilian agencies were integrated
early, very early, in our efforts. We created a National Vessel Movement Center to
catalog and to assess ship movements. In addition, with the passage of enabling leg-
islation from our Congress, we became full members of the national foreign
intelligence community and have invested considerable resources in expanding
our intel program and associated competencies.
My hat is off to Admiral Porterfield and the intel established in the navy for help-
ing us along the way as we build out a more sophisticated intel program. With their
help and their partnership, we have established a program called Coast Watch, a
new process for analyzing risks associated with vessels entering our ports. We estab-
lished a Joint National Maritime Intelligence Center with the Navy, which uses
these advanced notice of arrival reports that I have mentioned and other available
information to sort and classify vessels of interest, so we can board these vessels be-
fore they reach our ports, if deemed necessary. We have established additional
maritime intel fusion centers on the East coast and on the West coast within the
coast guard, for both military intelligence and law enforcement–sensitive informa-
tion, and established subordinate Field Intel Support Teams [FISTs] in key ports.
These teams are actively engaged in intel collection and first-order analysis, in co-
ordination with federal, state, and local intel agencies. They are joint in the
broadest sense of the word. This gives us top-down and bottom-up information in
the intelligence continuum. We have leveraged government and industry port
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safety committees to address security and info-sharing at a local level in a very col-
laborative way.
And, of course, effective 1 March, we moved, along with twenty-one other agen-
cies, into the new Department of Homeland Security. This alone has huge
implications for MDA and information-sharing, because it has already paid dividends
in facilitating sharing, particularly electronic sharing of law enforcement–sensitive in-
formation between Coast Guard, Customs, and Immigration agencies. We have
collectively partnered with many of your governments to establish a multilateral set
of protocols in order to create an international security regime, which includes the
ISPS Code and accelerating the introduction of AIS to increase awareness of ap-
proaching vessels. We are cataloging performance—security performance—of all
vessels entering the United States and beyond. The companies that they sail for,
the cargos that they take, the classification societies that are involved, and we will
have performance metrics holding them accountable for the good security regime.
In partnership with the CNO, we are establishing interagency prototype Joint
Harbor Operation Centers in coast guard and navy ports, improving both port se-
curity and force protection. If you ever visit San Diego, you should take a look at
the issue in San Diego and the center there. It is truly joint, in every sense of the
word: state, local, federal, civilian, military, and private, embedded in a joint cen-
ter. We have upgraded our VTS to enhance security including AIS, and we have
launched a major modernization program in the coast guard that is really MDA
centric. We call it Deep Water Modernization Project, but it is a complete recapi-
talization of the coast guard’s major cutters and aircraft. It includes UAVs,
sensors, C4ISR, furthering the national fleet concept we have partnered with the
navy on, and a network-centric system that gives us much-enhanced MDA in the
littorals and beyond.
So, as you see, in this not-all-inclusive list, we have taken some very aggressive
steps, some positive steps, but much, much needs to be done. We plan to move very
aggressively forward on our modernization program for a network-centric system
of ships and planes. We are aggressively and fully implementing the Maritime
Transportation Security Act and the ISPS Code in our country. We are completing
and working on a comprehensive port security assessment of fifty-five of the top
military and economically significant ports in our country. We are developing an
international audit team to audit security measures in foreign ports. We have ag-
gressively engaged the international community at IMO, and will continue to do so
on such issues as long-range tracking, enhanced flag-state responsibility, and trans-
parency. We plan to work with your governments in global industry to assist the
United States Customs, who has the lead in developing assets and that enables all of
us together, internationally, to track cargo from origin to destination. We have
gained enormously positive experience in a joint and interagency effort and in
Joint Interagency Task Force South [JIATF South] that was mentioned yesterday,
which could and should serve as a model for intel collaboration around the world. It
is readily expandable to transnational issues that extend well beyond counterdrugs.
Ultimately, what we need is what the CNO spoke about yesterday, a maritime
NORAD. In the United States Coast Guard, our plans are to establish a robust MDA
program office to help develop that architecture in partnership with the United
States Navy and NORTHCOM.
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So where does all this leave us? As we have all recognized through this sympo-
sium, there is much more for all of us to do. First of all, I would certainly be the first
to admit that we do not have all the answers, but I offer that the steps we have taken
are steps down the right path. Between all of us in this room, we hold the keys to
building an effective integrated, collaborative, worldwide maritime intelligence
network—as Admiral Clark put it, an opportunity of historic proportions, espe-
cially if we think in terms of maritime power in a broad and new definition of
jointness. Some of us are big; some of us are small. We have a variety of different
competencies, but we all have something to add to this fight.
I will close with one final thought. I would ask all of us to consider how your local
information-sharing systems might fit into a regional construct, suggested by sev-
eral panelists yesterday, by Vice Admiral De Leon and Rear Admiral Tay, for
example, and how such regional systems will help build a worldwide maritime
intel network. Thank you very much for your attention. I look forward to the rest
of the panel.
Admiral Furusho, Japan:
First, Admiral Clark, thank you for giving me this precious opportunity to speak at
this ISS. Admiral Route, congratulations on your excellent hosting of this, the
world’s largest naval symposium.
Fellow chiefs, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I am
Admiral Koichi Furusho, Chief of Staff, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force. Before
I left Japan, I called the former CNO, who attended the last ISS in 1999, and asked
how many in the audience listened to the speech in the auditorium. His answer was,
“About one out of ten.” I will try to do my best to keep you awake, especially those
who still have jet lag. Today I would like to talk about the “Strategic Value of Naval
Cooperation in the Western Pacific.”
The events of September 11th drastically changed perceptions of national secu-
rity throughout the globe, and it has affected the military policy of many countries.
Japan is no exception.
In response to those attacks, the Japanese Diet enacted a new law to enable the
Self Defense Forces to support the Global War on Terrorism. As a result, from No-
vember 2001 to today, twenty-five Japanese naval ships have been conducting
replenishment at sea in support of coalition ships fighting Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM in the northern Arabian Sea. We have provided roughly 320 thousand
kiloliters, or 85 million gallons, of fuel to three hundred ships from ten coalition
navies. This amount of fuel accounts for 30 percent of all the fuel consumed by co-
alition forces at sea.
This logistic support operation has been carried out very effectively. We have
learned that the key enabler of successful operations is interoperability. At the Fif-
teenth ISS, Admiral Jay Johnson stated: “We expect coalitions to play an
increasingly important role in international security.” Following this, the Japan
Maritime Self Defense Force, or Japanese Navy, started to focus on interoperability
in coalition operations. No one anticipated the terrorism that occurred on Septem-
ber 11th, nor could they have predicted the emergence of the largest coalition
operation in history in response to those attacks. Therefore, we, Japan, did not fully
understand what coalition operations were about.
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However, at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, or the WPNS, we saw the be-
ginnings of discussions on coalition operations in the form of maritime
cooperation in military operations other than war [MOOTW].
Western Pacific Naval Symposium
• Based on the Western Pacific subcommittee of ISS
• Symposium and workshop
• 21 navies.
I would like to briefly touch upon the development of the WPNS. The WPNS was
established in 1988, based on the Western Pacific subcommittee of the ISS, and the
symposium has been held every other year. The number of participating navies has
grown from 12 at the first symposium to 21 and now includes all the major regional
navies. In its early stages, the WPNS was a place to exchange information for mu-
tual understanding. As the time has passed, the discussions have developed, and in
the late ’90s, the focus of discussions shifted to cooperation among the WPNS na-
vies in MOOTW.
At the Eighth WPNS, which the Japanese Navy hosted last year, one of the
agenda items was how to cooperate in MOOTW and how to ensure interoperability.
We can say that the WPNS has become the framework for forging naval cooperation
rather than the forum for maritime confidence building.
The WPNS has entered a new era where discussion has expanded beyond the
immediate issues of the present and now also includes discussion of the direction
for our navies in the next generation. This year, we began a new program as a result
of the last symposium. This program provides an opportunity for junior officers of
the WPNS navies to ride a Japanese Navy ship during the Overseas Training Cruise
for a certain period. We expect these junior officers to take this opportunity to
share their knowledge and enlighten each other. One of the participants noted:
“Although I perfectly enjoyed the program, I have nothing to provide in turn. The
only thing I give is friendship. This friendship will never end. Please remember my
friendship.” I am very encouraged by this kind of response, and I am determined to
continue this program. Many of my fellow CNOs in this auditorium may be retired
by the next ISS, but I can assure you, at least to the CNOs from WPNS navies, that
they will be able to retire from the navy at ease, knowing that the next generation is
already cooperating with each other.
I would like to describe the strategic feature of the Western Pacific region, be-
cause it has worked as a driving force to promote naval cooperation. One of the
remarkable characteristics of this region is the fact that the sea has historically
played the role of catalyst for trade and communications. Having said that, the sea
has had different influences depending upon the historical period. For example,
the Sea of Japan, which is surrounded by Japan, Korea, China, and Russia, was for-
merly the front line for East-West confrontation during the Cold War. Now,
however, it is the Sea of Japan that supports the flow of trade for the economic pros-
perity of Northeast Asia, as well as provides the opportunity for bilateral and
multilateral exercises among the regional navies. In any case, given the fact that the
sea has connected the regional countries at various points in history, the WPNS
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could provide a multilateral naval framework even where no prior regional security
initiative existed.
Naval cooperation will greatly contribute to regional security in the Western Pa-
cific where the sea is the means of communication. The navies in the region need to
cooperate more, to cope with unconventional threats and dangers, including ter-
rorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the requirements
for naval cooperation in the area of MOOTW increase, the probability of coalition
operations will increase accordingly. Coalition operations among the WPNS navies
will not be easy, taking into account the varied capabilities and size of 21 participat-
ing navies.
The WPNS has been, and will continue to be, a strong foundation to build and
foster continued regional stability. Flexibility and mobility make the navies of today
the enablers for successful coalition operations. The WPNS recognizes the impor-
tant role for enhanced international naval cooperation in a dual-track process. One
track is focused on the near-term objective to enhance interoperability between na-
vies. The second track is focused on the long-range direction for WPNS in the next
generation. The combination of improved cooperation in the present and an eye
toward shaping the next generation of the navies clearly makes the WPNS of vital
strategic value to the countries in the region.
This concludes my presentation. Thank you very much for your attention.
Admiral Johnson, United States:
Thank you. It is a bit daunting to be sitting here trying to talk about the Mediterra-
nean when we have representatives from Portugal and Spain and France and Italy
and Greece, Turkey, Malta, the Black Sea, the Magreb and Levant nations, but I
will do my best, and I am sure, with all that expertise, if I make a mistake I will be
corrected. I would like to say that the environment that we live in in the Mediterra-
nean, I think certainly in the post–World War II era, has the longest tradition of
maritime cooperation. It is a tradition, I think, that carries well beyond the immedi-
ate Mediterranean area. In fact, I show that picture up there. That is actually from
Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR; there are five countries represented in that picture:
United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Italy, and the United States.
Here is another one [Figure 2], a little bit earlier, actually during Operation EN-
DURING FREEDOM, and those ships—many of you will recognize them: Charles De
Gaulle, the Invincible, Garibaldi, [The Netherlands HNLMS Van Amstel (F 831)], and
a couple of U.S. carriers, the “JFK” [ John F. Kennedy], and Theodore Roosevelt. This
tradition of maritime cooperation is so rich and so strong in the Mediterranean, it
carries over, I would submit, to all parts of the world, although we know in Opera-
tion ENDURING FREEDOM, and certainly in IRAQI FREEDOM, there were many other
navies—certainly our Australian colleagues, Japanese colleagues, and the GCC
states as well. The strategic focus, I think we can all agree, of NATO—and we can-
not talk about the Mediterranean without doing it somewhat also in a NATO
context; certainly each one of our nations, and I can speak for the United States as
well in this part of the world—the strategic focus, the strategic threat and what have
you, have moved south and east. During the Cold War, the Mediterranean, you
could say, was sort of a flank theater, but now it is the center of our security inter-
ests, and there are many, many reasons for it.
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When I talk about threat in my job, both as a national commander—U.S. Naval
Forces, Europe—[and] also as a NATO commander in the Southern Region, I talk
about such things as terrorism, the obvious threat that we have been talking about
much over the past few days. In fact, our particular region, the Mediterranean re-
gion, is an area of the world that is very much used as the logistics base for terrorists.
They need passports. They need to do banking. They need to do all manner of
things, and, in reality, they do it in all of our countries, the Mediterranean area be-
ing a prime area. Weapons of mass destruction are certainly another area that we
are watching very closely, and the Mediterranean plays a big part in that, not only
as a potential means for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also
[as providing] a great opportunity to interdict this kind of activity.
Transnational criminal activity is another area that we have paid a great deal of
attention to. There are estimates that fully 5 percent of the world’s GDP [gross do-
mestic product] is tied up in the drug trade, and we are seeing greater and greater
indications of the flow of drugs into this particular region. Heroin, opiate-based
kinds of drugs coming from the East, and cocaine flows from the Western Hemi-
sphere into Europe. This also is tied into the War on Terrorism, because I think
that terrorism rides on the backs of this criminal activity and the criminal activity lo-
gistics lines, which are very well established and organized. Terrorism rides on the
back of that.
I also talk about resources when I talk about the kinds of threats and challenges
we are going to face in the Southern Region. Most people, of course, when you talk
95
Figure 2. Maritime Cooperation in Operation Enduring Freedom
about resources, think of fossil fuel, and that is going to become increasingly im-
portant. The Southern and Mediterranean areas, for this, are the sources, and we
do not even know how rich those sources are yet. They come online from the Cauca-
sus, both through pipelines and through shipping from the Black Sea through the
Bosporus and Dardanelles, into the Mediterranean, across the Mediterranean
from pipelines that terminate in the eastern Mediterranean area.
Another resource in our particular region that is going to be a source of potential
strife in the coming years is potable water. My prediction is that that is going to
probably be the most strategic resource facing us in the next fifty years, a gigantic
challenge with estimates that, in the not too distant future—when I say not too dis-
tant, the next fifteen to twenty years—fully 40 percent of the world’s populations
will not have access to potable water. The social disruption that that creates, in
terms of disease, [will be significant].
The final area that I think has a gigantic impact on the security situation and will
drive a lot of the cooperation that we are going to continue to enjoy, I think, in the
Mediterranean area is the demographics in a large sense. The UN predicts that in
the next fifty years, the world’s population will grow from where it is today, 6.3 bil-
lion people, to just under 9 billion: 2.5 to 2.6 billion more people! But most of that
growth is in what I call “the near abroad,” if you talk about the Mediterranean and
its larger context. In other words, Africa will gain about a billion people, and South
Asia and Southwest Asia will gain the rest of that growth. We can only imagine and
have to start thinking about how that growth is going to manifest itself over the next
fifty years and what kind of security challenges this is going to present.
Well, the history of maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean in that kind of a
threat context—or I call it more than threat, it is a challenge context—that we have
facing us in the twenty-first century [is] a rich heritage of maritime cooperation that
I think is going to continue to serve us well in the future and something that we can
build on. Just the fact that NATO has been around for fifty-four years now, since
1949, has been a source of cooperation that we have continued to build on over all
of these years, is going to be very important for us. That picture that I show up
there—I think almost anywhere that you go in the world, the STANAGs, the ATPs,
the various OPTASKs that have been developed over the years, and NATO sort of
just transposed themselves into other parts of the world. The Standing Naval
Force, Atlantic [SNFL] was established in 1967. It has been going for thirty-six
years. SNFM [Standing Naval Force, Mediterranean] came online in April of 1992,
replacing what was called the Mediterranean On-Call Force that had been around
for several years. We have the tradition that began with SHARP GUARD, which had
both the NATO forces and the WEU forces working with our operations in the
Strait of Taranto during the crisis in the Balkans. We have the MCMRONs that
have again been developed both in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, a very pro-
found sense of cooperation that I think we can grow on.
Over the last two years, we have been involved in what is called Operation AC-
TIVE ENDEAVOR. The CNO, Admiral Clark, mentioned that yesterday in his
comments. Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, the Commander,
Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe, is in charge of that operation. We have had
thirteen different nations who have sent forces to the Mediterranean. This has been
going on—yesterday I believe it was, the 26th of October, was the two-year
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anniversary—and it has been immensely successful. As I mentioned, thirteen na-
tions have contributed forces to this effort. Next week, we hope to have a frigate
from Bulgaria that will join us for a short period, our fourteenth nation that will be
directly involved in this operation. You know the statistics on it. Over thirty-five
thousand boardings and what have you, in addition to the impact that I think it has
had on terrorism, and Admiral Porterfield can tell you how hard this is.
Much of the success, I think, is, you do not know what you do not know. I cannot
tell you that we have actually found an al-Qa‘ida terrorist, but I think we have de-
terred a lot of activity that could have ridden on the backs of this kind of commerce
that goes on around us and much of what Admiral Collins was talking about—flags
of convenience, ships that are not very carefully regulated, that have suspect com-
mercial ties, ownership, and what have you. We think that we have deterred a
considerable amount of activity that could have gone on onboard these ships.
We have also had some second- and third-order impacts that we did not fully an-
ticipate but have been rather dramatic. In 2002, the level of illegal immigration was
cut by nearly one-half in the Mediterranean area, and from our statistics, this ap-
pears to continue to be true in 2003. So I am absolutely convinced that this is an
operation that has been immensely successful, and it will continue for as far as I can
see into the future. We may have to modify it. In fact, we are in the process, right
now at the Naples Headquarters, [of] doing what we call a periodic mission review
that I have to get to SHAPE by the end of the week. We have been given some strate-
gic guidance to actually expand this, or take it out of Article Five and put it into the
ongoing NATO effort in the Global War against Terrorism.
We are working on that at this time, but when it is all said and done, our chal-
lenge is the same challenge that Admiral Collins talked about yesterday and talked
about this morning, and that is actionable intelligence, fused intelligence. We have
a lot of information. We do not have a tremendous amount of knowledge, and we
have got to figure out how to do that. Admiral de Donno talked about it yesterday.
His view is that we are going to have to take some kind of regional approach, and I
would like to close by endorsing that concept.
MARCOMED is a conference that NAVSOUTH hosts every year in our region in
May. Last year, it was hosted by our French colleagues in Toulon. It was a very
good conference; we talked about much of this. We had a presentation, and this is
instructive—the person who gave the presentation was a French gendarmerie colo-
nel who has been assigned to JIATF South [Joint Interagency Task Force, U.S.
Southern Command] for five years; he has been working in Key West for five years.
I think that the model at JIATF South is something that might be instructive to us.
We know that if we are going to be successful in developing information into knowl-
edge, into actionable intelligence, it is going to take an incredible amount of trust
and comfort-level working with each other. And so I am convinced that for Opera-
tion ACTIVE ENDEAVOR and for us to continue to progress in the Mediterranean, we
need to develop that kind of a capability. We need to give some thought as to how
we do it, under whose auspices it operates; but if we are going to continue to have
some success, we’re going to have to do this better. I think of what I know around
the world; the JIATF South is the best model, where you have multinational and
you have both civil and military who have been working together for a considerable
amount of time and they are comfortable with each other. They are in the kind of
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awkward position where they have a pretty good fused intelligence picture, but they
are resource poor. I think that we are in a position in ACTIVE ENDEAVOR where,
thanks to the support of the various nations, we have a pretty good stable full of re-
sources, but we do not have enough intelligence, and we have got to marry that
together and do better.
Now, I am talking beyond my competence and out of my area, but I could envi-
sion where you would have something that builds on what is being done in Key
West, ties into what Admiral Collins talks about with his FISTs and the various
things that he is doing in the Western Hemisphere, and then you would have some-
thing, I would propose, based in the Mediterranean. It could be under NATO
auspices, or something that is all-source. You would have another such center that
deals with the Southwest Asia–Horn of Africa–East Coast of Africa area, and then
possibly a fourth that deals with Southeast Asia. These four centers of excellence
could fuse this information together. As I have told Admiral Sanfelice, we have this
problem where we do not have good East-West flow. You should be talking to the
JIATF East or South. You should be talking to CTF 150 and what they are doing, so
we can be passing this information back and forth. For one reason, we think there is
a gigantic tie between the cocaine trade and smuggling of small arms, light weap-
ons, and what have you from our particular area and probably involved in some
other things. So I would leave you with that thought. This is not novel; it is some-
thing that everybody else has touched upon—we are at that point where we have
got to make some progress in this area or we cannot move forward with what we are
doing right now. Thank you very much.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
Thank you, Admiral. The final introductory piece before we break for thirty min-
utes will be a view from Africa from Admiral Retief from South Africa. Admiral.
Vice Admiral Retief, South Africa:
Thank you, Admiral Ritchie. Admiral Clark, delegates, good morning. On behalf
of my navy, I wish to extend our sincere gratitude for your invitation to attend the
International Seapower Symposium. It is indeed a privilege for us, and I wish to
thank the presenters for the excellent and illuminating presentations.
Today, I will report to the strategic value of maritime cooperation with a focus on
Africa, and the focus will be on sub-Saharan Africa, not on the Mediterranean re-
gion. As such, I wish to acknowledge the presence of my colleagues from
sub-Saharan Africa. They are Rear Admiral John Gbena from Ghana, Vice Admiral
[Samuel] Afolayan from Nigeria, and Major General [P. O.] Awitta from Kenya,
taken from west to east.
In the African environment, there is a growing realization that the sea can be
used to connect nations and the sea is also our most safe and most neutral route.
These realizations are ever still in a very immature and fragile state. For us, the sea
has always been there, and we never thought it would be vulnerable or challenged.
If you look at a map of sub-Saharan and subequatorial Africa, you will see that most
of the internal communications lines are east and west toward the coast.
To explain this situation, I wish to tell you that Africa has been in conflict and
subject to violence throughout the twentieth century, mainly due to colonization,
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wars of independence, civil wars, the democracies we have established in African
style, frustrations in new democracies, lack of infrastructure, various geographic
fault lines, food pressures, poverty, overpopulation, and disease. Really, it makes
our lives very difficult to manage this organization.
What is important to realize is that the overriding issue in subequatorial Africa is
about land and the redistribution thereof, and not yet about the sea. We are only
coming to grips now with the importance of the sea and the fact that we have re-
sources there we may have to defend in the future. In the African Union, which is in
the second year of existence, we operate in regions. The main regions in the sub-
Saharan area are COMESA [the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa]
in the east, ECOWAS [the Economic Community of West African States] in the west,
and SADC [the Southern African Development Community] in the southern region.
South Africa is a member of the Southern African Development Community.
Within SADC, maritime cooperation is facilitated through the existence of a formal
standing Maritime Committee, functioning under the auspices of the Interstate
Defense and Security Committee. In South Africa also, we have a situation where 95
percent of our economy is based on foreign trade. As such, the country has some-
what of an island economy.
The strategy of the standing Maritime Committee in the region is to focus on the
establishment of the following: a formal, regional maritime strategy—and we are
working hard on that, but I must tell you that, internally, our democracies are too
immature here to have national maritime strategies. So, that is the first aim. We are
working on interoperability of our navies. We are looking at a regional center of ex-
cellence for naval training in the SADC region, and already up to about seventy-five
sailors and officers from African navies are trained with the South African Navy. We
are looking at the regional ship repair facility to provide ship repair in the region, a
regional search and rescue and disaster management policy, a regional law en-
forcement at sea policy and agreement, a regional hydrographic agreement,
preparation of our extended continental shelf claims, and the establishment of a
culture of maintenance and upkeep of our naval assets.
Much has already been achieved through the offices of the Standing Maritime
Committee, and this committee is currently chaired by my colleague from Tanza-
nia. The most important issue for us at the moment is the confidence-building that
is taking place and being achieved through actions like regional seminars regard-
ing maritime issues, training opportunities offered by various participants, and
various multinational exercises. In South Africa, we take part in Exercise ATLASUR
with the South American navies from Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina every two
years, an annual transoceanic naval ship control exercise, interoperating exercises,
East and West, between member states of SADC, and, in fact, we invite members of
African navies in our region to attend these exercises as observers if they cannot
send assets to participate.
Also, under the recently concluded Mutual Defense Pact in Africa, we are defin-
ing our maritime contribution to the African Standby Force. This is being done at
the regional basis and is under discussion at the moment. Maritime cooperation in
the region is considered a success story, albeit a relatively small one. It is easy for
states to engage one another through ship visits, multinational naval exercises, and
participation in the future ASF—that is, the African Standby Force.
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We have found out a long time ago, you are received with greater friendship
when you come by sea than if you come over land with a squadron of tanks. The im-
portance of this story is not yet fully appreciated by our own superiors, nor by the
people of Africa; nor is it fully appreciated that events on land will in future be in-
fluenced by events originating from the sea. The establishment of the African
Union has expanded RSA’s [the Republic of South Africa’s] maritime involvement
with, specifically, countries like Ghana, Nigeria, and Gabon, and we wish to extend
this even further.
To summarize, the strategic value of maritime cooperation is not yet of great sig-
nificance in Africa, but the level of maritime cooperation between littoral states is
growing and will realistically reach a stage where it can no longer be ignored in our
region. This growth is ever currently bedeviled by a lack of resources and ships. In
the region, our fleets are aging. It is only South Africa which has an acquisition pro-
gram for new ships and submarines that is actually delivering in this year and the
next two years. There is also a perceived unimportance of maritime affairs, and it is
very difficult to focus our people’s minds on the importance of the maritime envi-
ronment. The growing involvement in peace support operations in African
conflicts, specifically under the flag of the African Union, is eating into our re-
sources and is making our life slightly more difficult. As I speak to you today, I have
a number of harbor patrol boats deployed in Lake Tanganyika in support of our
forces in Burundi. Also an issue that is very important to us is the inequality of our
participants in the various endeavors. We are trying to achieve parity and to avoid
domination of the group by one or the other of the navies.
To conclude, in the African Union, we have realized that the solution to our con-
flict lies in our own hands. If we realize our maritime objectives, we will have the
mechanisms in place to address the security issues around our ports, our ships, our
cargoes, and our crews. This is, however, going to take time; but we have started,
and for us, that is very important. We have a clear passage to navigate. I thank you
for allowing me to address you, and I assure you that we support the outcome of this
symposium. Thank you very much indeed, delegates.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
Thank you. Could we now break and please be seated ready to resume at 10:15.
Thank you.
[Break]
Vice Admiral Ritchie:
During the break, Vice Admiral Waranon from Thailand, who is a delegate here,
tells me that he was a graduate of the Naval War College and that this particular au-
ditorium is referred to by the students as “the blue bedroom.” So I would ask you all
to stay awake for the next hour and fifteen minutes, if you can. The next speaker is
Vice Admiral Godoy from Argentina. He is going to speak in Spanish, so I would
ask you to put your ears [i.e., headphones] on. He is going to talk about the issue
from a Latin American perspective.
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Vice Admiral Godoy, Argentina:
Thank you. [Translation.] Good day and many thanks to Admiral Clark and Rear
Admiral Ronald Route for the invitation to participate in this symposium on
themes which are of great interest to Argentina. Thank you.
In recent years, the international security agenda has undergone significant
changes. Threats to security no longer result exclusively from conflicts between
states, but they also stem from intrastate conflicts and from the interrelationship
between nonstate actors (such as individuals, nongovernmental organizations,
communities, etc.) and their own states or other states.
Between 1992 and 1994, the Argentine Republic, my country, suffered two ter-
rorist attacks: one against the embassy of Israel and the other against a benefit
society of the Jewish community. Hundreds of innocent people were killed in the
attacks. Less than a decade later, on September 11, 2001, the international commu-
nity was shocked by the attacks against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center,
which showed unprecedented criminality and violence.
The whole world was overwhelmed by a feeling of defenselessness, and we all be-
came fully aware that vulnerabilities make no distinction between borders and
actors. A lesson was learned: within this new security framework, events in the “pe-
riphery” are as important as those taking place in central countries and can often
be the prelude to more serious problems.
These and other brutal acts were the triggering factors for a redefinition of secu-
rity paradigms and for the search of new ways to achieve security. On the occasion
of the 9/11 attacks, the UN Security Council states that
[It] notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism
and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal
arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and
other potentially deadly material, and in the regard emphasizes the need to
enhance coordination of efforts on national, sub regional, regional and inter-
national levels in order to strengthen the response to this serious challenge
and threat to international security.
The sea—a favorable ground for the development of new threats. The sea—an
irreplaceable route for worldwide communication, shipping, and free naviga-
tion—is today a favorable environment for a wide range of illegal acts against peo-
ple and goods. Therefore, it is important to become fully aware of the vulnerability
of the maritime environment, a potential target for the action of criminal organiza-
tions. In this regard, measures adopted within the framework of the International
Maritime Organization reflect the concern of the maritime community over issues
such as maritime security and environmental protection, the fight against illegal
acts, and, recently, the possibility that nonnaval ships [may] be engaged in terrorist
attacks. In view of this situation, states are looking for the necessary mechanisms
and consensus to give global responses to the new challenges faced by humanity.
An example, among others, is the International Ships and Port Facility Security
Code, which has been drafted within the framework of the IMO and will soon be-
come effective. Yet the magnitude and dynamics of this new scourge and the size of
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the scenario involved call for a continued, thorough effort in search of innovative
measures to enhance international maritime security.
Strategic Value of Maritime Cooperation
To counter these threats, it is necessary to take at least two essential actions: to exer-
cise an increasingly more precise sea control, at all times and in all places, and to be
able to protect every ship sailing along. It should be noted that, in our view, the
concept of sea control is broader than that traditionally understood in tactical
terms. In our proposal, this concept involves close maritime surveillance and per-
manent presence. Therefore, it becomes necessary to keep an updated record of all
ship movements across the seas, which becomes a difficult task as ships frequently
change owners, names, flags, and courses, and navigate freely on the high seas. It is
even more difficult to control their crews, cargoes, and passengers, given the possi-
bility that members of criminal organizations may infiltrate the regular crews of
merchant ships. If we take into account the space occupied by the sea on the planet,
we realize that these tasks are so significant that no state by itself can perform them
as efficiently and as effectively as required.
It is precisely in these vast maritime spaces that navies should be able to
interoperate, even far from their own territory, by projecting their forces and im-
plementing the in-depth defense concept, in order to somehow prevent these new
threats from affecting coastal areas and causing important damages.
To that end, a close cooperation should be achieved between all navies, with a
view to establishing procedures to attain greater efficiency in terms of sea control,
as defined before. These control measures, and protection measures if so required,
could be initially implemented in each region, on a coordinated basis, taking into
account the geographical features and special characteristics of the states involved.
Two examples will help me illustrate how this cooperation can be achieved: on
the one hand, the agreement recently signed between the Chilean Navy and the Ar-
gentine Navy regarding the exchange of information for the monitoring of ships
carrying dangerous goods in transit through our region; and on the other hand,
the Combined Naval Antarctic Patrol effort conducted in the southernmost part of
the American continent and Antarctica. Another example, at subregional level, in
the southwestern Atlantic, is the organization known as Coordinator Atlantic Mari-
time Area, South [CAMAS], which operates on a permanent basis. The CAMAS is
integrated by Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina and is designed to moni-
tor and protect maritime shipping for the defense of its area of responsibility. It has
a command and control system to provide an updated picture of shipping within its
area of influence and, at the same time, to keep all members informed of any con-
tingency. It is worth noting that this is not a closed system; on the contrary, it gets
feedback from other countries as a result of bilateral agreements.
To counter the new threats effectively, it is undoubtedly necessary to develop a
high degree of interaction at the political, operational, and technological levels.
Leaving the political aspect aside, this model of response is based on the concepts
of information superiority, shared awareness, adaptability, and speed of command.
All these features require common command and control doctrine and procedures,
as well as a common representation of the environment to help navies operate on a
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coordinated basis. In addition to the above, much greater efficiency will be re-
quired to coordinate work and cooperation between the different national
organizations and/or agencies. In this respect, the Argentine Navy fully interacts
with the Prefectura Naval Argentina [Argentine Coast Guard], a force whose mis-
sion is to ensure security of navigation and enforce the law in waters within national
jurisdiction.
Thoughts and Recommendations
As we have stated before, the threats to security that are faced by humanity today
are multidimensional and involve all states. For this reason, we should think of
countering them through a cooperative security system aimed at joining efforts and
devising common strategies. In this sense, the efficient operation of such a system
requires a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance system to provide an adequate and timely answer
through a fluent exchange of information. This could be implemented by maritime
patrols designed to detect illegal activities, in coordination with neighboring coun-
tries and with countries flying the same flag as the ships in transit. In extreme cases,
we might think of conducting maritime escorting to protect merchant shipping in
the more conflicting or vulnerable areas.
We must also consider the possibility of signing agreements to facilitate both es-
corting and maritime interdiction operations beyond the territorial sea, when
appropriate, adjusting the legislation in force to this end. On account of the impor-
tance and complexity of these practices, it will be necessary to obtain the approval
of the highest political authorities in the countries involved. In short, the strategic
value of international maritime cooperation emerges from the crucial contribution
this cooperation can make to international security.
Therefore, according to what I have just expressed and regardless of the way
other international forums may tackle this problem, I propose:
At a Political Level:
1. To advise our governments on the need to devise tools and mechanisms for
cooperation at national, subregional, regional, and international levels which
will allow us to adjust responses to these new threats to international maritime
protection and, if necessary, continue working on the development of new in-
ternational legal regulations. In this respect, we propose to direct our efforts,
for example, on the revision of the International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (known as the
Rome Convention, 1988). Likewise, we intend to continue advancing in the
measures adopted during the International Diplomatic Conference on Mari-
time Protection, held within the framework of the International Maritime
Organization in December 2002.
2. To put forward, at the relevant political levels, the need to promote coopera-
tion between states for a rapid implementation of measures contributing to
effective compliance of current international rules with a view to enhancing
the maritime security level.
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At an Operational Level:
As of the implementation of the International Ships and Port Facility Security Code
[ISPS Code], the system should be in a position to provide safe ports; thus, concern
should merely focus on the transit of shipping. This poses the need of:
1. Developing an organizational, doctrinal, and procedural structure for sea
control and shipping protection between the navies. This structure should
initially contemplate the monitoring of movements and the exchange of in-
formation through a “network of networks” based on regional flexible and
autonomous organizations. In support of this effort, we propose to continue
advancing in the implementation of a long-range Automatic Identification
System [AIS] within the framework of the SOLAS Convention. This system
would enable control stations to automatically receive all information on
shipping identification, position, course, and speed of vessels navigating in
their area of responsibility, which could be supplemented with additional rel-
evant data.
2. Considering, as a next step, the future implementation of effective control
and protection measures by means of a combined naval power, since the
above-mentioned efforts would not suffice to counter the potential threat to
shipping in transit.
At a Technological Level:
The development of this system requires that navies and other governmental
agencies:
1. Be in a position to share information in real time
2. Gain a common awareness of the scenario
3. Use a common technical and tactical language, previously agreed upon
4. Profit from an updated and compatible technology, to be transferred from
the more advanced navies to the less advanced navies, thus reducing the exist-
ing technological gap.
Final Thoughts
The first requirement to achieve a suitable solution is the resolve of our govern-
ments to work with all countries on a coordinated basis. In this respect, the presi-
dent of the Argentine Republic, Dr. Nestor Kirchner, has recently stated in the
speech delivered on the occasion of the Fifty-Eighth United Nations Assembly that
“the vulnerability of all countries in the International Community in the face of this
scourge—international terrorism—can only diminish through an intelligent, con-
certed and multilateral action sustained over the time.”
These criminal acts against humanity have a perverse nature and jeopardize the
peace, prosperity, and security of our peoples. For these reasons, our contribution
in terms of naval power will consist in advising and cooperating with the political
leadership, by trying to anticipate potential events and by getting ready to counter
them effectively. We have sufficient evidence to think that such events might take
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place unless the appropriate measures are taken. In this critical situation, mistakes
can be forgiven, but lack of foresight is inadmissible.
Admiral Krzyelewski, Poland:
Admiral Clark, first of all, I would like to heartily thank you for your invitation and
to congratulate you for your new appointment. In the next few minutes, I would
like to present, admirals and gentlemen, the Polish point of view on North Atlantic
maritime cooperation.
When, over 10 years ago, with much enthusiasm, we celebrated the end of the
Cold War, for a very short period of time it seemed we were entering a new peaceful
era with no wars and no tensions. Unfortunately, the changes brought about with
Poland’s significant participation did not bring common peace—the world is
undoubtly more secure, but, unfortunately, less safe.
The Cold War was replaced by a growing number of local conflicts and terror-
ism. Today, when our country’s security is to rely on the North Atlantic alliance and
the united Europe, supporting joined international efforts aimed at a safe Europe
and world and protection of basic human values is the means for ensuring the coun-
try’s safety and development.
In the simple bipolar world of global competition between the East and the West,
matters of security came down to maintaining a balance between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. Today the situation is much more complex.
The change of international security conditions significantly influences also the
view on matters of maritime policy and security. It generates new tasks for the na-
vies of all the NATO countries. After years of preparations for a global clash and of
quiet nuclear rivalry in the deeps, naval forces have slowly returned to their typical
tasks in their territorial areas. The role of the Atlantic as the link of life between Eu-
rope and the United States is still vital. On the other hand, the scope of tasks is also
extended to include crisis response and participation in active peace support
operations.
Although there is no direct threat from our neighbors, as stated in the National
Security Strategy signed by the president of Poland, we pay much attention to tasks
conducted in the frame of the alliance collective defense. We also see the necessity
of participation in operations aiming at prevention of ignition and spreading of lo-
cal conflicts. The Polish Navy forces are, therefore, prepared to operate with the
alliance stabilization and prevention forces.
An important field for changes in the Polish Navy is adaptation to so-called
asymmetric warfare. We are aware that, as an active participant of peace operations,
we are under a threat of attack by armed groups of radicals and fanatics. This is a
new type of threat for us.
Our soon membership in the European Union forces us to tighten our national
borders, and that means, also, the sea border. That type of activities is in the area of
responsibility of other national services [Border Guard]. Nonetheless, the Polish
Navy must be prepared to support them, especially in the face of the probability of
increase of illegal immigration.
Being fully aware of the strategic value of maritime cooperation, which is a vital
factor of stability and peace, Poland is an active participant in the NATO enlarge-
ment process. As a young member of the alliance and a country of still-developing
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democracy, we are well aware of the problems that such transformations create.
Our understanding of the matter helps us greatly in those efforts.
We estimate that, at present, there is no real, direct threat to security and peace
in northern and central Europe. The stability is a result of the balance of powers.
Two fundamental tasks arise from that:
• Preparation of the Polish Navy command structure and forces to participate in
an allied joint operation
• The Polish Navy’s logistics readiness to conduct HNS [host nation support]
tasks for allied forces operating near our coast.
The first test of our readiness to conduct HNS tasks was last year’s STRONG RE-
SOLVE exercise [Figure 3]. The STRONG RESOLVE international exercise conducted
last year gave us an opportunity to verify in practice our HNS procedures, accord-
ing to the new NATO concept. During the exercise, 44 foreign vessels from 15
countries visited our ports and bases. The scope of the logistic activities may be de-
scribed, for example, by the quantities of supplied fuel (over 5,100 tons), fresh
water (550 tons), or received waste water (over 800 tons).
In the age of threats of terrorist attacks, smuggling of materials forbidden by in-
ternational law, and illegal immigration by sea, a constant control of shipping in
international waters and a capability of immediate reaction and terror-at-sea coun-
teraction are a necessity [Figure 4]. Another possible threat to shipping may be
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Figure 3. Host Nation Support Experience
caused by mines secretly laid in the sea routes and in harbor basins. With simple
and cheap means, not only a loss of sunk or damaged ships may be suffered, [but
an] even greater shortfall may be caused by suspension of shipping, import difficul-
ties, or increase of transport and insurance fees for the ship owners.
Nothing, though, may replace a quick detection of threat symptoms and a rapid,
decisive counteraction. Hence the stress must be put on correct threat evaluation
and on constant, effective, and secret monitoring of the situation at sea.
For that reason, close cooperation between all Baltic countries must be under-
taken. A subject to which we pay the most attention today is the preparation of
Polish Navy forces to participate in allied crisis-reaction operations (peacekeeping
and peace enforcement). We fully support the initiative of creating the SON, a force
continuously ready to initiate an allied crisis response operation.
The history of Polish ships’ participation in allied operations since the Second
World War began in 1992, when two of our ships participated in the DESERT STORM
operation. We also took part in ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Here I
would like to direct my thanks to the commanders of German and Australian navies
for the cordiality and help received by the crew of our ship, especially in the area of
communication.
The IRAQI FREEDOM operation was also our first experience with so-called asym-
metric warfare. The experience is especially valuable now, when we are improving
our force protection procedures, which are so important in the age of unconven-
tional threats. Our forces’ participation in multinational, allied operations and
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Figure 4. Shipping in the Baltic
training exercises is strictly bound to the matter of ongoing integration of the Pol-
ish Navy with NATO.
Training has for a few years included also the knowledge of the NATO com-
mand and communication procedures and lately the force protection matters,
based on recent experiences of participation in allied operations. I would like to
stress the good experience garnered from Partnership-for-Peace-like exercises like
Baltic Operation COOPERATIVE JAGUAR and COOPERATIVE VENTURE.
The factor that allows for successful training and a possibility of cooperation at
sea is the knowledge of English [Figure 5]. We can notice that we have bigger suc-
cesses in language training with officers. Therefore, more effort is put today into
the language training of petty officers and sailors.
Poland is and wants to be an active and reliable member of the North Atlantic al-
liance and the future structures of collective European security. We move from the
role of a “receiver” of the international safety to the role of a “giver.” That results in
set tasks for the Polish Navy:
• We prepare for crisis reaction within joint allied operations.
• We prepare for threats of asymmetric warfare.
• We create forces capable of immediate response to appearing threats to inter-
national safety.
Those are our most important tasks today.
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Figure 5. Language Skills Increase
Trying to foresee the future and especially future threats is very difficult. One
thing is sure: in the period of time equal to half of a typical ship’s life, the tasks she
would have been built for will be outdated.
• It is necessary, then, to build universal vessels which will be able to meet the
challenges of tomorrow.
• Navy must be balanced; equilibrium between all of its components is
necessary.
Thank you for your attention.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
As the final introductory person of this panel discussion on the Strategic Value of
Maritime Cooperation, I have been asked to focus on the Arabian Sea. As the last of
eight panel speakers in this particular symposium, I sort of have a feeling that most
of the thunder has already been stolen, but nevertheless, we will press on.
The three key strategic tasks of maritime forces, in any type of operation, might
be summarized as follows:
• To ensure the safety of global seaborne communications (and that is largely
what we have been talking about for a day and a bit)
• To enable the projection of power
• To actually project power from the sea.
Maritime cooperation is vital to all of those three tasks, and its utility has been
demonstrated throughout the twelve-year campaign to bring Iraq into compliance
with UN resolutions. In the wider context of the War on Terrorism since September
2001, much of that work has taken place in the Arabian Sea and the Arabian Gulf.
To us in the Royal Australian Navy, operations in the Arabian Gulf during IRAQI
FREEDOM were, in many ways, the climax of those many years of commitment to co-
alition operations. Over that time, my navy gained expertise in conducting
boarding operations and tactical command of the Maritime Interception Force. We
also developed an in-depth understanding of the littoral environment. In any war
in that region, the skills and environmental knowledge of the Maritime Intercep-
tion Force had to be exploited to the greatest advantage, to exercise sea control
out of the North Arabian Gulf and, in particular, the Khor abd Allah [KAA]
approaches.
Within the Arabian Gulf, unremitting surveillance and patrol efforts by multina-
tional forces enforcing UN sanctions and no-fly zones ensured that the Gulf was
locked down in 2003. No enemy craft were able to pose a threat to the force, and no
mines were laid. Compared with the difficulties of the mine threat imposed upon us
in 1991, this was a major hidden victory to the coalition forces and the result of the
arduous multinational effort over more than a decade. The success of the opera-
tions to counter the Iraqi mine threat lay in the fact that the force had maintained a
sustained presence inside Iraqi territorial waters. This presence forced them to
take elaborate and, ultimately, futile steps to disguise minelaying operations. Prior
to the war, multinational staff were attuned to Iraqi traffic patterns and, therefore,
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suspicious of any changes to them. The maintenance of the regular flow of shipping
into the KAA also served to counter minelaying by denying any chance to mine the
waterway before the conflict began.
Equally important was maintaining the integrity of the KAA once it was con-
firmed to be clear of mines. Riverine patrols were instituted and undertaken by the
U.S. Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as by international boat teams from eleven
coalition ships. Many of those who led boat teams were placed in an Australian ship,
the Kanimbla [L-51], or in the Polish Navy support ship Czernicki [Pennant No. 511].
Prior to that effort, doctrinal and procedural work had been undertaken to ensure
that riverine operations were conducted safely and efficiently, and all of those
achievements by naval forces had a significant strategic impact. The failure of any
one of those missions could have significantly changed the course of events, under-
pinning all of those achievements with a strong and abiding ethos of maritime
cooperation.
Maritime cooperation has many facets. Unlike armies and air forces, navies have
a long tradition of operating with each other and smoothly feeding into a multina-
tional command chain. Individual ships are comfortable with quickly forming into
a task group and with getting on with the mission at hand.
Of course, for any navy and every navy, I suppose, there are particular other al-
lies, other allied navies that that navy is used to operating with, and that allows the
levels of interoperability to be significantly enhanced. But since the end of the Cold
War, and more particularly since September 11th, we have seen the growth of non-
traditional coalition task groups. The force in the northern Arabian Gulf was a
good example of that. The U.S. Navy, the British Royal Navy, have, with others,
been long-term participants with the Royal Australian Navy, alternating tactical
command of that coalition task group in recent years. But the ease with which U.S.
Coast Guard ships fitted in, the ease with which the Polish ship Czernicki fitted in
and contributed so effectively, was indeed impressive.
The long-standing commitments to operations in the Gulf, particularly sanction
enforcement, have achieved remarkable interoperability. To give one particular
example from earlier this year, boarding parties from one navy, if required, oper-
ated from a ship of another navy, and in many cases using a boat from a third navy.
The effect of that seamless interoperability was to provide a much more flexible
course for the expanded capacity. Importantly, this very close level of
interoperability included virtually all units being on a coalition-wide area network
to allow chats via the command and control medium.
For the boat operations, the common secure communications network was
achieved, and robust recognition signals and procedures were developed to pre-
vent these boats from becoming victims of fratricide. From a logistic perspective,
the force also charted new ground. Logistic support of U.S. Coast Guard ships was
provided on an improvised basis by the Australian command ship Kanimbla, and
that was quite successful. Equally important was the invaluable support that the Pol-
ish support ship Czernicki provided, bringing forward replacement boats and stores
as required.
Those achievements were, in part, the result of very close cooperation between
task units and task group command staff. Those staff were invariably multinational
in composition, and they possessed good interstaff working relationships. As a
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bonus, they possessed excellent corporate memory of that long-running operation,
and that has overtones, I think, of the MDA that Admiral Collins talks about.
To go back to the three strategic tasks, what can we take from a multilateral co-
operation in the Gulf? Firstly, to the task of ensuring the safety of global seaborne
communication, it has been said many times in the last thirty-six hours here, but
the War on Terror has thrown into focus the vulnerability of the worldwide net-
work of shipping from terrorist action. Many multinational efforts, we have
heard, are in trying to protect ports, checkpoints, and shipping lanes, and these
are dependent upon a high and increasing degree of international cooperation.
Much is nonmilitary, but a significant component requires naval support. Our mu-
tual dependence on seaborne communications means that such efforts are likely to
increase in the future.
On enabling the projection of power, both Iraq wars, in 1991 and 2003, were
maritime-enabled conflicts. Truly multinational efforts, land forces were inserted,
sustained, and supported from the sea. Maritime cooperation protected shipping
and kept sea lanes clear for strategic lift, flowing and uninterrupted. The 2003 con-
flict operated under greater terrorist threat than that of 1991 and, hence, extensive
multinational patrols in other parts of the world: in the Straits of Gibraltar, as we
heard; in the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, and in the Malacca Straits.
On projecting power from the sea, both conflicts and Afghanistan have demon-
strated the utility of the ability to project power from the sea, and sometimes in
ways that have not always been predicted by strategic thinkers. Multinational forces
projected air and land power from fixed-wing carriers and amphibious forces and,
in the case of Afghanistan, against a wholly land-locked country. Other multina-
tional forces closed off escape routes in South Asia, across the Arabian Sea. Surface
ships provided essential fire support into southern Iraq.
What of the future? Continuing dependence of the global community on the
maritime environment means that that environment will become a target of choice
for those who wish to disrupt world order. In the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea,
the navies involved drew on their traditional strengths, the cooperation, flexibility,
and the willingness of commanders to delegate to the appropriate commanding of-
ficers, irrespective of which navy they were in. It is clear to me that ships’ companies
revel in the multinational environment and in sharing a mission focus. Given the
scope, they can identify the measures required to refine their doctrine and their
procedures to achieve the mission. Cooperative efforts exploit the capabilities of
each nation involved. They allow navies to play to their strengths. The maritime en-
vironment is one particularly suitable to smaller nations to make meaningful
contributions to collective efforts within limited resources. Cooperation also in-
creases the likelihood that nothing will be missed. Different countries look at
problems in different ways. Against the hidden and changing threat, such as terror-
ism, this diversity will become increasingly important in involving effective
strategic responses and effective preventative measures.
In part because of our experiences in the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, we
now understand that cooperative activities across the spectrum of conflict and the
range of maritime operations have significant parts to play in achieving the secure
environment that we all seek. Much of this activity is unglamorous, and much of it is
unseen, but it is vital nonetheless. Maritime forces must be flexible, adaptable, and
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versatile, and so must be the international cooperation in which they engage. We
must expect—and, indeed, we must look for—new opportunities to utilize mari-
time power for collective strategic ends.
Thank you.
Discussion
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
Right, we have finally got to the bit you are all waiting for, which is where we ask you
questions, and the first one we would like to ask you is—no, we won’t! Who has a
question?
Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:
Perhaps not a question, an observation; I would like to build on the point that Ad-
miral Collins has raised so well, both yesterday and today, with respect to a domain
awareness—with, perhaps, a reflection, and that is simply that here we have been
greatly focused on the need to share information between nations and build very ef-
fectively a picture which can work internationally. But I think, frankly, one of the
greatest challenges for nations with extensive coastlines and maritime areas lies in-
ternally. Admiral Collins, both you and CNO yesterday talked about cooperation
between USN and the Coast Guard. I think that there are frequently tendencies for
navies to think that use of resources must necessarily claim ownership of those
resources—lots of opportunity there for cooperation between government agen-
cies. If I could simply close by observing that what we have done in Canada, over the
last several years, is to put the navy as the focus and as, perhaps, the agency that is
best placed to manage information. We have pulled in information from fisheries,
from the other government departments; we fuse the picture together, and then we
disseminate that, both internationally, with yourselves, of course, with the U.S.
Coast Guard and Navy, and to the agencies at home. It is an important step. It is
one that does not require a vast expenditure of resource, and it is one that I heartily
encourage all the nations here to look at closely, as part of this overall picture.
Admiral Collins, United States:
I could not agree with you more. Again, it is leveraging all our respective competen-
cies and resources, in terms of national and regional interest, and we do not partic-
ularly care who owns it. It is to put together a system that gives you good
performance at the end of the day, and I think that has clearly been the approach
between the coast guard and the navy in the United States. If you look at the various
partnerships we have formed, whether it is a joint collaborative collocation of our
intel establishment or leveraging our respective competencies, it is nonredundant
but complementary competencies that you put together. One plus one equals four,
frequently. The fact is that we are leveraging all our competencies for the
counterdrug war. We have got a Department of Defense command in Key West; it
has a coast guard flag officer; it has civil law enforcement agencies; it has liaisons
from countries around the Caribbean and beyond; and you are leveraging all that
capability. If you look at a force lay-down, for example, of the counterdrug [opera-
tions] today, you will see probably ten or eleven ships, about 40 percent of which are
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gray hull, about 35 percent or 40 percent are coast guard. You will likely see a
Dutch and a Belgian and a French and a British ship, a British oiler with fused in-
formation out of JIATF West, where you can put metal on target. So you have got
effective, efficient intel; you have got a cooperative, using all the respective capabil-
ities of our services together. In the case of the U.S. Navy and the Coast Guard, we
have put coast guard boarding teams on navy ships in that particular mission, be-
cause—why? They are not duplicative, but they are complementary. They have the
law enforcement capability you need to do the search and the arrest and the seizure
and whatever. Together, they make a very powerful package. And that is just one
example. There are numerous others where that type of maritime cooperation yields
incredible performance; and, again, to cite that specific mission—counterdrugs—we
have less resources today, in terms of ship days, MPA hours, and so forth, than we
did pre-9/11. Yet, because of the effective partnerships and the leveraging of our
respective competencies in fused intelligence, we are getting more output from the
system. We were close to breaking a record last year with less resources, and the rea-
sons were international partnerships, great use of technology, fused information,
and leveraging everyone’s competency. So, a long-winded answer, but I obviously
could not agree more with your observation.
Admiral Johnson, United States:
Just to carry on with that theme, we are not maybe as well organized in the Mediter-
ranean theater as the JIATF South example, but I would submit that certainly with
the effort that we have made in force protection over the last two or three years with
our allies—I am speaking now, nationally, of when we send a Sixth Fleet ship in: in-
credible cooperation with those host nations that allow us to do port visits. I am
speaking, going from west to east, of Portugal, Spain, obviously France, Italy,
Greece, and Turkey; our STROG [STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR] Operations that have be-
gun last February, thanks again to the leadership of Spain. But that operation is not
just the navies; it involves the Spanish radar system that is now an excellent system
in the STROG, and several internal organizations within Spain. Greece and Turkey
in Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR are working very closely with their coast guards, in-
side their territorial seas. That information is fed to Admiral Sanfelice’s staff to help
us build a coherent, recognized maritime picture. So we are sort of in the nascent
stages of working through this, but it is no longer a navy stovepipe; it is growing and
gathering steam. And I think we are going to have a much more coherent picture,
and we need to jump on this opportunity now, to build a JIATF South–like capabil-
ity within our region.
Admiral Doran, United States:
My question is for Admiral Furusho. Admiral, first of all, I would like to congratu-
late you on that wonderful presentation, given in such excellent English. It was ter-
rific; very nicely done. My question, sir, is, in the recent PACIFIC PROTECTOR
exercise that was hosted by Australia, Japanese participation was solely by the Japa-
nese Coast Guard. Do you foresee a time in the near future where the JMSDF would
have a role to play in such an exercise or in such a real-world operation?
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Admiral Furusho, Japan: [Translation.]
Thank you for your praising us; I am going to answer in Japanese. To answer Admi-
ral Doran’s question, while Japan’s Coast Guard [JCG] participated in the PSI [Pro-
liferation Security Initiative] exercise, we, the JMSDF, also made our members join
it as observers. On the subject to participate in the exercise by our ship and/or P-3C,
of course we just are talking with our government with the aim of participation in it.
Therefore, we are negotiating with our government that we can participate in the
exercise next year with our ships and/or aircraft, instead of being mere observers, if
possible.
Additionally, I mention about the problem being for some time. The coast
guards of each nation had been invited to the symposium, and their top men have
been participating. Vice Admiral Yokoyama, JCG, had intended to participate in
this symposium equally, but I hear that he cannot participate due to his urgent busi-
ness, unfortunately.
On the WPNS level, [as] I presented a little while ago, I wish to lead to the direc-
tion that each coast guard in the regional Asian area will participate in the WPNS
together from now [on], as well as having some coast guards participate in this
symposium.
Vice Admiral Feldt, Germany:
The question to you, Admiral Collins, again: I think you described a very complex,
centralized organization, and my question is, how can you ensure that, in this orga-
nization, there is a transformation from data to information to knowledge, and
then bring this knowledge back to the decision makers? How can you ensure this? I
think it is a real challenge, and if you can elaborate a little bit about that, that would
be very fine.
I have a second question for the panel. We talked a lot about, and I think we con-
firmed a lot about, what we have to do and what our challenges and tasks will be. My
question to the panel is, have you thought about a strategy to convince our society
that what we are talking about here in this symposium is something which is their
topic as well? So this awareness, which you are always asking for—I think we have to
include our societies in developing this awareness as well, and I would be very much
interested if some of the regions and areas have thought about a possible campaign
in respect to this.
Admiral Collins, United States:
Clearly, the challenge of Maritime Domain Awareness is to take information, fuse
information, and make it relevant and actionable and meaningful so that you can
take our respective scarce resources and put them on target to get the biggest re-
turn. That is clearly a quality approach, and I don’t think you put your eggs all in
one basket; I think it is a multilateral type of approach. You try to have the best
combination of structure, organization, policy, doctrine, technology, sensors, coor-
dinated databases, that you can mine data and push-pull architecture from various
databases across the government. We, also as I mentioned, are trying to consider it
on the tactical level as well as the strategic level—but, on the tactical level, building
field intelligence support teams, as I mentioned, like the one in Boston or New
York. For example, you will see the national guard in there; you will see the police
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department, the state police, the Customs, the Immigration, Coast Guard, and so
forth. We are trying to fuse information in a tactical level and say, “Where do we put
our boarding teams today? Where is the highest risk today in this port, in terms of
allocating our resources?” That is actionable knowledge—if it is well informed.
That is at the tactical level, and I think it is working and building quite well. At the
strategic level, across the government, that is also another level at which to gener-
ate information and awareness for policy decision making, budget-priority decision
making, and a host of other things. I think the creation of, in our case, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security is an integrating, structural organization move that will
help us manage information and turn it into knowledge better. One of the major el-
ements within the new department has a complicated title, Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection. It is an undersecretariat, direct-report to the depart-
ment, incidentally led by a retired three-star marine, that is the collector and repos-
itory of information products from CIA, FBI, Defense, and others, fusing that
information and turning that into knowledge for the president, the secretary, and
others. They have to take action [on questions] like, “What is the security condition
today that we are going to set, across the country or in a particular port?” And it has
got to be based on the best information at the time. So we are trying to develop an
interagency architecture, interagency system, that push-pulls information, and it is
hard. It is hard work, because there are a lot of people with their fingers in the pie.
We have created the Department of Homeland Security, but that is not all the secu-
rity agencies in our government. So it is a challenge, but I think those are some of
the key approaches.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
Admiral, can I ask you if you have a public affairs strategy to explain what it is that
you are doing of significant change?
Admiral Collins, United States:
Clearly, part of the information is disseminated to the private sector, for example,
and so, through this, our new department is sort of a clearinghouse for informa-
tion, which will be this new undersecretariat that I mentioned. In terms of distribu-
tion of information to the private sector, if we want facility X in port Y to have a
good security protocol and to implement certain security provisions, it has to have
awareness, too, and we have to distribute information. So, the security information
that is distributed is through an evolving [organization]. We have only been a de-
partment since 1 March [2003], but involving architecture which distributes threat
information through the country. In terms of just general awareness on homeland
security issues and strategy—that type of thing—there is a form of public affairs di-
mension to Secretary Ridge’s department. They are very actively involved in com-
municating strategies, approaches, precautions, and the like.
Admiral Johnson, United States:
To your second question, Admiral Feldt, I think that part of the burden rests on our
shoulders, and that each one of us, in our own way, has to get out on what we call
“the rubber-chicken circuit.” You have got to get out there and talk to the people:
every forum that you can find where you can bring the message. We have the saying
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in the United States about all politics is local and all local politics has to do with
jobs. As Admiral Clark and most of our speakers have alluded to, in globalization,
most of the growth in our economies has to do with that part of it that has to do with
exports and imports and the future well-being of all of our citizens. The extent that
they have economic well-being is very much based on the fact that we have to have a
stable, secure maritime environment. Somehow, we are having difficulty connect-
ing the dots, and, more importantly, having difficulty having our respective societ-
ies connect the dots, on just how interrelated this is and that their well-being is
inextricably linked to this. I do think that we can do better; we must do better. It is
also part of educating our politicians so that they can carry this mantle for us. I do
think it is a problem, though, in the world that we live in, i.e., in Europe. It is a par-
ticular challenge that we have got to all work on collectively.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
Just on that second question, in Australia, the issue of explaining the PSI exercise in
the Coral Sea [Proliferation Security Initiative]: A lot of effort was put into explain-
ing to the public why that was happening, and then a lot of effort was put into cover-
ing it, from a press point of view. I think that it came out reasonably well. So you just
have to keep working at it. But as I said earlier, I think much of the things that we
are talking about are unseen, unsung. That is the business of navies: to make sure
that the people who have the dollars understand what you are doing so that you get
the resources.
Admiral Band, United Kingdom:
I think, if we are honest, we are not winning this battle at all. The force structure
challenge to practically every navy I know is explaining why, after we have solved
the ASW [antisubmarine warfare] problem, we need to keep escorts, MPAs, and ev-
erything. These are exactly the units that we need to engage the ocean element of
this campaign we have been talking about, and I think that every navy here is under
pressure in those areas. While we can be smarter in net-centric and intelligence-led
operations, in the end looking after high seas is a heavy activity, I think for some
time, and I think we have got a serious problem in practically every navy now, get-
ting at that lower end of the force structure. You know, it is very easy to argue for an
OPV; it is a lot less easy to argue for a multicapability escort which can do this but
then also can do some serious force projection and power projection. So I think we
have got a long way to go. I thought the comment by Admiral Retief about the
land-centric view in Africa [can be extended]. But rest assured, I think the land-
centric view is alive and well, all over the place.
Admiral Angel Tafalla Balduz, Spain:
It is not a question, it is something that I would like to share with you and get some
reaction. In the second LIVEX exercise on antiproliferation on BSI, we established
what we thought was a challenging scenario, and we struggled to have political con-
sultation for the missions, and said we should have an exercise on rules of engage-
ment, and how this would follow, and if this was too much for the nation. The
nation had objections to the framework that we established. One could accommo-
date this, because we changed the framework. We redrew the active participation in
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the exercise. So what we have learned is, that was an exercise with a selected group
of nations that believe in antiproliferation; if we are going to do that for real, we
need to establish a robust political consultation—without that, the mission will fail.
It is not the problem for navies to cooperate together; this is a piece of cake. But, at
least for the NATO environment, it is the consultation, the agreement on the mis-
sion, the intricacies, that need to be established. This is what we learn from these
exercises, and we anticipate this problem could happen in real life, too.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
I agree with you. I think that unless there is political agreement as to what we are
setting out to achieve, then we are not going to achieve it; and I think that that is-
sue, really, was brought up yesterday. I think that Vice Admiral Klaver was moving
toward that explanation when he was talking about ROE. But would anybody else
wish to comment?
Admiral Furusho, Japan: [Translation.]
In answer to the German admiral’s question, if there is any other topic for the sym-
posium: We have kept very good cooperation with each nation’s navy. Actually, we
have had good operations with ten nations’ navies in the Arabian Sea, successfully.
However, we hardly had trained with the JCG domestically. Since three years ago,
when the spy ship case occurred, the Japanese general public came to pay attention
[to the fact] that JMSDF can scarcely operate with the JCG, though it has kept a
good interoperability with USN. Accordingly, we regard the two matters as impor-
tant. One is how we share information between JMSDF and JCG. The other is the
training on how we do the initial cooperation. For the purpose of the two important
matters, we have shown the Japanese people the participation of each of our ships
and aircraft with each other’s during the fleet reviews that have been held splen-
didly every year. Additionally, we show the people our presence on how JMSDF and
JCG deal with terrorism, drug peddling, and so on, by providing the media the
training scene conducted on the regional level. I conclude that we have to begin
them from familiar options so that we share limited budget and manpower.
Admiral Godoy, Argentina:
I am going to speak in Spanish. [Translation.] I will speak in Spanish. More than a
question, I want to make a reflection. Here this morning we have talked about the
strategic importance of maritime cooperation between our respective fleets of our
forces. It appears to me that a fundamental aspect in order to implement that coop-
eration is that we understand each other a little more. This is the important part of
this cordial gathering here in Newport.
In the sense of one from a South American country, I have the impression that at
times the more developed powers see the regions [of Latin America] too compactly,
as a single bloc with overly homogeneous interests. I want to implant [the idea] that
in the particular case of South America we have much in common, but we also have
different realities: There is a CONOSUR reality, there is an Atlantic reality, a Pa-
cific reality, and a Caribbean reality. Therefore, to speak of a Latin American
reality is not easy. In this sense, the more we understand these realities, the easier
will be the cooperation and the buildup of forces that share interests.
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Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
I make no claim to being a superpower, so I will pass it over to Admiral Johnson to
answer.
Admiral Johnson, United States:
Thank you very much, Admiral Ritchie; I very much appreciate that. Admiral, I
share your sentiment, and there sometimes is a tendency to take a broad brush at
things and not understand these different nuances of what goes on inside the larger
region. I cannot speak so much to the Southern Hemisphere, although in my time
in Atlantic Fleet I began to gain some appreciation for that, and I share your con-
cern and your suggestions. I see it much more now in the context of, say, the Medi-
terranean, since I have lived there now for some three years and been operating
there and spent most of my life operating with the Sixth Fleet. There is the NATO
part of it; there is the Levant; there is the Magreb; there is the Black Sea. There is
an incredible amount of texture, and we would do well to understand that and to be
able to leverage it to a maximum benefit, rather than just speaking of the Mediter-
ranean or just speaking of the Southern Hemisphere or just speaking of Southeast
Asia. We do have to do a better job of that. I do agree with you that getting together
like this is the most important thing that we can do, and I think that we need to con-
tinue it in this ISS context, which is the entire global perspective. But I think we
would be well served if we continue to build on the wonderful regional sea power
symposia—we call it the RSS—that is hosted by our Italian colleagues now, on the
odd year. I think that there is something with the Asian navies as well, and I am not
so sure of exactly what the comparable organization would be for Western Hemi-
sphere or Latin American navies, but I think we need to do that. This could be the
capstone, and then we [could] have a series in the off years, a series of regional sea
power symposia to build a better understanding in this world.
Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
I think it is time now to bring it to a close. Could I personally thank everybody for
their contribution to the discussion this morning.
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7Luncheon Address:
Maritime Power for the Twenty-First Century
The Honorable Gordon England
U.S. Secretary of the Navy
Admiral Clark, United States:
For all of you who so enjoyed yesterday and the rainy day that we had, we decidedwe would try to change the venue here for us a little bit today. And I want to
thank all the people here from the officers’ club and how they have helped us make
these events the last two days work here. If you would just join me in a round of ap-
plause for the folks here.
It is my distinct privilege to introduce our luncheon speaker to you today. The
year was 2001. We had an election late in the year 2000, and the new administration
was pulling the executives together to lead this administration. I had been the CNO
for about six months when President Bush was inaugurated, and, of course, he
brought in Secretary Rumsfeld, and they decided to put together some unique
skills to help us run the Department of Defense. Their approach for the service sec-
retaries was, while these are positions that require confirmation, nomination first
by the president to the Congress and then confirmation by the United States Sen-
ate, the real approach here was to bring individuals into Defense who had excelled
on the business side of this industry. Those of us in uniform were watching this with
great interest, as you can imagine, and over the course of time it became clear that
the president intended to nominate Gordon England to be the secretary of the
navy. I remember my first session with him in preparation, initial briefings, and
meeting him and talking about what was going on in the navy and what our chal-
lenges were. What I wanted to share with you today was that I found our secretary to
be a person of great character who knew the business end of this business, and he
became the individual who created the senior leadership team in the Department
of the navy, to lead a department that in our military is unique, because there are
two services in our department, as opposed to the Department of the Army and the
Department of the Air Force. From the very beginning, he put a focus on this thing
called teamwork, with him as the leader, the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
and the CNO. I have to tell you that I found his leadership to be not only refresh-
ing, but personally of great value to me, because, you know, I am a destroyer man. I
grew up on ships, and there was not much about my experience that taught me
what was going to be required for me to lead from the military side of this thing, to
lead my navy and to understand the financial implications of running an organiza-
tion as big as this. Gordon England helped me come to appreciate the business end
of running the navy in a way that has been of tremendous value to me personally.
He would pull me aside and say, “Now, Vern, let’s talk about our strategy for how we
are going to go at this,” and gave me wonderful counsel on when it would be a good
time to go after a particular issue and when it would be a good idea not to do that. I
was tremendously impressed. I knew that he was a man who had done very well in
the American business scene, and he was nearing the point in his life that it was time
for him to retire. In fact, retirement was just on the horizon for him. And when
asked by the president, he made the decision to delay all of that and to come serve
the nation and our navy and the Marine Corps team as the secretary of the navy.
And so it was a tremendous experience, which was shattered late last year when we
learned that the president had asked him to go be the deputy at the newly estab-
lished Department of Homeland Defense. In fact, I will tell you¯and I have never
spoken about this in the public way¯but the Commandant of the Marine Corps
and I went on a “recce-run” to talk to him about the foolishness of this idea. But be-
cause he is a person of service and he believes in service, and because the president
asked him to do that, he made the decision to go serve in that capacity. Well, I can
only tell you, to make a longer story short, that the department was overjoyed
when, very recently now, they made the decision that he had done the hard work
that they had needed him to do over at Homeland Security and it was time to let
him come home and come back to our department and continue to lead in the De-
partment of the navy. When we think about the things that we have been talking
about yesterday and today, I want to assure you that we could have nobody come to
speak to us who knows [more about] the issues that we are confronting in dealing
with the Global War on Terrorism. We could not have anybody come and speak to
us who knows more about the challenges of pulling together organizations to do
the tasks that are in front of us, here in the United States of America, than Gordon
England. So, ladies and gentlemen, it is my distinct honor to introduce to you my
good friend and our secretary of the navy, the Honorable Gordon England.
Honorable Gordon England, United States:
Admiral Clark, thank you, and good afternoon. This is a profound gathering, I will
tell you; this is very impressive, to be here, to have all this naval leadership from
around the world in one place and interacting. I made the comment when I came in
that I am a firm believer that you do not establish good relationships between coun-
tries, you establish good relationships between people. Relationships between
countries are built a person at a time and between the leadership. So I think meet-
ings like this are absolutely magnificent in terms of building these bonds of friend-
ship around the world, and the CNO and I thank you, I congratulate you, and I
thank everyone for being here. This is terrific, that you all came this long way. I un-
derstand there are seventy-five navies represented here. I know we are separated by
many, many oceans, but it is good that we could come together. We call this the
thinking capital of the United States Navy, right here. So you’re all here in our
thinking capital. Also, we have some coast guard chiefs with us; I am happy to see
the commandant here, Commandant Tom Collins. I understand he spoke to you
also. It is wonderful to see our commandant here, because of the vital role that our
coast guard plays in our national security, particularly after events of 9/11/01.
Also, I know that we have a number of Middle Eastern naval chiefs here with us
today, and many of them are here for the first time. As many of you know, this past
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Monday was the first day of the holy month of Ramadan. The guidance to Muslims
during Ramadan is that they spend this time with family members. And they are
here with us. So for this week, we are the family members, and I thank them for
their great support and for allowing me to be part of your family this week. So, a
very special welcome to all of our friends during this week of Ramadan.
As you can tell, Admiral Clark and I are very close, and I do want to say a very
special thanks to [someone] who is a very special leader, a great friend, and some-
one who was just honored by the president of the United States. Many of you may
know he was just recently asked and nominated by the president to extend his tour
of duty for another two years. This is only the second time in our navy’s history that
this has happened. The other time was a famous admiral, Admiral Arleigh Burke,
[whose tour of duty as CNO] also was extended two years, and I just want to say it is
an honor for this navy, and it reflects great leadership. Admiral, it reflects your
leadership, your experience, the great job you do with our navy, navies around the
world, and I want to thank you for your service, your sacrifice, and your personal
friendship. I will tell you the greatest thing about being secretary to the navy—you
get to serve with our great CNO and also our great commandant. Our last comman-
dant, you know, went on to be the Supreme Allied Commander, and we have
supreme days, I know, in mind here for Admiral Clark.
First of all, it is a privilege to be here. It is an honor and a great privilege to be
here to talk about a few issues today. It is excellent that you all come together and
discuss the issues of the navies, but also the issues of the world.
The world has changed. The world did definitely change from the last time this
symposium gathered, four years ago. We may be different nations, from different
places in the world, but we now have a common mission, and that is this War on
Terror. We are now all bound in a common war and a common objective, and it will
take all of us together—working together and, frankly, fighting together—for us to
prevail, to bring peace and harmony and stability back to the world.
I know all Americans, but I think most people in the world, will remember where
they were on 9/11/01. It turns out the World Trade Center was indeed aptly named;
it was a world trade center. When the attack on the World Trade Center happened,
there were 219 people killed from thirty-five countries other than the United States
of America. So it really was a world event, and it was not just America that was at-
tacked; the world was attacked that day in New York. There are probably only a
handful of memories that we have that other people can share with us that are that
profound.
Now there is a great challenge before us, and in my judgment, terrorism—and
terrorism in this modern form, and I will speak a little bit about how it got in this
modern form—is one of the greatest threats we have ever had to civilized societies
in this world. The causes are probably many and diverse for international terror-
ism, but I believe that international terrorism is enabled by a few characteristics that
have happened in perhaps the last ten or twenty years. In my view, there are five
fundamental characteristics that have brought about the situation we are in today. I
would speak very briefly about those five.
First of all, there is globalization. Perhaps an overused term, but if you think
about globalization, [it is the] ability to move people, goods, services, money, al-
most unimpeded—and to some extent with very little government involvement.
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Goods, people, money, services can move around the world, and I mean literally
around the world. And that is not about to change. I mean, periodically we have
demonstrations at different places in the world, but the fact of the matter is, this
[globalization] will accelerate, and you cannot turn the clock back. So globalization
is the ability to move anything, money, goods, services, people, around the world.
That is going to go unimpeded and, if anything, accelerate.
Couple that with the fact that technology is now much lower cost and much more
readily available, and continues to become much more readily available. My back-
ground is in electronics, developing electronic systems for military airplanes. At
one point in my career, in the 1980s, we were putting global positioning satellites in
military airplanes. It was brand-new technology at the time. It cost us $200,000 an
airplane to put a GPS system in a military airplane. About a month ago, I was at a
sporting goods store in the northern Virginia and Washington, D.C., area. I went in
to buy a GPS receiver, and the GPS receivers went anywhere from $79 to about
$200 U.S. The person in the store wanted me to buy one for $149, and I decided,
no, that’s too expensive. So I bought a $79 GPS system, a little digital display: drop
the breadcrumbs, right? Three-satellite tracking, everything very, very precise,
probably good within about ten feet of any place on the face of the earth; $79. You
know, in the U.S. military, we talked about how we own the night, because of all the
night-vision and all that, that we have in all of our militaries. But you can now buy
night-vision in your automobiles. For a thousand dollars you can buy a very good
night-vision system. So this technology is becoming very, very low cost, available
around the world; and, again, with globalization, you can move it around the world.
This whole information age and all it portends: it is the ability to move informa-
tion. Terrorism is not new; what is new is the ability to organize international
terrorism. If we decided to form a club—as a matter of a fact, to some extent, we
have, if you think about it: this group can communicate; we can communicate infor-
mation. We can do it from wherever we reside around a room; we can do it
instantaneously. By the way, our men and women at sea now not only communicate
with their families, but we now have mothers and fathers on our ships, right on the
high seas, who help their children with their homework assignments.
This is the ability to move information so you can organize. If we were to orga-
nize a chess club, if ten of us got together from different places in the world and
decided we would organize an international chess club, we could do it this evening.
And we could put the rules into place and how it operated, and we could control
things in advance. So, we can do command and control instantaneously. You can do
it anywhere in the world; it is easy to organize. So terrorism has a new dimension:
easy to organize, with command and control anywhere in the world, and carry out a
mission anywhere in the world. That is why terrorism is no longer local. That is why
it is now international, and, by the way, in that same way information is dissemi-
nated. So I worry once in a while. People would ask me with my last job at
Homeland Security, what worries you the most? And I would say, well, I worry about
everything. But what worried me the most was specifically biological. And the rea-
son I worried about biological is because of this rapid dissemination of information
that used to take a long time. By the way, it’s interesting—look at a newspaper
someday, about some interesting activity that is taking place in this whole area
of genetics or biology. You read about some breakthrough, some genetic
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breakthrough, some biological breakthrough. And a month later, someone some-
where else in the world is doing the same experiment; and a month later, someone
else is; and then they move beyond that. So there is very rapid dissemination of in-
formation; goods, services, the ability to organize, has forever changed the world.
The world will never be the same.
I have been through three “isms” in my lifetime. I am older than some here.
[During the] first “ism,” I was four years old, and that was the fight against fascism,
and that took a world war. Then, a few years later, the United States went into Ko-
rea with a lot of our friends and allies. We did not know it at the time—people
talked about the Korean War—but it turns out it really was not the Korean War. It
turns out it was a very, very bloody battle of a much larger war, and that war did not
end until the Wall came down in 1989; and that was the war against commu-
nism—the second “ism” of my lifetime. And now we are into the third “ism,” terror-
ism. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is not the war; it is more like Korea: it is part of this
much larger effort in this greater War on Terrorism. And I am afraid that, frankly,
like the other “ism,” communism, this one is going to last a long time, much longer
than any of our tenures in office. Because of the factors I mentioned, this is going to
be a long-term threat. And it is now not just countries, remember; this is now small
numbers of people without any affiliation with any government, or without any
country. So small numbers of people with access to technology, ability to organize,
communicate, have changed the whole world.
They will forever have changed the world. And it is not just the terror groups we
have today. Once in a while I think about countries who harbor terrorism, and I
think they are very shortsighted. They do not realize that everyone in the future can
be a target of international terrorist activities. I think our CNO was right on target
yesterday, [when he] commented that, of course, terrorism is a world prob-
lem¯that naval powers must unite for one fight, and that Sea Power 21 can help
transform the way we fight as an international force. I would like to complement,
that is to add on to, the CNO’s comments yesterday and give you a little bit of my
view¯a little broader, perhaps, strategic view.
In September of 2002, we put out a new National Security Strategy for the United
States, and that got a lot of attention. It had three key themes, and at the time it was
generally referred to as the Bush Doctrine¯and, frankly, in the United States and
in many places of the world, it got some negative reaction. But let me tell you what
the three themes are for the Bush Doctrine. First is, we will take the fight to the en-
emy. We will take the fight to the enemy, preemptively if we have to. We will fight
this war with our world partners, but we will act alone if we must; we will use all
means, primarily diplomatic and economic, to fight terror, but we will use military
methods if that is the final option.
Now, there are three big “ifs.” The three big “ifs” are the part that generally gets
most of the attention¯that is, [they are] generally highlighted by many of the
press and many of the analysts. But I would emphasis the three main themes them-
selves to you: We will take the fight to the enemy. We will fight this war with our
world partners. And we will use all means, primarily diplomatic and economic, to
fight terror.
But there is an “if.” If they [our world partners] cannot work that way, then we
will take what actions we obviously have to do. Some people have called this
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doctrine “assertive unilateralism,” but I will tell you that none of us¯none of
us¯can ever again stand by as danger gathers. We cannot do it. And, in fact, the
best defense is, generally, a swift and devastating offense. When necessary, because
of the size of this threat and the consequences of what can occur, you can no longer
stand by and wait for an event. This is an emphasis on action. It is broad-based. It
does include all means, military, economic, and diplomatic.
Now, my conclusion is that this strategy is right on target. You need to know: The
United States of America, we do not fight for land, we do not fight for money, and
we do not fight strictly to impose our will. We do, however, take up arms to secure
our country and to defeat evil when it threatens our lives and our freedoms and lib-
erties, and we do that for our friends and allies, and we do it with our friends and
allies. That has been our tradition for 227 years: the fight to defend freedom and
liberty around the world. That will continue to be our legacy, and we will continue
to fight for freedom, and we will finish the job once we start. The president, in his
Strategy, wrote, “History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger, but
failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security
is the path to action.”
This strategy emphasizes the first imperative of all of our governments collec-
tively, and that is protecting our citizens. The objective of the strategy is to provide
a stable environment for peoples and governments to flourish. For that to happen,
we need to recognize that security and economic development are two sides of the
same coin. Security is necessary for economic development, but in the long term,
economic development is needed for security. But in all cases, security comes first,
and that is the fundamental approach of the doctrine of the United States¯that is,
to provide a secure environment for economic development around the world.
Peace and prosperity are not ordained; they are earned. So we need to build on our
inherent strengths. Navies fight away games. It does not matter if it is ten miles or
ten thousand miles offshore; we are the best, we are the first, defense, so that the
last defense may not be needed. We bring our sovereignty with us; we are the only
part of the larger forces able to act anywhere in the world, around the clock, to exe-
cute the commander’s intent. Basing from the sea, coupled with our long-reaching
capabilities, enabled by technology, naval forces are very unique and very essential.
We should redouble our efforts to harmonize all of our navies, our coast guards,
and other systems needed for our collective defense. We need to build or
strengthen our channels of communication. The rapid and accurate flow of infor-
mation between us is the foundation of actionable intelligence.
We then need to link this technology, this intelligence, with the appropriate law
enforcement, and with agencies around the world that can take action against ter-
rorism. Preventing the use of the sea to transfer arms or to move weapons of mass
destruction or components or ingredients of weapons of mass destruction or drugs
is going to be an endless challenge. Just as we use the seas to defend our interests,
our adversaries use the seas to attempt to advance theirs. Our world will always turn
to all of us to keep the lines of communication and commerce open in its vital geo-
graphic straits. Imagine the impact on our world if the Straits of Hormuz,
Gibraltar, Malacca were closed, for just a matter of a few days; it would have a cata-
strophic impact. The Suez and Panama canals are two of the greatest gifts from a
prior age, and they allow free commerce around the world, begetting more
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freedoms that orderly countries like ours all cherish. But with every gift comes a re-
sponsibility, and now it is our responsibility to keep the great ocean seas and straits
flowing freely and safely.
As the CNO commented, prior to coming back to the navy I served as the deputy
to Secretary Tom Ridge at the Department of Homeland Security. That was a fasci-
nating experience, and it gave me some other insights in terms of this collective
security and this war on terrorism. By background, at the urging of the president of
the United States, the Congress in November of 2002 established the Department
of Homeland Security here in the United States. That was the largest reorganiza-
tion of the government since the Department of Defense in 1947. The Department
of Homeland Security is much smaller than the Department of Defense, but still
very large; it is about a hundred and eighty thousand people. It has a budget of
about $37, $38 billion¯so still a very, very large department. There are six critical
mission areas in the Department of Homeland Security, called out by the president
of the United States. Here are the six areas that are the primary responsibilities of
the Department of Homeland Security:
• Intelligence and warning
• Domestic counterterrorism
• Border and transportation security
• Protection of critical infrastructure and assets
• Defense against catastrophic threats
• Emergency preparedness and response.
Now, in just about any complex endeavor—and that is certainly a complex en-
deavor, those six objectives—goals are easier to accomplish through partnership;
and in this case, international partnerships are essential. You cannot have homeland
security without international partnerships. So, at the Department of Homeland Se-
curity, we set up international objectives. We wanted to promote information and
technical and education exchange with our friends and allies, the same as we do on
the naval and DoD side. We want to share best practices and technologies, includ-
ing research and development information on homeland security technologies. We
want joint training of first responders and everyone involved in this whole arena,
and we want exchange of expertise on terrorism prevention, response, and crisis
management. So we made this an international effort. And in Homeland Security,
just like in the United States Navy, we try to bring in nations throughout the world
to work with us in this collective activity.
The Customs Service now has relationships with twenty countries in the world,
probably all of them represented here. And that is with the ports, so we can work at
the ports for container security initiatives. It turns out that 95 percent of all the
cargo in the world travels on containers. It all goes, by the way, on all the ocean
seas and straits that we all need to protect; it all travels on ships and in contain-
ers. So container security is particularly critical, and that is about 95 percent of all
the trade.
We also worked with international civil aviation organizations, with the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, particularly with all the coast guards and those of
you here, to establish standards, processes, and systems that, between us, would
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provide for this collective security. So, the approach is to align the Department of
Defense with the Department of Homeland Security and then to establish interna-
tional coalitions working with those two departments. Internationally, working with
these two departments, was our approach that had mutual shared security, and that
is the approach that we have now with the Department of Defense and Department
of Homeland Security in the United States: international shared responsibility with
these two primary departments in America.
President Bush is right. It will take all of us, the entire international community
working together, to defeat terrorism. It will also take our international navies rep-
resented here today to make that possible. We are an essential part of this whole
effort, between our countries. This War against Terrorism will be a thousand fights
across the globe and across the years. This is not going to be a fight like the great
victory by Nelson at Trafalgar: there is not going to be this one fight that changes
the outcome of this war. Working together, our navies can be a vital element of this
victory. Our goal should not be the avoidance of another 9/11 2001. Rather, our
goal should be a freedom from fear of another 9/11, anywhere in the world. That
should be our goal for our children and our grandchildren. They should never live
in fear that there will be another 9/11 type of attack, anywhere in the world. So it is
not to avoid; it is so they do not have to live in the fear of that. This is now our battle,
and I believe together we will indeed be victorious.
In closing, Admiral Route, thank you. I think this is a magnificent symposium
you have put together. I appreciate that the Naval War College has given me an op-
portunity to express a few views today. I particularly want to thank our great CNO,
for one, bringing everyone together, but for the leadership he provides, not just in
the Department of Defense in the United States, but literally around the world.
God bless you for your great service, Admiral. I thank all of you, everyone here, for
your great commitment, for your great service to your countries and to your navies,
and I thank you for your commitment to freedom and liberty. I am proud to stand
here with each of you today. Thank you for all you do. Thanks for the opportunity
to be with you, and the very best for the rest of your symposium. God bless you all.
Thank you very much.
Discussion
Rear Admiral Route, United States:
Mr. Secretary has agreed to take a question or two. If anyone has a question, please?
Lieutenant Colonel Dashti, Kuwait:
How do you¯on the planning level, can you convince the Muslim world that the
War against Terrorism is not against their religion, but is against a group? Thank
you, sir.
Secretary England, United States:
It turns out [in] the Department of Homeland Security, our responsibility was also
terrorism within the United States of America, so we have had terrorist attacks.
Oklahoma City was a terrorist attack against America by an American, by the way.
But this, I believe, is a long-term issue. This is not just Muslims; this is not al-Qa’ida.
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I believe the genie is out of the bottle. This issue of terrorism is a new kind of war-
fare, and I think it is a new kind of warfare we all need to learn to live [with] and ad-
just to. It can affect any country, any religion, any nationality. The history of the
world is, [shows that] there will be [such] groups in this world at different times, in
different years and different environments, who can band together, [perhaps with]
only a small number of people.
By the way, here is something to think about. I thought about plotting. I have ten
people on the vertical axis. Start back when we were all cavemen; go back thousands
and thousands of years. How many people could ten people damage, hurt, or kill?
I expect for a long time it was pretty much a straight line. Ten people probably
could damage or kill ten people. Then you got into the Civil War or about that
era—cannons, more accurate guns—and it probably went up, but not [by] many
people. We were still pretty much one on one, even at that time. Then, at World
War I, it probably changed some more, with tanks, machine guns; and in World
War II, it became world. But on the other hand, it took a lot of people. It took whole
countries to develop, to generate the money, the resources, the technology, to build
the weapons of war. I am not sure, in total, that it changed a whole lot. Now, for the
first time, ten people, unaffiliated, getting their hands on a weapon of mass de-
struction, whether it be chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological—the curve
probably starts to go exponential. So, it is different. And by the way, the ten people
can be any ten people—they can be any race, any color, anywhere in the world. Ten
people can organize internationally and, I think, in the future, do great harm to the
world. So this is not about today, precisely; this is about a threat to the world that
has changed. I would also contend that, if you take that exponential curve, if you
take the policies to the left of that curve and you apply them to the right of that
curve, the results could be deadly.
I believe firmly that the president of the United States has great clarity of vision
of what this threat is, this greater threat of terrorism. He has great clarity of vision
and great resolve that you need to act differently than we have in the past. And I
have great confidence in the president, that we will end up with policies and ap-
proaches in the United States and in the world that help us deal with this much
larger threat we now face. So I do not think it is a question so much of exactly today;
it is a much larger issue of terrorism and how we deal with it on a global basis, recog-
nizing that it now utilizes the same technologies available to us.
Admiral Band, United Kingdom:
Thank you very much for setting out and restating the president’s strategies, which
I think are encouraging for all of us: talks about partnerships, allies, friends, coop-
eration. There is also, of course, the patience factor: “We retain the right to do it
alone.” I think the thing we will all look for is this application of reasonable pa-
tience to get the international community to agree, because I think there has been
some potential damage in the last years to some international communities. Some
of them probably do need shaping up and shaking out, but I think my suggestion,
certainly coming from Europe, is that respect for the right ones will be a very im-
portant part. Hence, using the IMO to sort out thought rather than going unilat-
eral. Do you have any comments on that?
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Secretary England, United States:
The only comment, particularly: I will put on my Homeland Security hat and say
this can only be successful with international cooperation. I think the difference, in
this particular case, is New York City, Washington, D.C.¯our sailors were killed in
the Pentagon. I mean, we were attacked in the United States of America. So we may
feel a little differently than people who are not attacked, frankly. We feel this threat
much more vividly. So while we will be patient, we may not have the same degree of
patience, because we are sort of waiting [for] what happens next here. I believe the
president feels that way. Yes, there is certainly a certain degree of patience, but I
think you can understand if we do not have the same level of patience as everyone
else. I think it is different when you have been attacked and when you are a target. I
am not sure where that line is, in terms of patience, but certainly we all understand
this is one world we all live in.
[inaudible question]
Secretary England, United States:
Okay, I will leave you [with] one thought, and I believe it is a very, very valuable
thought. I think it has been ingrained in the Department of the Navy. We do not go
about our business trying to find ways to cut costs. We do not go out to find money,
and we do not just go out and cut costs. Our mantra, the way we operate, and what I
would suggest to everyone, [is] that the way you operate is that you always look for
ways to be more effective. How do you become better at everything you do? Invari-
ably, as you make yourself better at everything you do, you will find that you are also
doing it more efficiently. So the CNO and the commandant and Admiral Fallon, and
all the other admirals here: every day you are looking to see how do you run the navy
better? How do you make this a better navy? And as a consequence, we have found
that not only can we run it better, but we save money. Then we take that money and
we buy more airplanes, and we buy more ships, and then we become even more effec-
tive. What I would encourage you is not to try to find ways to save money—try to find
ways to be more effective, and you will save money and it will pay back, because you
can reinvest the money where you really need it. Simple, but it works. Thanks again.
Rear Admiral Route, United States:
Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. We are indeed honored to have you join us at
our symposium today. We are very honored because of your background and what
you bring to this office and what you bring to the podium. It is unusual to have some-
one with the knowledge of the administration, with experience in DoD, experience
in setting up a new Department of Homeland Security, and then to come back to the
Department of Defense and to speak about these issues from that perspective.
What is incredibly amazing here is, we are hearing the same things resonate
throughout this symposium. It does not matter whether it is from our civilian lead-
ership, from our military leadership, or from the leadership of the other navies and
coast guards who are here with us today. This is a very important alignment, as I see
it, and we are really grateful that you were able to come and share this time with us.
I also am going to adopt “The Thinking Capital of the Navy at Newport” here, and
we hope that you will come back and join us again sometime soon. Thank you, sir.
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8Seminar Working Group Reports
Moderated by Dr. Kenneth Watman, Naval War College
Professor Lawrence Modisett, United States:
Welcome back for the third and final day of our symposium. I want to start bythanking all of you for the excellent work done in the seminars yesterday.
The moderators tell me that the discussion was quite lively and focused and that
there was good representation from everyone in the seminars. So thank you very
much for doing that; it really helps a great deal.
As you will recall, our plan for the symposium was that we would use the panels to
present issues involving coalition operations at the tactical, operational, and strate-
gic levels, and then use the seminars to give you the opportunity to discuss
real-world application of those issues in the operational scenarios that you were
given to deal with. This morning our panel is going to consist of the briefings by the
spokesmen for the various seminars, who will tell us the highlights of those discus-
sions and what you came up with. There will be a brief opportunity for questions of
clarification only, after each of the presentations, and then there will be time at
the end of the panel, as we have been doing throughout, for more thoughtful
comments and questions from the floor. Our moderator this morning is Professor
Ken Watman; Ken is the chairman of the Naval War College’s War Gaming
Department.
Dr. Kenneth Watman, United States:
Thank you very much, Lawrence. Let me talk just a few seconds about the adminis-
trative details of this panel, which, as Lawrence said, is designed to be the culmina-
tion of the broad and conceptual discussions that took place in the panels on the
first two days, which then in the seminars were made more concrete and more prac-
tical, using a seminar war game as the mechanism for guiding the discussion and
adding sharpness and specificity.
Now we will hear the briefs from those seminars. Each briefing needs to be no
more than ten minutes long, if at all possible, and better if it is shorter. We have a
limited amount of time, and I would ask each of the presenters to try and stay within
those constraints. There will be time between presentations for a short question or
two, particularly if that deals with a matter of clarification. Please save the more sub-
stantive, broader questions, or questions that might engage all of the panelists,
until afterward, where we can get a sense of how much time we have to deal with
them. Also, please let me amplify Lawrence’s requests that you use the micro-
phones in the aisles. With that please, let me turn the floor over to Rear Admiral
Mujtaba of Bangladesh.
Seminar One
Rear Admiral Mujtaba, Bangladesh:
Admiral Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy, and gentlemen.
Good morning. At the beginning of today’s session, I would like to recap briefly the
situation or the scenario of the case. As you know, Green and Orange have declared
that they will take certain actions to protect the Orange and Green Strait’s environ-
ment from destruction involving these nations. They have also enforced a traffic
charge for any vessel transiting through that strait. Due to the scenario and practi-
cability for tariff collection campaigned by Green and Orange, vessels’ insurance
rates have begun to increase and traffic to slow down through this strait. This also
deeply affected the world economy, as a backlash. Accordingly, the United Nations
formed a coalition and multinational task force [MNTF] to ensure the freedom of
navigation [FON] to this strait.
Now, let us look into the details of the two-day game from the MNTF perspec-
tive. Some assumptions had to be made to make the scenario sufficiently specific for
our discussion.
The Mission
Ensure freedom of navigation; specifically, increase the flow of commerce
through the strait to the pretariff level.
Our Assumptions
• Diplomatic moves and economic pressure did not dissuade Orange or Green
from their proposal to enforce this tariff.
• There was a United Nations Security Council Resolution mandating a Multi-
national Task Force (a “coalition of the willing”) to guarantee ships’ safety in
transiting the strait.
• The UN mandate did not allow the MNTF to engage in preemptive military
action.
• One nation would have the lead in command of the MNTF; this does not nec-
essarily have to be the United States (despite historical precedent).
The concept of operations is as follows:
• The MNTF would use ISR (hopefully U.S.-supplied ISR, due to the greater ca-
pabilities) to reduce the threats from enemy weapons systems.
• The force was judged sufficient for a “show of force” to deter Orange and
Green, but was considered to have too few MCM [mine countermeasure]
ships, too few hulls for escort, and had a perhaps unneeded amphibious capa-
bility. The force was perhaps more appropriate for full-scale combat
operations than for guaranteeing freedom of navigation.
• An Information Operations campaign would be waged, designed to show the
world that the MNTF was a defensive force assisting world commerce and that
Orange and Green were the nations violating international norms. Orange
and Green would be informed of what actions were deemed completely unac-
ceptable (“trip-wires”) and that the consequences would be severe.
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• The Orange-Green restriction on FON would be gradually eroded by the fol-
lowing method. First, a purely military convoy would transit the strait. Then a
small number of heavily escorted merchantmen would transit the strait. Grad-
ually, the flow of commerce would be increased until the Orange-Green tariff
system was rendered noncredible.
On rules of engagement:
• Ideally (i.e., what the naval commanders would prefer), identifiable hostile
acts by either Orange or Green would be met by a coherent campaign to de-
stroy the military forces of that nation that are capable of threatening ships
transiting the strait, either currently or in the future.
• More realistically, the UN would only authorize the MNTF to operate under a
plan of “self-defense plus.”
Thank you.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Thank you very much, Rear Admiral Mujtaba. Are there any short questions that
anyone would like to ask? Please, on the left? No? All right, with that, let me turn
the floor over to Rear Admiral El-Arbi from Tunisia.
Seminar Two
Rear Admiral El-Arbi, Tunisia:
Admiral Clark, admirals, gentlemen, good morning. I am the spokesman of Sem-
inar Two. This group had to examine the piracy scenario. I intend to present the
issues and challenges this group identified, and I will end with some recom-
mended options.
According to the scenario, there has been an increasing amount of piracy in
and around the Green-Orange Strait. Reportedly, neither the Green nor Orange
governments are supporting pirates. A United Nations multinational task force
has been formed, with a charter to deter and/or apprehend the perpetrators of
these piracy acts. From the group discussions, two excursions arose: one with
Orange-Green cooperation, and a more complex excursion without Orange’s
cooperation.
Not surprisingly, the issues and challenges that we identified are those discussed
during the plenary sessions:
• First, this is more than just a military issue. It encompasses legal, law enforce-
ment, diplomatic, economic, and social aspects.
• Second, the level of littoral nations’ cooperation and/or support through the
UN multilateral, multinational task force is a key point.
• Third, quality of available intelligence is also a key factor. Governmental and
nongovernmental agencies should be involved, such as shipping companies,
insurance companies, customs, local police, local coast guard, and so on. But
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how do you fuse intelligence from such different government and
nongovernmental sources?
• Fourth, discussions about rules of engagement found the group confronted
with the same issues and challenges discussed here during the last two days.
• Fifth, one question we tried to answer was, what do you do with pirates you ar-
rest? This would be a real issue in the case of the second excursion.
The group recommends the following options:
• First, take a holistic approach to the challenge and use all capabilities, diplo-
macy, information, military, and economic.
• Second, local support to pirates being identified as the center of gravity of
“the enemy,” undermining it will contribute to eliminate safe havens to
pirates.
• Third, involve littoral states in MNTF. This will be the role of diplomatic
endeavor.
• Fourth, assemble forces using capability approaches or approach. This would
prevent the use of aircraft carriers against rubber boats.
• Fifth, the concept of operations should include deterrence actions such as
presence and port calls, [and] alert actions with the precondition of an intelli-
gence surveillance and recognizance effort.
• Last, develop rules of engagement to match the threat. The ideas that
emerged were to consider escalated ROEs and to consider the use of nonlethal
means.
In conclusion, the second seminar, to make it brief, recommends, “Don’t use
cannon to shoot a mosquito.” Thank you very much.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Are there any questions for Rear Admiral El-Arbi? All right. We are doing very well
with our time budget here; this is good, and that was an excellent presentation. Let
me turn the microphone over, please, to Rear Admiral Davidson of Canada.
Seminar Three
Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:
Thank you very much. Admiral Clark, gentlemen, good morning. I will attempt not
to break this excellent shorter-is-better trend and move quickly through this.
Syndicate Three was asked to look at the issue of humanitarian assistance issues
involved with preventing loss of life at sea. In brief, the scenario we were asked to
examine involved a multinational force which was operating in the straits, in a free-
dom of navigation mode, to ensure freedom of navigation.
The particular scenario was that one of the ships of the multinational task force
had observed a vessel which was assessed to be unseaworthy and boarded that ves-
sel. I should point out that this was not a declared emergency and the vessel was not
in distress. But once they did board the vessel, they discovered that there was a
large number of sick and infirm people on board. So the task for us, basically, was
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relatively straightforward. What do you do in this circumstance? How do you do it?
How do you balance the humanitarian operation with your primary mission? And
there was a second part of this, which was, how do you deal with arisings—that is to
say, if people on board are taken to be illegal migrants, for example. So that was the
scenario that we faced.
I should say, right at the beginning, that our syndicate was very privileged to
have participants who had very extensive personal experience in exactly this sort of
humanitarian assistance operations that we examined. These ranged from experi-
ence in the Mediterranean, the Straits of Gibraltar, Adriatic, the Gulf, the Gulf of
Oman, China Sea, and the Pacific. So I think we were remarkably privileged. We
had both coalition and national perspectives, and we had an extremely interesting
and informative discussion, including some discussion on very specific cases, which
illustrated, for example, some of the dirty tricks that can be uncovered when you
are in the people-smuggling business or countering that. We also discussed the de-
cisions states must take, and we discussed the consequences of inaction; more on
that in a moment.
We spent quite a lot of time on the scenario implications, as they were presented
[Figure 1]. We decided not to fight the scenario, in the best traditions of naval offi-
cers discussing things that they would prefer to do differently, and we decided not
to fight the information gaps, but rather to concentrate on the fundamental issues
rather than the tactical play. Having said this, in the circumstances—that is to say,
in an operation which is focused on freedom of navigation and, more to the point,
an operation which was not focused on embargo operations, where there is no
MIO-LIO tasking—the whole question of boarding a vessel which is in transit, not
in distress, not broken down, was questionable to us. And we felt that in the scenario
as presented, the boarding was not justified. However, having then dutifully fought
it just a little bit, the scenario was presented as a fact, and, therefore, we focused on
the arisings and the consequences from such an action. We assumed further that
the boarding was sanctioned by the commander of the multinational force.
Having boarded and determined that there is a problem, our issue really was,
then, what chain of action, what chain of decisions, does this unleash?
The first thing that we concluded was that the overall mission continues, and, if
there is a humanitarian operation in progress, it has to be supported. The overall
mission itself carries on, and there is no interruption to that. Probably the main and
most substantive detailed discussion was this issue of action and subsequent respon-
sibility, and, having boarded, clearly we felt that we were bound to assist.
The options ranged from, in a fairly straightforward way, the provision of water
and food, medical support, which would enable the vessel to continue on its way,
consistent with the freedom of navigation tasking, to another range of options. If
the vessel were judged not to be just unsafe or unseaworthy, which can sometimes
be a fairly subjective assessment, but actually in danger of foundering, then there is
a whole other issue, and that is the evacuation of personnel—the most suitable plat-
form to disembark people, and the whole chain of diplomatic engagement which
would be required to get people ashore to a port of refuge.
Our group discussed in some detail experience of various states in these sort of
operations and brought up very clearly, and focused on, the caution and awareness
intended on embarking personnel in ships of any nation, and, where possible, the
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preference to enable ships to continue en route. However, there was also a very
great awareness of the consequences of inaction, and we discussed cases in which
ships or nations have not rendered appropriate humanitarian assistance and there
has been needless loss of life. Clearly, the issue is balance and judgment on the
scene and, at the end of the day, our obligation to assess other mariners in distress.
134 Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium
Figure 1. Discussion Flow for ISS—Preventing Loss of Life at Sea
The sense as well from this—this is the final point I will make on the action and
responsibility one, and it’s an important one—[was] that the multinational task
force having authorized the boarding then, we felt, assumes some responsibility to
cooperate with the ship which has done the boarding, and also to assist with the hu-
manitarian operation. It was clear that this could go quickly and assume some
predominance as a national issue, but the multinational force, having engaged on
this, had a responsibility to help get it right. We felt that there would be, almost in-
evitably—for the nation whose ship was involved in the boarding and to embark the
distressed mariners—national attention, which would accelerate as media expo-
sure accrued to this.
The third point, and I have just introduced this, is that we felt that the scenario,
which presented these personnel as—the distressed personnel on board—as illegal
migrants, was really not central to the game play and that our assessment and con-
clusion were that these were really mariners in distress and that we will treat them as
distressed mariners. And that focused how we dealt with this. There was a game
play instruction regarding the potential for the outbreak of violence onboard the
vessel. We did not really get to this at all; but clearly, in the circumstances as pre-
sented, a non-embargo operation where your rules of engagement would not
normally extend to boarding and actions on board another nation’s ship—you
would be obliged to rely on the international standing rules of engagement, which
would cover these sort of circumstances. And intelligent reliance on the principles
of preservation of life and minimum use of force would be your guiding doctrine.
The final two points I will cover very quickly. This very useful and very, very in-
teresting discussion pointed out the need for very clear policy guidance regarding
humanitarian assistance when you are in a coalition or multinational force which
could involve this sort of operation—guidance, that is to say, on the action to be
taken and the scope and range of action and the responses, thought out freely by
the commander and understood by the participants well ahead of time. And lastly,
we felt that there was an interesting opportunity, and perhaps even a requirement,
that arose from this discussion, for the exercise of some contingency plans in hu-
manitarian assistance as part of future coalition operations. Thank you.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Thank you very much, Admiral. Are there any questions, anyone? Please.
Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie, Australia:
Did you give any consideration to the question of whether or not a multinational
force would actually work in this circumstance, given that whoever boarded the ves-
sel probably is going to end up owning the people and you are going to have to take
them somewhere?
Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:
We had an interesting discussion on this, and, frankly, one of the points we raised
late in the afternoon was that, in this scenario, it is a bit like an ambulance driver go-
ing down the street and stopping and looking at somebody and saying, “Well, you
don’t look very good; you know, you’d better get in.” We decided not to go down
that line.
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Our discussions ranged from the possibility of an ad hoc boarding, an unautho-
rized boarding, in the absence of clear direction or passing from the coalition; but
given the geographic scale of this, we felt that was not practical, and, therefore, it
had to be a sanctioned operation, and we went on that basis. I think you are right,
Admiral, that at the end of the day the national play on this would be significant,
depending on the number of people, the size of the vessel, and everything
else—and also, I think, probably the extremity of the circumstance, if there were
ships and assets in the coalition that were better suited to take on or to disembark
personnel. There would have to be some degree of cooperation in that, but owner-
ship being nine-tenths of the law, I suspect that the diplomatic effort to help
disengage from this would certainly largely center around the nation of the board-
ing ship—in this case, on the ship to which they are disembarked.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Admiral, do you wish to pursue that? Is there anyone else who would like to ask a
question at this point? All right. Please, the floor over to Rear Admiral McHaffie of
New Zealand.
Seminar Four
Rear Admiral McHaffie, New Zealand:
I thank you very much. Admiral Clark, Admiral Route, fellow delegates, on behalf
of Syndicate Four and those that have not yet had a chance to express personally
their gratitude and thanks for the ISS, I wish to pass that on from that syndicate and
also to thank the facilitators that we had in our discussion, Captain Critz, Professor
Wawro, and Captain Hayes, who led us particularly well and steered us occasionally
in directions when we got into considerable detail in some areas. The scope of my
presentation is that I will just briefly outline the scenario, and then we will discuss
two issues, plus what we believe are brief solutions to those two issues. Finally, I will
discuss two areas that our syndicate considered worthy for further study.
Just very briefly, our syndicate’s aim was to discuss the naval support to civil au-
thorities in the standoff that could occur in the straits that we were considering, and
our mission primarily was established as freedom of navigation through the straits
and ensuring and allowing, where possible, innocent passage as required.
In our deliberations we had some considerations before we discussed the events
that actually occurred, as how we might deploy our forces, noting the large num-
bers of units we had available to us. In essence, we were going to deploy to the east,
primarily to the entrance to the area, with our larger forces and use smaller forces
through the choke point, and have one VLHA also close to the east, ready to react
should a situation arise. We had to consider that side of the risk of dividing our
forces and how that might be achieved, and also we had discussions on how we
would affect the escort, should that be necessary.
You will know, those of you who have read all the scenarios, that at that stage
when we were positioned and ready to go, seventy environmental warriors
boarded—unannounced and unexpectedly—the tanker, at which stage we were
then positioning units, and we had one unit very close by in order to render assis-
tance to the master of the tanker that had called a Mayday. Unfortunately, during
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that stage of the operation, the vessel went close to the tanker and damaged it, and,
therefore, the tanker became somewhat disabled. At that particular stage, I was
someone from the syndicate to explain to higher authority why it was one of my ves-
sels had damaged the tanker. During my absence, the syndicate did some sterling
work in sorting out some of the issues, and when I came back, the situation was
pretty much resolved. So, a sigh of relief on my part, thank you very much to my fel-
low members of the syndicate, but, perhaps, now to the more serious issues of what
we considered in plenary.
Without going into the nitty-gritty and the real issues of how we might have dealt
with the environmental warriors, we found in our discussions that one of the issues
that we faced was really understanding the rules of engagements; and the rules for
use of force must be robust to ensure the premature use of excessive force—in other
words, to make sure that it does not occur. So a great deal of our discussion was
about [how] we did not want to lose much time in taking action to be effective
against the environmental warriors, but we really did feel that we must have robust
ROE established very early in the piece in order that we would not have to deliber-
ate and actually [would] be able to take effective action early. Therefore, if we
establish that clarification needs to be sought, then that must be done in a timely
manner.
The other issue that faced us in discussing what sort of ROE we would use in this
situation was the limits of proportionality and how much force we could use. The
solution to this particular dilemma, which would have been common to all syndi-
cates, is really the need for considerable planning and analysis of such situations,
and particularly war gaming to exercise these ROE through the potential scenarios.
We also feel to do that it actually needs to be war gaming and planning done not
only within the military environment, but very much within the civilian environ-
ment—in other words, establishing contact with all authorities and making sure that
we all know where we stand. And particularly, when we consider the amount of envi-
ronmental issues that are now prevalent in the world as well, if we do not have contact
with those individuals, then it is going to make life particularly difficult for us.
The second issue that we raised coming from our discussions was a policy issue
and that military missions need to be better defined in terms of policy issues which
surround them. Again, one thing that came through in our particular syndicate was
the issue with regard to environmental matters and, particularly considering that
we are in a multinational task force and between both Orange and Green, in deal-
ing with what we considered to be an international organization that was trying to
make a point. The solution to this issue is again very similar to the previous one.
Engage early on the other instruments of national power by diplomatic, economic,
and informational [means], to better bound the military contribution. This, again,
would establish and ease the perceptions and confrontation. In other words, if we
are in contact, it would lower the threshold that we should know the modus ope-
randi of such organizations.
One of the discussions that we did have was, in fact, press coverage, and we were
in some doubt as to how far the environmentalists were going to take this issue.
They may well only wish to get on CNN, and once they are there, they would not
wish to go any further. So we had to consider how long we would have to be con-
cerned about how long they are on the vessel and the overall situation.
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So, our seminar, our group, came up with two areas for further study, and those
are, again, emphasizing the environmental concerns and potential solutions, par-
ticularly with regard to freedom of navigation issues and choke points. Other issues
that we considered, very briefly, were such things as the depth and the environment
and the impact of that particular area. One of the shortfalls that we identified was
that we actually did not have any oceangoing tugs or anything that were available
within the task group to actually take immediate effective action. Although we felt
we could do that with the ships we had available, we would have been better served
with the availability of tugs and such.
The final point for further study is, again, better integration of diplomatic tools
and consideration of demarche—in other words, being able to make sure that we
can demarche between both Orange and Green, to establish better positioning in
regard to environmental issues, and, of course, to emphasize the need and require-
ment for provision of both treaties and agreements and regional groupings of
personnel, both in the maritime multinational task force and also within inter-
agency and intergovernmental levels. That concluded deliberations in Seminar 4.
Thank you.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Thank you, Admiral. We have heard from half of the speakers on this panel, and we
are ahead of schedule, I am pleased to say, so it occurs to me that we might at this
point deal with some broader questions—some more open-ended questions, per-
haps—that people may have been holding back to the end. I think we can entertain
some of those now, if there are any that anyone wants to engage in.
Admiral Johnson, United States:
One of the interesting issues in our group that came up, that I do not think is
unique to the fact that some of us were in the European theater, was this issue of en-
vironmental warriors; maybe their name could have been Greenpeace, or some
other such organization. When we deal with those, we have to keep in mind that
these organizations are also well entrenched in the political process of many of the
countries that we deal with over there, and so this puts a different complexion on it.
In fact, they are part of various ruling coalitions and what have you, and there is a
great deal of sympathy toward these groups. And so that adds a degree of complex-
ity that not everybody from every part of the world may fully appreciate and under-
stand. And so, as you deal through one of these, the public affairs aspect of it and
the diplomatic aspects of it are probably as large, if not larger, than the pure mili-
tary aspects, as an observation. I do not know if anybody else has any thoughts on
that, or if you have the same problems in all parts of the world, but it is a very real
consideration in the part of the world where we happen to live. Thank you.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Anyone on the panel who would like to comment on that observation, or anyone in
the audience who would like to?
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Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:
I would simply add that I have been at the receiving end of some visits from some of
these folks, and, Admiral, I can only echo the observation. Very well thought out,
very carefully planned, very effective disruption of activities; and you are right, they
are masters of manipulation of public opinion and bringing visibility to issues they
wish to document. So I could not agree more; it is a public relations issue as much as
a security issue, very frequently.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Are there any other broader questions, not just addressing the issue of environmen-
tal warriors, but those that our other panelists had spoken to: freedom of naviga-
tion, piracy, and preventing loss at sea? Please.
Vice Admiral Buck, Canada:
I’d just like to pick up on the exchange between Admiral Ritchie and Admiral
Davidson. Admiral Ritchie made the point that in this multinational scenario—and
this was the distressed mariners scenario—that, likely, the nation that effected the
support to the distressed mariners would end up inheriting them. I would be curi-
ous whether the panel had any discussion about that in terms of how, in practical
terms, assistance could be provided but might not necessarily have required that
the distressed mariners be embarked in the multinational ship (because I think you
indicated that there had been a wide practical discussion of that). And, of course,
from our own experience in the Arabian Gulf–Persian Gulf area, there are some
practical examples of how you can avoid that. But I would be curious whether you
actually had some discussion on how you could resolve the issue, without necessar-
ily getting into some interesting immigration arguments.
Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:
Yes, we certainly did, and some of the specific examples focused on experience in
the Straits of Gibraltar and essentially in areas where there was tasking specifically
to counter illegal migrants. This was not the scenario that we were dealing
with—we were dealing with essentially an arising at sea and how you manage this.
This, of course, also was in a narrow strait, ten miles wide, with bordering nations
who were uncooperative. We did not go deeply into game play—into the issue of
which ship you would embark them in, or if at all. It was a strong sense that, if at all
possible, you avoid this and you facilitate the vessel on its transit as your primary
goal, in this one. Had the play developed further so it was necessary to disembark,
we would have gone further down that route and looked at platforms, capabilities,
and so on. Really, the strong sense was: you do everything possible to allow them to
continue on.
Admiral de Donno, Italy:
Talking about the issue of life-saving at sea, one interesting aspect that I think must
be considered in the final day of discussion is how is one able, from a multinational
military force at sea, to give humanitarian assistance to a boat of illegal immigrants.
You know that there are international laws which establish specific behavior for this
kind of a situation, but this is something that—particularly in the Mediterranean,
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with the operations we are doing in support of ENDURING FREEDOM, with the multi-
national NATO forces working in the Eastern Mediterranean and around the Gi-
braltar Straits—it is possible for multinational forces to find boats with illegal
immigrants crossing the Mediterranean. This is something that can happen. So an
interesting thing is to see how the ships belonging to different countries, which
have different approaches to this problem, behave in this situation, being part of a
multinational force with the force commander and a chain of command which can
be of other nations. I would like to know if they have taken in consideration this as-
pect, or if there are any remarks which can be made on this?
Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:
I think, Admiral, that was a central thought as we concluded our deliberations, how
in an operation like this—whether it was the possibility of encountering vessels with
personnel in distress, or for whatever reason—the coalition or the multinational
task force absolutely had to have a clear understanding of the possible range of ac-
tivities and a clear, well-thought-out-in-advance plan for dealing with those, pre-
cisely in order to reconcile where there were different national approaches and
which would help you sort out, perhaps, which ships you would employ, the scope
of activity that they would be able to engage, and so on and so forth. Coordination
amongst the players: that is essential to our thoughts.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
The gentleman at the left has been waiting patiently.
Unidentified Speaker: [Translation.]
In Spanish, please. Not only in the case of humanitarian assistance, but in piracy
and in all these cases, there is a strong aspect of public opinion. Only one of the
four panelists has mentioned the importance of this aspect. Sadly, we are in a world
where perception is worth more than reality, and images more than ideas. What-
ever force and whatever role it has, there is an important communications
component.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Thank you very much. Who would like to respond?
Rear Admiral McHaffie, New Zealand:
That certainly took up some discussion in the syndicate over the environmental is-
sue, and one of the first things that we talked about was making sure that we had ad-
equate public relations coverage. We saw, with that issue, that we would need to
have real good top cover, because the reality would be that we would have to make a
judgment as to how serious the environmentalists were. And, therefore, we did not
want to take preemptive action if they only had one aim. That was the whole point
of our discussion, to try and get to a position where we know where those risk levels
are and when we have reached decision points, because we could have gone in there
immediately and taken action, whereas their aim may have been just a very simple
one. It was complicated, however, by the damage to the vessel, and we had other
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considerations associated with that. But yes, it was very much part of our discussion,
and your point is particularly valid.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Is there anyone else on the panel who would like to respond to that?
Admiral Tafalla Balduz, Spain:
I worked with a humanitarian assistance group in Seminar Three, and also have ex-
perience with some cases. Every case is different, so there are no recipes for success;
but our main philosophy, which I would like to share with you, is that we should
avoid having full responsibility for a situation that is not caused by ourselves. We
need to share the responsibility, especially with the littoral state. So, coming to hu-
manitarian relief, other than when human life is at risk, [it is important to] talk with
somebody directly with the shore authorities, to share the responsibility. We help
them to take them on board only when the littoral states are able to accept them. So
I think the key point of this situation, in my personal point of view, is not to have the
full responsibility of the situation, but to share with somebody else: multinational
commander, littoral states, or organization that you to report to. Other than that,
you finish in a situation that the final responsibility is with the ship taking it, as in
this particular case.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Would anyone in the audience or on the panel . . .
Admiral de Donno, Italy:
Yes, may I? Just another remark to what the admiral said, and always related to the
situation of illegal immigration. That is something that, unfortunately, we are ex-
periencing very widely in the Mediterranean. First of all, the difference between
the situation of illegal immigration and the situation of life-saving at sea is really
very thin, and most of the time those situations have the final goal to be an illegal
immigration, but they are performed through life-saving situations, which changes
the international law under which the situation must be checked. But according to
what the admiral was saying, I think there is not only a problem of deciding, as a
navy, what to do in certain kinds of situations. It is also a problem of how the na-
tion’s entire system accepts this. I want to share with you a typical situation regard-
ing these facts. Last year, in 2002, I had the same commanding officer of the same
ship who was prosecuted by a judge for two different situations: the first time, be-
cause he had not given support to a boat in distress, and, in another situation, be-
cause he had facilitated illegal immigration. So, as you see, the same man with the
same ship in two different situations, he behaved absolutely perfectly from a techni-
cal point of view—in fact, as his boss, I have nothing [critical] to say about his behav-
ior—but he has been put under prosecution by a civilian judge for two different
situations: once, because he was inattentive to the law to save people at sea, and an-
other one, because he disobeyed the law to discourage illegal immigration. Just to
give you real-world examples.
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Vice Admiral Ritchie, Australia:
I have got to support what the admiral said, from my own personal experience in
very similar circumstances, which led to Senate enquiries and all those sorts of
things. But the difficulty that the man on the spot has in deciding between, per-
haps, political direction and the very humanitarian sort of feelings that all mariners
[have] for people in distress, because illegal immigrants often become people in
distress—it is a very difficult position that we put commanders on the spot in, out
there in action.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Anyone else on the panel or in the audience, please?
Brigadier Montanaro, Malta:
Just a comment on an additional concern. I wonder whether the same panel also
examined the situation where the individuals themselves on the boat do not want
help, because this often occurs as well. You are in international waters. You have the
situation that everybody has just mentioned, but because they want to go where they
want to go, as opposed to where you want to take them because of the situation that
you found them in, you are then faced with this situation. Questions: Are you enti-
tled? Are you within the law? Do you have jurisdiction to say, “Okay, get on my ship;
I am taking wherever”?
Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:
That was very central to our preliminary discussions, and the scenario was rather
complicated by the geography in which we were operating, in that we would have
been, at any time that this coalition was taking place, in the territorial seas of one
state or the other: first point. Second, the nature of this operation was to facilitate
the free passage of ships, and we examined the scenario-play very closely, and it was
not a case of declared distress. It was a subjective assessment that this vessel looked
unseaworthy, and, therefore, a decision had been made to intervene. A fundamen-
tal question—and our conclusion amongst the panel—was that, in such circum-
stances, if the vessel was not in evident distress, if it was not having navigation
difficulties, you could query it to determine if everything was all right, perhaps, but
by and large, this intervention, we felt, and the boarding were not warranted in the
circumstances. However, this scenario was that this decision had been taken and
that it did play out accordingly.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Anyone else like to comment on that particular line or any other, before we move
on? All right. With that, please let me turn the floor over to Vice Admiral Afolayan
from Nigeria.
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Seminar Five
Vice Admiral Afolayan, Nigeria:
Admiral Clark, President of the Naval War College, senior colleagues, good morn-
ing. I am representing Seminar Five, and we had two scenarios, but the objective of
the two scenarios is the same. The aim of the terrorists is to attack a multinational
gathering, and the given mission statement is to deter the terrorists from attacking
the gathering at the Olympic Games. The situation is such that one cannot contem-
plate not taking a position, because of the provisions of the present International
Law. It was a hot argument between the participants, and we could not come to the
conclusion that the commander of such a task force only would take a position that
would be contrary to world opinion. This, to my mind, raises issues that these semi-
nars have been discussing in the past two days. What do we do in this serious issue,
where thousands of lives are put in danger? Do we follow the Law of the Sea? Do we
follow the traditional Maritime Operations Law? Do we follow the law of the United
Nations Security Council that are not very precise (and by their nature are meant to
be so)? These are the questions that arose in our seminar.
The issues that are involved are of three basic elements: the legal aspect, the
rules of engagement, and the mission statement. We found out that all these are
ambiguous. In the first scenario, the ambiguity in the rules of engagement mission
statement, which was to deter, is subject to different interpretations by the nationals
of the multinational neighbor task force. The United Nations Security Council Res-
olution on self-defense cannot be said to cover any attempt to board a ship
suspected to be carrying terrorists, without permission from the host country or any
other higher authority. Hence, the commander of such a multinational task force
cannot make a decisive decision or pass any definite orders to units under its com-
mand. In such a conflicted environment, what does he do?
The result of not taking any actions should the terrorists attack the participants
of the Olympic Games would be too serious to contemplate, as thousands of lives
will be subjected to serious danger. However, the decision to attack or board these
affected vessels is beyond a military position; rather, it is a political act, which
should be supported by the appropriate United Nations Resolution. The interna-
tional communities should not allow events like this or that of a similar level. We are
nationals of countries to which this can happen in any part of the world.
Participants of Seminar Five are of the opinion that serious thought be given to
the amendment of rules of engagement to allow for clarity of mission and to give a
definite guide to the commander that is in charge of multinational forces. We also
think it is necessary that the rules of engagement should be such that the units un-
der that command can understand. Thus, the consensus opinion of the participants
of Seminar Five is as follows:
Scenario A
• Green maritime vessels may be loading terrorists in a Green port for transport
abroad.
• MNTF sent to “deter” terrorist deployment.
• Terrorist ships may be rapidly lost on the high seas.
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Key issues:
• Legality of stopping/boarding vessels in Green/Orange territorial waters in
the absence of UNSCR
• Different national interpretations of right of self-defense
• Issues in overlapping territorial seas
• Meaning of “deter”; expectation of more definitive mission statement for
MNTF.
That is a summary of our decision on scenario A, which is about the boarding of a
vessel within our own territorial water, and we all know what the rules of engage-
ment and the Law of the Sea Convention say on this issue. Can we legally, on
suspicion, board a ship within our territorial waters? Seeing the danger that ship
poses, do we dare tie our hands and allow the ship to get into the area where we can-
not look at, detect, or arrest him, and to go and carry out the attack? These are
issues that we feel are very strong issues that are beyond a military position; they
should be handled at the strategic level. To my mind, the commander that is in
charge of this task force, as we all agree in my syndicate, is helpless; and any posi-
tion that he takes there, he may find that he may not be backed up by his
government. Therefore, the United Nations, as a global body, should be tasked to
look into all these rules, beyond consideration of the present situation in the world,
where terrorists pose serious risks.
Scenario B
• Green cargo ships in international waters may be carrying WMD for terrorist
operations abroad.
º MNTF sent to deter terrorist deployment.
Key issues:
• Consensus on MNTF action.
• Must make clear link of WMD to terrorist activity.
• Nothing illegal about a sovereign ship carrying WMD.
• Need clarification of character of WMD.
• Legal basis is then self-defense or SUA Convention [for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation].
• Proportionality principle applies; thus, measures taken depend upon assets
available.
The second scenario is a follow-up, but the issue involved this time around is that
there is a loophole in rules that are existing and that can be used, and that is in the
International Maritime Organization Convention, Article III, subsection B, which
allows boarding of a suspected vessel carrying out unlawful activities. It is on that
that—with the handicap we have on rules of engagement and other interna-
tional rules, and considering the seriousness of the vessel carrying weapons of
mass destruction—we feel that we can exploit this and board the ship. But the
point came up, again, which we have been discussing in this seminar: The multi-
national forces may not all be capable of detecting weapons of mass destruction by
any equipment they may be carrying on board. But among them there are maybe a
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few that may have this capability, so the idea of shared information becomes very
relevant. Hence, the weapons of mass destruction that have been carried can be an-
alyzed, classified. Then it becomes very easy for the task force commander to take a
position. But in absence of that, it may be very difficult. But in this particular sce-
nario, as I said earlier, we use the International Maritime Organization law to
board the ship, bearing in mind the consequences of leaving the ship to go and at-
tack the people at the Olympics.
This is our solution to the second part, but I would want this body to look at the
issues critically: that is, the present or the existing rules of engagement and the mis-
sion statement of this nature of exercise, that it would be decided if something
concrete can be done concerning this issue and, therefore, the statement of the Sec-
retary of the Navy in the lecture he gave yesterday would become fact. If these
situations are not tackled by the world body, if you get to a state that an individual
would take what is the only option left to him to prevent the threat of terrorists, that
is a big question to the whole world. Do we allow an individual on his own interpre-
tation to act unilaterally? Do we as a United Nations body look at issues at stake and
amend the existing laws? These are things that I will leave to be answered by this au-
gust panel, to talk about and maybe make recommendations at the appropriate
level to our political leadership. Thank you very much.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Thank you, Admiral, for a very interesting presentation. Here, within about five
minutes of our designated break time, my inclination is to hold large questions for
the admiral until we return, because I think this is obviously a very key subject, and I
think there will be an interest in talking at some length about it.
Captain Romano, United States:
Thank you, Dr. Watman; I am going to hold the remainder of the administrative
remarks until we come back. At this time we will take a break and reconvene at
10:15.
[Seminar reports from Seminars Six, Seven, and Eight and a portion of the dis-
cussion have not been transcribed, due to a fault in recording the session. The
discussion resumes, below, following the presentation by Seminar Eight. For details
of these seminars, see reports of discussions in the seminars at the end of this vol-
ume. —Ed.]
Discussion
Vice Admiral Sandagiri, Sri Lanka:
First of all, let me thank Admiral Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S.
Navy, for giving me and my delegates this opportunity to participate in this sympo-
sium. In the time we have arrived here, assembled, and participated in discussions,
we have [had] much discussion on ROE, the rules of engagement. I am not too sure
this rule of engagement has been specified to meet the various differing situations
under the scenarios that we have discussed yesterday. Certainly, each nation would
have adopted certain instructions under ROE to tackle whatever situations that
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would arise in the area that they are operating. I would like to get into the situation
where the bottom line of ROE could be considered, in general, in facing any situa-
tions as maritime nations, because at times we find the ROE one that, when you add
it up, may not be the best ROE. Even the UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea] is very silent on this issue, as far as the ROE is concerned. So I
would ask the panel whether we could have a set of ROE as a bottom line and to be
suited to meet situations by each nation, in the betterment of coexistence of na-
tions. Thank you.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Who would like to pick this up?
Rear Admiral Davidson, Canada:
Perhaps I could just start by offering a thought or two and then invite the other
panel members to kick off as well. I think the discussion that we had over the last
day or two really reinforced exactly the point that you are raising, Admiral. We have
some standing rules of engagement now, of course, which apply to segments of the
international community, and the NATO ones, the ones that we work with the
United Nations, and clearly there is a need to standardize the general concepts of
these. I think the other point, though, that came out very vividly in the discussions
that we have had on this is that, regardless of the degree of agreement and stan-
dardization for a particular operation, there will always be some national instruc-
tions and some national caveats on participation, and that will not change. The
message, though—and I think perhaps the most important message of all—is the
need for participating nations in such an operation to share those rules of engage-
ment and ensure that there is common understanding of the critical elements of
this when they engage in an operation. We have had lots of recent examples where
that has been very difficult for commanders to obtain, and the limits on national
participation have greatly affected the effectiveness of some elements of an
operation.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Anyone else like to pick up this issue of ROE? All right; are there other questions or
comments, please? Yes, sir?
Vice Admiral Hull, United States:
[I am the U.S. Coast Guard] Commander, Atlantic area. I, too, would like to thank
Admiral Clark and the United States Navy for inviting the Coast Guard, and what
we bring to the table and how we work together, to this conference. It has been very
instructive for me, and all of us, to be able to be engaged in this. I would go back to
the comment about how do you prepare or how do you operate in a world today
that is a little different: security, economic prosperity; it is the sharing of informa-
tion, the awareness going on [in] the MDA picture. And I would go to Admiral
Johnson’s comment yesterday on a joint interagency type of organization that can
fuse law enforcement and military data, then transmit orders or directions to ships
at sea in the maritime environment, as a model we should look into. I think you can
use some of the JIATF model in the Caribbean that takes into account international
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sovereignty. It has multinational representation in the command center. It has
rules of engagement involved but yet respects those rules of engagement of the host
countries. I think there is a lot of experience over the last fourteen years; no way do
we know the answers, but it is a model that I think can be looked at in instructive
fashion, and I encourage you to do that.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Other comments or questions?
Vice Admiral Roughead, United States:
To follow up on Admiral Hull, we talked about the various regional models that can
be used—and to try and fit a common model around the world, I think, is very chal-
lenging—but what our objectives might better be is to establish the regional organi-
zations and strive to have the connectivity between those organizations be
compatible. That way, each region can adapt to the scenarios it will face, the struc-
tures that may be in place; but the objectives should be how they connect, so that in-
formation and dialogue can pass through that [connection] and yet let each one
take its own form, if you will. Thank you.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Other points? Other questions?
Admiral Fallon, United States:
In the business of humanitarian and NGO, I think this is an area that is going to be
with us for quite a while, obviously with increasing levels of activity around the
world. It seems that we might benefit from some kind of a structured approach to
this, in the form of, maybe, a template that could be used by the military authorities
and another one by the humanitarian organizations. They always have needs and
requirements, and when we get into these operations, there is a long list of things
that people want to have done that the military can facilitate and assist. And it
seems that, typically, when we get into these operations, we are back at a very low
level, doing the same things again and again. It seems that you may offer this up for
discussion as you go back to your own nations and whatever regional forums that we
get involved in, that we might consider this and see if we can come up with some
common procedures that would make it easier, when we get into these operations,
to get started rather than going back to the baseline and doing it all from scratch.
Thank you.
Dr. Kenneth Watman:
Additional comments on this point? Are we cooked? Let me, for myself, express our
great appreciation and our great respect for the energy and the wisdom and the
professional expertise all of you committed to this session, the panelists, and to the
meeting in general. A report will be issued and sent to you.
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9Closing Remarks
Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route and Admiral Vern Clark
Rear Admiral Route, United States:
Thanks, gentlemen. It has been a pleasure hosting you here these past few days.On behalf of my staff and some others who have helped us, it has been our
pleasure to provide the venue and the support to enable you to conduct a successful
conference. Many of you have been effusive in your praise and your thanks to me,
and as much as I appreciate that, I would like to bring some of our folks down front
here who have helped and put a significant amount of time into this. I will just men-
tion a few names as they are walking down here. Senior Chief Tessier is our security
coordinator. You have seen many of our folks in the camouflage uniforms around
the spaces, but he is also coordinator with the region for their security as well as the
Newport Police and the Rhode Island State Police. Captain Derek Offer coordi-
nated the escort officers who had been assigned to each of you individually. Our
escort officers are primarily our faculty members here and staff members at the
War College, but we do have some from Navy Warfare Development Command
who have helped. Chief Parker, who coordinated our transportation, drivers, and
the buses; our medical folks, including HM2 Smith, who not only helped us in the
medical world, but helped fix the bus the other day. Our command center person-
nel—you have met and seen many of these. The folks who have been standing
around and helping you with the microphones for the last couple of days have been
instructors from the Surface Warfare Officers School, just down the street here, and
we appreciate their help. Donna Rubel, our protocol officer, and Debbie Maddix,
the assistant for Commander Carol Elliot, who is our Special Events Coordinator. If
you all will join me in thanking these folks, who are just the tip of the iceberg here in
support that we have provided today. Thank you. Thank you all very much.
I would also like to thank the folks in the Pentagon, Admiral Boomer
Stufflebeem and certainly Pete Romano and the folks in N52. Admiral Clark, it has
been our pleasure to do this for you, sir, but we could not have done it without your
support, and we certainly appreciate that. And with those final remarks, I turn the
podium over to you, sir.
Admiral Clark, United States:
Thank you. In accordance with the rules, I will identify myself. I am Vern Clark
from the United States. I just want to say a few things in closing. Actually, there are
so many things that could be said. I am so taken by the appreciation that I person-
ally feel to each of you for choosing to be part of this symposium. I am a great be-
liever in the power of choice and how important it is; and to me, the fact that you
would choose to be part of this symposium is, above everything else, more impor-
tant than anything, and I thank you for that. One of you said on the first day that
getting together as a group is the most important thing of all, and I like that; I be-
lieve it says it absolutely perfectly. The group would not work if each of you had not
chosen to be part of it, and I thank you for that.
Admiral Route, we are very grateful to this institution—the center of thinking, as
I was reminded again this week—for the effort that it takes to put something like
this on. Of course, you all recognize that it has been four years. How many of you
were here four years ago? Just a couple. In four years you can forget how to put
one of these on; the lessons learned slip away. Your folks did a tremendous job,
and outside of the little thing with the bus problem—we will get a medal to the
corpsman and the medic for his ability to apply medical procedures to the bus and
get it going again.
I hope this was an enjoyable time as well for the spouses that were here. One of
the things that came out of this, for me, is the importance of the regional structure
that was set in place a few years ago. I was fortunate enough to be part of the Re-
gional Sea Power Symposium that took place last year in Italy under Admiral de
Donno’s leadership; it was a real privilege for me to be able to attend that. It strikes
me that we have to think about the output of these kinds of sessions. More than any-
thing else, I will take away perspectives and insights from you, the key leaders—the
majority of the leaders that are responsible for leading navies. You have all given
me something very, very important to think about. Years ago—when I was a lieu-
tenant, actually—I worked for a very wise admiral, who said to me, “Vern, don’t
ever forget that we are all functions of our perspective.” I have gained new perspec-
tive these last two days. It is important for me to understand where individual
leaders are coming from. It is important for me to understand how you connect the
dots in the circumstances that you face.
The scenarios gave us opportunities to think about real-world situations. Some
of them had artificialities that you challenged, appropriately; but all of them [were]
designed for us to share our perspectives. I guess it was the middle of the first day
when I turned to Ron and said, “Ron, we have to get all of these presentations. We
must make them all available to everybody here, because we are hearing some very
thoughtful pieces, some very thoughtful positions.” And I have to go now and
spend some time thinking about all of those and see how I am going to make them
part of my total perspective. I think that is clearly one of the very important prod-
ucts of this symposium.
But there is more that needs to be done, it seems to me, and Admiral de Donno
made this point earlier; Gary Roughead made it today: the ability to focus, using
the regional symposium structure to help us deal with some things that we need to
wrap our brain around. Let us just take the ROE example. There were ques-
tions—very, very good questions—raised about that [that] fundamentally meant
this: “Well, why do you feel about ROE the way you do?” Individual discussions
went on, and the individual discussions are a key part of what this symposium is
about; but, potentially, we need to spend more time putting together a notional
ROE for specific things that we are facing and have the hard and difficult discussion
about why individuals feel the way they do about ROE.
I remember times where I was convinced I knew more about ROE than anybody,
because not very many people spent a lot of time thinking about it. When I was a
ship commanding officer and my boss asked me to give a presentation on ROE,
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that fact caused me to think a lot about what I was going to say to the group. And I
was never the same in the way I thought about ROE after that event, because I had
to think my way through a scenario and really come to grips with why I believed
what I did believe about ROE. It might be a good thing for us to do. I do not at all
believe that we can come up with an international ROE that will solve every case.
But I believe that as naval and coast guard leaders it could be worthwhile for us to
consider—to tee up to—this subject, because, as it was stated several times, we keep
coming back to it. So maybe this is something for us to think about in the future.
I will tell you what else I took away from this. The next one of these we have, two
years from now—put it on your calendar now. We were late getting the invites out
this year, and I apologize, but sometimes there are distractions. For us to do this, we
have to get permission from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and sometimes
that is easy, and sometimes it is more difficult; but put it on your calendar for two
years from now. Two years from now, I want us to hear from the Regional Sea Power
Symposia. The Chief of the JMSDF [Admiral Furusho]—we heard your comments
about the symposium that was held in Japan last, and I believe that it would be very
valuable for us to hear the actions that are occurring out of these events. When I was
in Venice with you, [Admiral] Marcello [de Donno] you set up some task forces to
do work [on] follow-on problems, and now I will tell you, Marcello, at the end of
this—the symposium is over, and as we were going through it, I realized that I
should have had part of the agenda, the discussion, that led to specific actions that
you directed and that the delegates agreed to, so that we could have this collective
growth that comes from the regional structure. Next time I intend to do that. To
the maximum extent possible, we want to be parties to these kinds of things; when
we are invited to the regional structures, we will be there. So, this has been very
valuable to me.
It seems to me that the focus of our discussions has taken us to the point where I
might just close with this thought. If I had my way, what I would do now is go to a
large boardroom and get the chiefs together, and just sit down and talk about the
challenges each one of us is facing. I would love to hear what is going on inside your
heads. At lunches, at dinner, and at sidebar discussions, I have shared with a num-
ber of you, and I am taken at how similar our challenges are: people; money; which
ship to design and buy, and how to convince the legislature that this is a good thing;
and how to get posture for the challenges that we face. All of us are facing the same
kind of things. I would love for us to have time to just sit down and talk. But that is
not the way we laid out the symposium, and, everybody, your time schedules are
just incredible.
One of the things that has been driven home to me is—as our nations make
judgments about how they will invest the nation’s resources, and they are all doing
that; around the world nations are making those judgments—how important it is
for us as services to win in the marketplace. Now, that is an economic term that is
not oftentimes used in war-fighting parlance, but I am convinced that all of those
scenarios that were up on the screen represent the marketplace—the marketplace
of challenges and problems that our nations are facing in the world.
I am a very joint guy, and I do not get up and ever speak negatively about the
army or the air force or the Marine Corps or the coast guard. I do not do that be-
cause I have learned that none of us can do it by ourselves, and our country and we
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must work together. But I will say this—that I am more convinced after three
years and three months in this job, that if I can’t handle these kinds of chal-
lenges, my Congress, my leaders, will be looking to see if one of those other guys
can handle it better.
This is why I said, on the first day of this symposium, that we face difficult and
demanding challenges. Some of these scenarios do not have good answers to
them—which is why they were up there, because they are difficult. It is why I be-
lieve, more than ever, that we must figure out how to partner together to maximize
the outcomes that are available to us. That is my very, very self-centered [view]—all
about my own personal needs and requirements—but it is about how I can make my
navy more effective and I can have it win in the marketplace. I want each of you to
know that, since I am going to be around for a couple of more years, I am looking
forward to working with every one of you, figuring out how we, working together,
can do that. I used examples on the first day, talking about points of cooperation
that are already helping me.
The issue of technology and C4I and interoperability conductivity came up time
and again. I am asked frequently, “You are going very, very fast; are you going to
slow down?” I want to assure you that the answer is “No!” But I also want to say this
to this collective body: these guys sitting on the front row down here—we all work
together, and they work in different parts of the world. They have a task to be
spending their resources to develop solutions to reach halfway toward everybody
else, because we understand that is part of being a partner. I want you to know that
the gates are wide open on how we can utilize the explosion in technology to help us
be better connected. That is the direction that these guys have been given, and that
is what we intend to do to be better partners. In order to make that a reality, I am
just asking myself a question, and it might be a question that we ask ourselves col-
lectively. Looking at those scenarios, and let us say they are two years from now, I
ask myself, “How do I want to write the headline that is going to result from my
navy’s being involved in that scenario?” Whatever it is that I need to make happen
between now and two years from now to gain the ability to write that headline, I
need to get working on.
So to each and every one of you, I look forward to the creation of these partner-
ships in better and more meaningful ways, so that we can write those headlines
together in a way that makes sure that we are winning in the marketplace—so that
when the scenario is complete, somebody does not say, “Wow, why did we commit
the navy to that? Why is the navy having so much trouble dealing with that?” The
difficult issues that we need to raise to the political leadership, that we need to raise
inside our structure—I am most interested in the development of these views and
ideas so that I can take them up in my government to force the issue in the interna-
tional domain, so that we can deal with these kinds of challenges effectively in the
future.
I wish you well as you head to your homes, and I thank each of you. I was think-
ing how different we all are in the different cultures that we come from. The
secretary yesterday talked about all of you that are in the middle of Ramadan and
how important it was that you became part of this. It emphasizes our differences,
and I appreciate the step that you took to be part of us in the middle of this very
special and important season to you. As we acknowledge our differences, I would
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like to focus also on how much we have in common. One of the things that we have
in common is, those ships cut through the same kind of ocean and that water all
smells about the same. If you fall in it, it is always salty. On those seas, we get a
chance to do things for our nations, working together; we can get a chance to do
things for this whole world, and to face the challenges victoriously in the first part of
the new millennium, in the twenty-first century. So, to each and every one of you, it
has been a great honor to have you here. We regret the fact that it was four years be-
tween events, but we invite you to make reservations for two years from now, and we
look to seeing all of you who are continuing to serve then—and if you are not,
please make great representation to those who relieve you that this is a wonderful
thing for them to do and that when they come year after next, they will be encour-
aged to get up and dance with the CNO. Take care.
Captain Romano, United States:
Thank you, Admiral Clark. This concludes the sixteenth biennial International
Seapower Symposium. Please have a safe trip home, gentlemen.
153

10
Seminar Working Groups
During the first two days of the symposium, participants worked together inplenary sessions at which panels of speakers addressed issues of common con-
cern. On the afternoon of Tuesday, 28 October 2003, participants divided into
eight groups for seminar discussions. These discussions were intended to draw fur-
ther insights from participants on issues addressed by the speakers during the
plenary sessions.
Each seminar focused on one of eight scenarios provided by the Naval War Col-
lege. Participants played the role of a multinational task force undertaking
operational planning for the scenario described. Key objectives were to identify is-
sues likely to arise, possible solutions, and areas requiring further study.
Each seminar group had two moderators from the Naval War College faculty,
one with operational expertise and one with expertise on international political is-
sues. In addition, the College’s International Law Department provided each
seminar group with an expert on legal issues and rules of engagement.
A spokesman for each seminar group briefed highlights of its discussion in the fi-
nal plenary session of the symposium on the morning of Wednesday, 29 October.
Figure 1. Scenario Map
Orders of Battle
Orange/Green Forces’ Order of Battle:
Orange
• (3) FFG
• (2) FF
• (4) PCM
• (8) Fighter Aircraft
Green
• (4) FFG
• (4) FF
• (6) PCM
• (4) PC
• (1) Diesel Submarine
• (1) AOR
• (20) Fighter Aircraft
• (4) Maritime Patrol Aircraft
• (2) CDCM Launch Sites
Green/Orange Platform Capabilities:
• FFG
º Max Speed: 29 knots
º Max Range: 4,500 nm (20 knots)
º Surface-to-Air Missiles
• Range: 5.5 nm/Speed: Mach 3
º Surface-to-Surface Missiles
• Range: 66 nm/Speed: 0.9 Mach
º Guns: 100 mm
º Antisubmarine Mortars
• Range: 1,200 m
º Radars: Air/Surface Search; Fire Control
º Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search
º ASW/OTH-T: (1) Multipurpose Helicopter
• FF
º Max Speed: 28 knots
º Max Range: 4,500 nm (12 knots)
º Surface-to-Air Missiles
• Range: 2.7 nm
º Guns: 114 mm
º Torpedoes
º Antisubmarine Mortars
• Range: 1,600 m
º Radars: Air/Surface Search; Fire Control
º Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search
º ASW/OTH-T: (1) Multipurpose Helicopter
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• PCM
º Max Speed: 22 knots
º Max Range: 1,140 nm (17 knots)
º Guns: 40 mm (Aft); 20 mm (Forward); Machine Guns
º Depth Charges
º Radars: Surface Search
º Sonars: Hull-mounted Active Attack
• Green Diesel Submarine
º Max Speed: 10 knots (Surfaced)/17 knots (Dived)
º Torpedoes
º Mines: 24 In Lieu of Torpedoes
º Radars: Surface Search
º Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active/Passive Search and Attack
• Green AOR
º Max Speed: 18 knots
º Max Range: 18,000 nm (14 knots)
º Cargo Capacity
• 10,550 tons of Fuel
• 200 tons of Feed Water
• 200 tons of Drinking Water
º (1) Medium Helicopter
• Green MPA
º Speed: 350 knots (Max)/170 knots (Patrol)
º Range: 4,900 mi
º Max Endurance: 18 hr
º Weapons
• Air-to-Surface Missiles (31 nm)
• Standard Bombs
• Depth Charges
• Torpedoes
• Orange/Green Fighters
º Max Speed: 1.25 Mach
º Max Altitude: 66,000 ft
º Combat Radius: 432 nm
º Weapons
• Air-to-Air Missiles
• Air-to-Surface Rockets
• 750kg General-Purpose Bombs
• Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles
º Speed: 0.9 Mach
º Range: 50 nm
º Guidance: Autopilot and Active Radar-Fire and Forget
Multinational Forces’ Order of Battle:
• (1) CV
• (2) DDG
• (1) FFG
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• (4) Fast Attack PC
• (1) Diesel Submarine
• (1) Combat Support Ship
• (1) Amphibious Assault Ship
Multinational Forces’ Platform Capabilities:
• CV
º Max Speed: 32 knots
º Max Range: 7,500 nm (18 knots)
º Surface-to-Air Missiles
• Range: 7 nm/Speed: 2.4 Mach
º Guns: 100 mm
º Radars
• Air Search (110 nm)
• Air/Surface Search (140 nm)
• Fire Control
º Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search
• CV Aircraft
º 25 Strike/Air Defense Fighters
• Speed: Mach 1
• Service Ceiling: 45,000 ft
• Combat Radius: 300 nm
• Weapons: Air-to-Surface Missiles (31 nm); Air-to-Air Missiles;
Laser-guided Bombs
º 7 Surface Search/ASW Aircraft
• Sensors: Surveillance Radar; FLIR; Sonobuoys
• Weapons: Torpedoes; Depth Bombs
º 2 ASW Helicopters
• Torpedoes; Depth Charges
• FFG
º Max Speed: 29 knots
º Max Range: 4,500 nm (20 knots)
º Surface-to-Air Missiles
• Range: 25 nm/Speed: Mach 2
º Guns: 76 mm
º Torpedoes
º Radars
• Air Search (250 nm)
• Air/Surface Search (140 nm)
• Fire Control
º Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search
º ASW/OTH-T: (2) Multipurpose Helicopters
• Fast Attack PC
º Max Speed: 38 knots
º Surface-to-Surface Missiles
• 4 to 8 Missiles (depends on torpedo loadout)
• Range: 70 nm/Speed: 0.9 Mach
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º Guns: 76 mm
º Torpedoes
º Radars: Air/Surface Search; Fire Control
• DDG
º Max Speed: 29 knots
º Max Range: 4,000 nm (18 knots)
º Surface-to-Air Missiles
• Range: 21.5 nm/Speed: Mach 2
º Guns: 114 mm
º Torpedoes
º Radars
• Air Search (145 nm)
• Air/Surface Search (140 nm)
• Fire Control
º Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search
º ASW/OTH-T: (2) Multipurpose Helicopters
• Submarine
º Max Speed: 12 knots (Surfaced)/20 knots (Dived)
º Surface-to-Surface Missiles
• Range: 70 nm/Speed: 0.9 Mach
º Torpedoes
º Weapons Mix: Total of 20 SSM and Torpedoes
º Radars: Surface Search
º Sonars: Hull-mounted; Active Search/Passive Search and Attack
• Support Ship
º Max Speed: 26 knots
º Max Range: 6,000 nm (25 knots)
º Cargo Capacity
• 177,000 Barrels of Fuel
• 2,150 Tons of Ammunition
• 500 Tons of Dry Stores
• 250 Tons of Refrigerated Stores
º 2 Helicopters
• Amphibious Assault Ship
º 1,500 Troops Embarked
º 10 CH-53 Helicopters
º 2 LCPL
• Littoral Combat Ship
º Primary Missions
• Mine Warfare
• Small Boat Prosecution
• Inherent Missions (SOF, NEO, MIO, Medical, etc.)
• Littoral ASW
º Top Speed: 40–50 knots
º Weapons: 57 mm Gun; CIWS; Mission-Specific Module Packages, includ-
ing UVs
º “Hybrid Lily Pad” for MH-60 R/S Helo and VTUAVs
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Seminar Working Group One
Freedom of Navigation
Participants:
Moderators
Operational Perspective: CAPT Walter J. Richardson, USN
Policy Perspective: Prof Craig M. Koerner
Legal Perspective: LCDR Errol D. Henriques, USN
Country Delegate
Bangladesh RADM Shah Iqbal Mujtaba, Chief of Navy
Barbados LCDR Errington Shurland,
Chief of Barbados Defense Force Coast Guard
Brunei COL Matussin Joharie Bin Haji,
Commander, Royal Brunei Navy
Cameroon VADM Guillaume N’Gouah N’Gally,
COS Cameroon Navy
China VADM Zhou Borong,
Deputy Chief of Staff—Plans
Egypt RADM Mohamed Ibrahim Madyn
Finland CDR Tapio Maijala,
Commander Kotka Coastal District
Guatemala CAPT Otto Guillermo Wantland Carcamo,
Commander of Caribbean Command
India CG Deputy Inspector General A. Rajashekhar,
Commander, Coast Guard District #1 Gujarat
Kuwait CG LT COL Abdallah A. Dashti, Commander,
Squadron 74, Kuwait Naval Forces
Malta MAJ Martin Cauchi Inglott,
Squadron Commander, Armed Forces of Malta,
Maritime Squadron
Netherlands VADM Ruurt A. A. Klaver,
Commander in Chief, Royal Netherlands Navy
South Africa VADM Johan F. Retief,
Chief of South African Navy
United Kingdom ADM Jonathan Band, Royal Navy,
Commander in Chief, Fleet
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Venezuela RADM Jaime Toro Calderon,
President, Venezuelan NWC
United States ADM Thomas H. Collins, USCG,
Commandant of the Coast Guard
United States RADM Ronald A. Route, USN,
President, Naval War College
United States Mr. Gerard Yoest, Political Advisor to the
Commandant of the Coast Guard
Freedom of Navigation Scenario and Questions Posed:
Recently, the governments of Green and Orange have seen a golden opportunity to
control their adjoining strait (the internationally recognized Orange-Green strait).
Orange and Green declare that they will “take certain actions to protect the Orange-
Green strait environment from destruction by the heavy merchant shipping traffic
of the world’s wealthy nations.” “We will crack down on substandard shipping and
put in place regulatory measures that will see to a smooth flow of traffic while at the
same time substantially reducing the probability of accidents involving hazardous
cargoes.” Accordingly, Orange and Green join forces to charge a tariff to all vessels
transiting this key international waterway. The tariff will be used “to defray the cost
of the regulatory teams ensuring substandard shipping does not transit the strait
and to pay for cleanup teams chartered with environmental protection in the
strait.”
Last year, over half of the world’s merchant fleet capacity sailed through the Orange-
Green strait. Although extremely limited alternate routes are available, closure of
the strait would be extremely expensive for some states and disastrous for others.
Having to divert merchant cargoes around Green (a large and extended archi-
pelagic nation) would increase shipping rates, decrease annual available cargo
capacity, and eventually affect consumer prices. Orange is a relatively small conti-
nental nation.
Shortly after Orange and Green begin their tariff collection campaign, vessel in-
surance rates begin to increase significantly, and the slowdown of traffic through
this strait starts to have a critical detrimental effect on the globalized economy as
the resources distribution cycle is hampered. Accordingly, the United Nations
forms a coalition multinational task force (MNTF) of the willing to ensure freedom
of navigation (FON) through the strait.
How does the MNTF do mission analysis?
What is the public affairs plan for the MNTF (press embedded or not)?
How does the MNTF deal with the coastal defense cruise missile (CDCM) threat
from Green?
How does the MNTF deal with potential mine threats?
What preemptive actions (if any) would be warranted? Strike CDCM and/or
mine storage sites? What action (if any) is warranted if intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) assets detect mines on the pier next to Green or Orange
vessels? What action (if any) is warranted if ISR assets reveal a CDCM site is manned
and has a missile uploaded?
What is the MNTF’s role with respect to Green and Orange naval vessels?
161
A MNTF vessel escorting an oil tanker through the strait is hit with a CDCM
launched from Green. What actions are available to the MNTF?
Another MNTF vessel hits a mine in the strait and is dead in the water. Both
Green and Orange deny it was one of their mines. Neither country will allow the
stricken vessel to enter port for repairs. What recourses are available to the MNTF?
Was the composition of the MNTF appropriate for its mission? What additional
resources (if any) would the MNTF need?
How does the MNTF gauge mission accomplishment?
Summary of the Discussion in Seminar One:
• Mission
º Ensure FON (i.e., increase commerce flow)
• Assumptions
º No success with economic/diplomatic [influence]; therefore,
military actions appropriate
º UNSCR to uphold right-of-passage
º No preemptive mandate from UN
º Lead-nation command structure
• Campaign Concept of Ops
º Strong ISR to ID and “reduce” threats
º Sufficient MNTF resources for show-of-force mission
º IO campaign critical; must include deterrents
(i.e., trip-wires, demarches)
º Graduated transit sequence for risk mitigation
• Recommended ROE
º Not preemptive, but close (i.e., robust definition of “hostile intent”)
º Response proportional to current and future threat
• Probable ROE
º May have to operate under “self-defense plus.”
Seminar Working Group Two
Piracy
Participants:
Moderators
Operational Perspective: CAPT Steven D. Kornatz, USN
Policy Perspective: Prof Bradd Hayes
Legal Perspective: CAPT Grimord
Country Delegate
Albania RADM Kudret Celaj,
Commandant of Albanian Navy
Brazil RADM Marcus Vinicius,
Director, Brazilian NWC
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Denmark CAPT Lars Kragelund,
Commander Naval Base Korsoer
Dominican Republic RADM Rafael Lee Ballester,
President, Dominican NWC
El Salvador CAPT Marco Palacios,
Navy Chief, Salvadoran Navy
Guatemala CAPT Rafael Alfonso Reneau Franco,
Commander of the National Naval Defense,
Puerto Quetzal, Escuintla
Jordan BGEN Dari Alzben
Lithuania CAPT Kestutis Macijauskas,
Commander in Chief of the Lithuanian Navy
Poland ADM Roman Krzyelewski,
Commander and Chief of the Polish Navy
Portugal VADM Antonio Carlos Rebelo Duarte,
President, Naval War College, Lisbon
Qatar COL Tarig Khalid M. F. Al-Obaidli,
Commander Qen Al-Udeid Missile Boat
Singapore RADM Ronnie Tay, Chief of Navy
Sri Lanka VADM Daya W. K. Sandagiri,
Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy
Thailand VADM Werapon Waranon,
Chief of Royal Thai Navy
Tunisia MAJ Tarek Faouzi El-Arbi,
Deputy Chief of Staff Navy
United States RADM Thomas H. Gilmour, USCG,
Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety,
Security and Environmental Protection
United States BGEN Thomas A. Benes, USMC,
President, Marine Corps University
Piracy Scenario and Questions Posed:
Recently, there has been a rapidly increasing number of piracy incidents in and
around the Green-Orange strait. While presenting a danger to the welfare of the
ships’ crews involved and preventing the ships from plying their trade, the piracy
attacks also present a hazard to navigation in these shallow and restricted waters.
Reportedly, neither the Green nor Orange government is supporting the pirates.
A UN MNTF has been formed to combat the rising piracy. The MNTF’s charter is
to deter and/or apprehend the perpetrators of these piracy acts. The Green-Orange
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strait is, however, one of the world’s busiest, and there are many vessels of many
types plying these waters on a daily basis.
How does the MNTF do mission analysis?
Accordingly, how does the MNTF position its assets to deter the pirates?
What is the relationship between the MNTF commander and nongovernmental
organizations (International Piracy Center in Kuala Lampur, shipping companies,
insurance companies, etc.)? What is the MNTF’s role in dealing with the pirates?
Will port calls help as a deterrent (presence obvious to pirates)?
What host-nation support would the MNTF seek from Orange and/or Green?
Logistic support; access to ports; airfields; supply, training, and rest facilities; terri-
torial waters; airspace; etc.?
What is the role of MNTF aircraft?
While on patrol, a MNTF ship races to a mayday, and suspected pirates appear
to be leaving the area of a piracy act with an Orange military vessel escort. What op-
tions are available to the MNTF ship?
What if the pirates and escort are in Orange territorial waters, 5 nm from Gun-
bar Port?
Was the composition of the MNTF appropriate for its mission? What additional
resources (if any) would the MNTF need?
How does the MNTF gauge mission accomplishment?
Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Two:
Seminar Two discussed the implications, challenges, and possible solutions
raised by a piracy scenario. The term piracy is really a misnomer for the scenario
presented. In order to help participants understand the legal issues, two definitions
of piracy were provided. The first is the legal definition:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, com-
mitted for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the juris-
diction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft.
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
sub-paragraph (a) or (b) Article 101 of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The two most important points about the legal definition are that acts of piracy
must be committed “on the high seas,” which has been interpreted to mean beyond
the 12-mile territorial limit and therefore “outside the jurisdiction of any State.”
Under the legal definition, very few acts of piracy actually occur. Almost all of the
statistics offered at the conference and in various news reports come from the Inter-
national Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center. Its definition of piracy is:
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Piracy is an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or other
crime and with the capability to use force in the furtherance of the act.
Under this definition, acts of piracy can occur in territorial waters as well as in
port. This raised the first issue in the minds of participants. Regardless of whether
the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution authorizing a MNTF, most
participants indicated their countries would not provide assets unless both Green
and Orange agreed to the operation. When queried as to whether they would con-
tribute forces if only one of the two countries agreed, they were not sure.
The legal advisor also provided a couple of other points he felt participants
would find useful:
• Duty to cooperate in the suppression of piracy.
º Domestic law and UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
• Right of approach and visit.
º To verify the nationality of the vessel.
º If reasonable grounds, may investigate for piracy.
• Sovereign immune vessels.
º Flag state has authority to take law enforcement action.
• The inherent right of self-defense.
º All ships and aircraft are entitled to take necessary and proportionate mea-
sures in self-defense.
He also talked about the Right of Passage:
• Transit passage through straits overlapped by territorial seas:
º All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage.
º Continuous and expeditious transit.
º Surface, air, submerged.
º No threat or use of force against the coastal nations.
º May not be suspended.
The legal advisor said of the Right of Hot Pursuit:
• When a pirate vessel is fleeing from international waters into territorial seas or
archipelagic waters:
º Every effort should be made to obtain consent of the coastal nation.
º Entry without consent is a serious matter.
º Entry may be undertaken if consent cannot be obtained, but must be broken
off if the coastal nation so requests.
º Jurisdiction devolves to the coastal nation.
• Pursuit may be undertaken through international straits.
Participants were asked to do some quick regressive planning, beginning with
the desired end state. The scenario indicated that the UN resolution discussed de-
terring and/or apprehending those involved in piracy. The participants added that
they wanted to secure safe transit passage for all ships in the Green/Orange Strait,
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with the ultimate goal of making the strait pirate-free. To do this, they realized they
would have to eliminate all pirate safe havens ashore.
To help participants consider how they might obtain these goals, they were
asked to list the strengths and weaknesses of the pirates. Among the pirates’
strengths were anonymity, the fact that they had the initiative, their familiarity with
local geography, their local support (be it governmental or private), their low oper-
ating costs, and their inside intelligence. Among the weaknesses listed were
knowledge about MNTF operations, logistics (they were dependent on local re-
sources), their limited endurance, the fact that they were lightly armed with few
defenses, and their lack of legitimacy.
When asked what forces they would prefer to have for the MNTF, most partici-
pants agreed that a high (frigates and corvettes)/low (fast patrol boats and
helicopters) mix would be ideal. They said in planning the MNTF they would pre-
fer to look at what capabilities would be needed rather than what platforms.
Foremost among needed capabilities would be good intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance. They pointed out that organically gathered intelligence would be
insufficient to meet the problem. They were interested in fusing a large amount of
intelligence provided by organic assets, national and international intelligence
agencies, shipping firms, brokerage firms, port authorities, law enforcement, etc.
This, they felt, would be the single most important challenge to accomplish if the
operation was to succeed.
In preparing a concept of operations for the MNTF, participants recommended
a three-tiered approach: deterrence actions, alerting actions, and response actions.
They believed that “just being there,” like a cop on the beat, would deter much of
the piracy. Alerting actions included good command and control of the MNTF, as
well as providing transiting ships with warnings when pirates were in the area. Be-
cause pirates are generally lightly armed, minimum resistance can normally
discourage them. When deterrence failed, the task force had to be prepared to re-
spond with boarding teams, fast patrol boats, armed helicopters, etc.
Participants took a broad, holistic view of the problem. They realized that no
task force would ultimately succeed if pirates could continue to muster local sup-
port. As a result, they wanted the international community to undermine local
support by demonstrating it was more profitable for them to cooperate with law en-
forcement than to support the pirates. They were not sanguine that piracy could be
eliminated completely and, therefore, argued that the goal should be to turn en-
forcement of the strait over to local governments. To this end, they recommended
that Orange and Green forces be an integral part of the MNTF. Offering training
and assets would also be an incentive for local governments to come to grips with
the problem.
During a previous plenum discussion involving piracy, one delegate raised the
issue of piracy in the territorial waters of a “failed state.” Since it was raised earlier,
the issue was discussed in the seminar. The first issue raised was that no legal defini-
tion of a failed state currently exists. As a result, there can be no authoritative
responses as to what might be legal when no legitimate or functioning national gov-
ernment exists. The legal advisor believed that the international community would
be on solid ground if it responded to piracy even within territorial waters if the
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littoral state had no means to enforce the law on its own. Not everyone agreed that
was a correct interpretation of the law.
Another topic broached during discussions was rules of engagement. Delegates
felt that adopting a series of escalating ROE would ensure that the right rules were
used in the right situation. They were very interested in making sure that only pro-
portional force be used. Looking at the intimidating order of battle provided for
the MNTF, one participant remarked, “You don’t want to use a cannon to shoot a
mosquito.” Participants were very interested in pursuing nonlethal weapons that
could be used to stop pirate vessels.
Seminar Working Group Three
Preventing Loss of Life at Sea
Participants:
Moderators
Operational Perspective: CDR Jeffrey Barker, USN
Policy Perspective: Prof Peter Dombrowski
Legal Perspective: Prof Dennis Mandsager
Country Delegate
Canada RADM Glenn V. Davidson,
Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic
Croatia RADM Zdravko Kardum,
Commander in Chief, Croatian Navy
Ecuador LCDR Mac Abelardo Mera,
Sub-Director of Naval Education and Training
Egypt RADM Mohammed Ali Mohamed Zaki
France VADM Alain Dumontet,
Commander, Naval Action Force
Greece RADM Ioannis Goulousis,
Deputy Chief of Hellenic Naval Staff
Greece Commodore Christos Karadimss
Honduras COL Nelson Mejia Mejia,
Commander of the Honduran Navy
Iceland MR Asgrimur L. Asgrimsson,
Head of Survey Division, Icelandic Coast Guard
New Zealand Commodore Patrick Williams,
Defense Attaché, Washington
Pakistan ADM Shahid Karimullah,
Chief of Naval Staff
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Philippines Commodore Carlos Agustin,
President of the Philippine National Defense College
Spain ADM Angel Tafalla Balduz,
Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Turkey RADM Ilker Guven, Commander,
Turkish Naval War College
Venezuela RADM Leopoldo Aponte Gonzalez,
Chief of Naval Education and Training
United States RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN (Ret.),
Director, Center for Strategic Studies,
CNA Corporation
Preventing Loss of Life at Sea Scenario and Questions Posed:
While the MNTF is conducting freedom of navigation operations in the Orange-
Green strait, one of the task force vessels stops and boards a vessel that appears to
be unseaworthy and dangerously overloaded. Once onboard, the boarding party
finds that many of the personnel on this wayward vessel appear deathly ill from lack
of water, food, and sanitary facilities. The vessel also lacks basic safety equipment
and is being operated by inexperienced sailors. Green and Orange both say they
have inadequate medical facilities to handle such a large number of sick personnel
and refuse to allow the wayward vessel to dock in any of their ports.
What does the MNTF do? It appears that many of the ill will perish in the next
few days if they don’t receive immediate medical care.
How do you balance the humanitarian exigency with your primary mission, free-
dom of navigation through the strait?
What would you do if you discovered this wayward vessel was in fact smuggling
migrants when you boarded it?
What would your ROE be if the migrants onboard began to riot, set fires, or even
attempt to create flooding or explosions to protest your presence onboard the
smuggling vessel?
As the MNTF commander, you receive word that it may take weeks to finalize the
disposition of the wayward vessel personnel as the international community negoti-
ates direct repatriation or the assistance of a neutral government. What do you do?
Was the composition of the MNTF appropriate for its mission? What additional
resources (if any) would the MNTF need?
Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Three:
Scenario: In the straits of two coastal countries vying for supremacy over the use of
the straits, a MNTF boards an unseaworthy vessel that is overcrowded with sick and
infirm passengers. Master does not ask for assistance but agrees to be boarded.
Ship’s crew is inexperienced, and there is no safety equipment. Neither coastal
state actor will agree to take the vessel into its port. MNTF Mission: Freedom of
Navigation under UN Mandate.
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Issues
• ROE.
• Peril at sea.
• Vessel appears to be unseaworthy and overloaded.
• Does MNTF have the authority to board?
• Under what authority?
• Do coastal states have a legal right to deny aid under Law of the Sea (right of
safe harbor)?
• Vessel is a hazard to navigation.
• Boarding this vessel could be seen as an act outside the Freedom of Naviga-
tion mission.
• Op order for UN MNTF is very mission specific.
• Is the master to be held responsible to a court of law?
• Which country is the vessel flagged to, and where is the vessel bound for?
• Illegal migration; no apparent papers.
• Did the MNTF vessel that boarded the unseaworthy vessel have orders from
the task force commander?
Comments from the Panel Members
• Once you board the vessel for any reason, the responsibility for the life of the
people [becomes] the MNTF’s.
• The MNTF steps into the shoes of the flag state.
• Suggestion: We give them humanitarian help (water, food, and medical assis-
tance), but we keep the captain and crew responsible unless the ship is sinking.
Help, but do not interfere. Legally, the flagged country is responsible.
• Coastal states should take the ship, but [there is] no way of enforcing the law.
• Take the ship just outside the harbor, but render humanitarian assistance.
• Suggestion: Keep the people off your ship, and assess the situation and con-
tact the United Nations.
• World opinion would dictate action on the part of the MNTF.
• Does the primary mission take precedence over the humanitarian aid
requirement?
• Suggestion: Arrest the people responsible (master and crew) and take people
to Medical on one of our ships.
• If we make one of the coastal countries take the people off the ship (safe har-
bor), this does not validate any excessive claim for control of the straits.
• The flag state of the ship should exercise police action.
• Moderator’s comment: What would your countries’ ships do if they were the
ship that stopped and boarded the unseaworthy vessel? If you were part of a
MNTF, would you consider yourself under international law or your country’s
laws in governing the behavior of your vessel?
• Who takes the responsibility? National responsibility (the ship that does the
boarding would follow its country’s policies on authority when in this
situation).
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• Action by one member means the responsibility is assumed by the task force
commander.
• Does it matter who the task force commander’s country is [in determining]
what the commander’s decision will be?
• The nature of this problem is political, and it is to whom I report.
• If the task force commander tells you to board, can the onsite commander re-
fuse because it goes against the SOP of the onsite commander’s country?
• When public affairs/opinion kicks in, it becomes the UN’s responsibility.
Concluding Discussions
1. Mission continues.
2. It is moral and legal to rescue the people, and it is legal to provide safe har-
bor; the delegates had differing views on safe harbor.
3. [There is a] need for a multinational CONOPS to cover this situation, [as
there is] insufficient guidance at the multinational level. As soon as you take
[the people] onboard your vessel, national rules come into effect.
4. [There is a] need for guidance for MNTF.
5. The action taken leads to responsibility.
6. As you form your MNTF, [it] needs to address these situations. (In writing.)
Humanitarian aid assistance is a national responsibility. A statement regard-
ing boarding policy [is needed].
7. Distressed mariners (not policing rep).
8. Not just your action but your reaction to the participants (captain and
refugees).
9. Not a black-and-white issue.
Final Conclusions and Briefing Points
1. Mission continues.
2. Action taken leads to responsibility.
3. Distressed mariners.
4. Clear policy guidance needed.
5. Build exercises into program.
Seminar Working Group Four
Naval Support to Civil Authorities
Participants:
Moderators
Operational Perspective: CAPT Michael Critz, USN
Policy Perspective: Prof Geoffrey Wawro
Legal Perspective: CAPT Hayes
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Country Delegate
Argentina CAPT Rafael Luis Sgueglia, Director of Operations,
Policy and Planning
Australia VADM Chris Ritchie, Chief of Navy
Belgium VADM Michel Hellemans,
Naval Representative to the Chief of Defence
Brunei MAJ Abang Abas bin Abang Haji Omarzuki,
Staff Officer for Operations
Chile VADM Rodolfo Codina Diaz,
General Director, Maritime Territory and
Merchant Marine
Ecuador RADM Victor Hugo Rosero Barba,
Commandant of Ecuadorian Navy
Georgia CAPT Zaza Erkvania,
Deputy Commander of Georgian Navy
Germany VADM Lutz Feldt,
Chief of German Naval Staff
Latvia CAPT Ilmars Lesinskis,
Commander in Chief of Latvian Naval Forces
Morocco CDRE Mohamed Laghmari,
Commander, Royal Moroccan Navy
New Zealand RADM Peter M. McHaffie, Chief of Navy
Nigeria RADM Amos Adedeji,
President, Nigerian Naval War College
Philippines VADM Ernesto De Leon,
Flag Officer in Command
Sri Lanka CAPT M. Pemathilake, Senior Staff Officer
Sweden RADM Jörgen Eriksson,
Navy Inspector and Director of Naval Training
United States ADM Gregory M. Johnson,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe
United States VADM Terry M. Cross,
Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area
United States VADM Gary Roughead, Commander, Second Fleet
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Naval Support to Civil Authorities Scenario and Questions Posed:
Environmental Warriors, a world-renowned activist organization, has been prolific
in its attempts to deter oil-laden vessels from transiting the narrow strait between
Green and Orange. Environmental Warriors claims many unsafe vessels are plying
these waters and that it is only a matter of time before one of these vessels collides in
the strait or runs aground and causes an oil spill, with dire consequences to Green
and Orange and the surrounding environment. Environmental Warriors wants all
oil-laden vessels to take alternate routes, avoiding the strait. Economically, any di-
versions would be cost prohibitive. Both the Green and Orange governments ap-
pear to be giving tacit approval to the efforts of Environmental Warriors, as neither
country has condemned the Warriors’ actions, nor have they used any military or
law enforcement assets to curtail the Warriors’ campaign.
Today, a UN MNTF patrolling in the strait, chartered with stopping the Envi-
ronmental Warriors’ efforts against FON, receives a mayday from an oil tanker
entering the western approaches to the strait. The mayday reports that at the break
of dawn, seventy members of Environmental Warriors used grappling hooks to
sneak their way onboard the oil tanker and overwhelm the crew. In his last broad-
cast over channel 16, the ship’s master indicated that the activists were demanding
that the ship turn around and avoid completing its transit through the strait. The
master said there is insufficient space to turn the vessel around safely and to do so
would risk a grounding or collision, with the attending environmental
circumstances.
One MNTF ship is close to the oil tanker’s position. What does the MNTF com-
mander task the ship to do?
The oil tanker continues to turn dangerously in the strait approaches despite re-
peated warnings from the MNTF ship on scene. What action(s) are now
authorized?
Without other recourse, the MNTF ship damages the screws on the oil tanker,
leaving it dead in the water.
What is the MNTF ship authorized to do with the Environmental Warriors
activists?
What if the activists use force to resist the MNTF ship’s boarding party?
Was the composition of the MNTF appropriate for its mission? What additional
resources (if any) would the MNTF need?
Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Four:
• What are we thinking on the strategic level?
• This is a straits operation, plain and simple.
• We must assume that our governments have agreed to the mission; now let’s
make some ROE.
• Our mission: secure freedom of navigation.
• FON doesn’t include military transit unless Green and Orange agree.
• We will use minimum levels of force.
• Shouldn’t UN go to Orange and Green and tell them that they have a respon-
sibility to keep the strait open, and that we’ll assist?
• Our force is overkill—we may have to pick and choose.
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• The carrier and sub will move out to the eastern entrance to provide ISR; we
will detach standard protection for the carrier: DDG, AOE. That gives us two
groups, an air-heavy group with support, and the PCs to patrol and escort in
the strait.
• Logistics are a huge concern. How do we sustain the flights, particularly given
that the carrier needs “sea room” to do flight ops—i.e., longer distances to
and from the strait.
• Ship has been boarded; a Mayday has been received—what do we do? Move
vessels and helicopters to the area. Lean on the governments that support En-
vironmental Warriors. (One participant dissented: Organizations like
Greenpeace have a very positive public image. We must be careful here.)
• We must not let the tanker turn around. Stop him, or repossess the ship.
• We must exhaust all diplomatic options to gain control of the ship before us-
ing force. One participant recommends calling the hijackers on their radio
and asking if they need help, particularly after we shot their propellers.
• Who would be so stupid as to shoot the screws of a big ship in a narrow strait?
We don’t have tugs to control the ship. Who gave that order? (Admiral, was it
you? Ha, ha.)
• We must call the hijackers and ask if they need help. They probably feel
trapped, helpless on the uncontrollable ship.
• The principle of ROE must be the appropriate level of force. We screwed up;
we went beyond minimum ROE and shot their screws, thus making ourselves
part of the problem.
• Do we talk or do we act? And how much leeway do we have, anyway, since the
ship is now out of control. We now have to act.
• Areas for further study—address enviro concerns of Environmental Warriors,
and also Orange and Green, who may not like all this risky transit. Maybe
there should be a pipeline.
• We should work harder on regional cooperation, so that Orange and Green
will solve such problems themselves.
Seminar Working Group Five
Antiterrorism/MIO; Suspected WMD at Sea
Participants:
Moderators
Operational Perspective: CAPT William C. Reed, USN
Policy Perspective: Prof James Fitzsimonds
Legal Perspective: Prof Wolff von Heinegg
Country Delegate
Australia Commodore Russell R. Baker,
Director General, Navy Strategic Policy and Futures
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Bulgaria CDR Mitko Alexandrov Petev,
Deputy Head of Operations Branch
Chile ADM Miguel Vergara, Chief of Naval Operations
Chile CAPT Edmundo Gonzalez,
Director of the Chilean Naval War College
Dominican Republic VADM Euripides Antonio Uribe Peguero,
Dominican Republic Navy Chief of Staff
Japan ADM Koichi Furusho, Chief Maritime Staff
Malta BRIG Rupert Montanaro,
Commander of the Armed Forces of Malta
Nicaragua CAPT Armando Jose Gomez Zapata,
Head of Pacific Naval District Military Region
Nigeria VADM Samuel Afolayan, Chief of the Naval Staff
Panama GEN Jose Antonio Isaza Ros,
Director General of the National Maritime Service
Peru RADM Luis Ramos Ormeno,
Director of the Peruvian Navy War College
Qatar BG Mubarak Ahmed S. A. Al-Mannai,
Commander Qatar Emiri Navy
Romania RADM Victor Blidea, Director of Navy Staff
Spain RADM Jesus Alvargonzalez,
Chief of Staff, Maritime Action Force
Uruguay CAPT Miguel Sorrenti,
President of the Uruguayan Naval War College
United States ADM Walter F. Doran, Commander, Pacific Fleet
United States RADM John M. Kelly,
Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
United States RADM Richard D. Jaskot,
Commandant, National War College
Antiterrorism Scenario and Questions Posed:
Numerous acts of worldwide terrorism have been traced back to country Green.
Green is apparently trying to export a new brand of extremism that has a nascent
following in numerous countries. Agents of Green and their supporters have rou-
tinely used terrorist acts when their interests have been threatened. It is believed
that Green maritime vessels are the primary means for inserting terrorist teams
into target countries. The government of Green appears to have acquiesced to the
operations of terrorist organizations from within its borders but has been
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extremely careful in not providing active support to these groups in order to main-
tain its claims as a state that does not sponsor terrorism.
Sensitive intelligence has revealed that Green intends to make a significant
statement warning “the enemies of Green’s enlightening extremism” with warning
of a catastrophic terrorist attack at the upcoming Olympic Games.
A MNTF has been sent to the waters off Green to deter potential terrorist de-
ployments. Yesterday, commercial satellite imagery revealed a high level of activity
at a known terrorist camp in Green. Security has been increased around the camp’s
perimeter, and numerous trucks have arrived in the past few days. Intelligence ana-
lysts believe the trucks may be used to transport terrorist personnel to merchant
ships located in Green’s major port. Detecting the loading of terrorist personnel on
merchants pierside is highly improbable.
Given this, can MNTF ships legally stop Green merchant vessels as they leave
port in Green territorial waters? Terrorist vessels are continually given new ficti-
tious names, repainted or reregistered using invented corporate owners, all while
plying the high seas. Given this, if the terrorist-laden merchants reach interna-
tional waters, they will be impossible to track and cross-decking of terrorists with
other vessels cannot be discounted.
What is the MNTF’s role with respect to any Green actions to prevent the
MNTF’s antiterrorist ops?
Suspected WMD at Sea Scenario and Questions Posed:
Country Green is again up to its nefarious ways. Sensitive intelligence has revealed
that three Green cargo ships are at sea, holding in an area approximately 50 nm
northwest of Green. These vessels, which have been at sea for about one month, are
suspected of carrying Green weapons of mass destruction that may be used to sup-
port terrorist operations. The vessels have refused frequent requests to provide de-
tails of their cargo or destination and are maintaining radio silence.
The same MNTF sent to the waters off Green to deter potential terrorist deploy-
ments remains on patrol. Today, significantly increased communications have
been detected between the cargo ships and a Green military operations entity
known to have supported terrorist operations in the past. Intelligence analysts be-
lieve the cargo ships may be receiving their orders and could get underway at any
time.
Given the likely cargo of these vessels and their imminent departure, can MNTF
ships legally stop these Green vessels in international waters?
It is uncertain if the vessels are carrying chemical, biological, or nuclear weap-
ons. If the Green crews scuttle the vessels, this could potentially cause catastrophic
environmental damage. What courses of action might the MNTF take?
Now consider that the MNTF has advanced equipment to detect the presence of
contraband by visual, chemical, and radiological methods. Does this alter the
courses of action that the MNTF might take?
What is the MNTF’s role with respect to any Green actions to prevent the
MNTF’s antiterrorist ops?
Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Five:
Moderator comments or a general sense of discussion is in brackets.
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The discussion opened with an invitation for questions:
• Is the area between Green and Orange considered international waters?
[They are overlapping territorial seas.]
• Do the two nations have any type of agreement as to the waters? [None that is
known.]
• Are the potential terrorist cargo ships flying the flag of Green? [They have
been in the past, but their current flag is not known.]
• Who is in charge of the MNTF? Is there a UNSCR for MNTF operations?
[This is not stipulated in the scenario.]
• Are there open seas on either side of Green and Orange? [Yes.]
General Discussion on Scenario A
• The terrorist ships are clearly in internal waters.
º Do we have the right to board and search them in territorial waters?
º Does this come under any right to preempt possible attack?
• We must assume that the MNTF is under UN authority and UN control; does
such UN authority then allow for MNTF boarding of the ships?
• The first step should be to ask Green to intercede and stop/inspect the ships.
Failing that, we should ask Green to allow the MNTF to board the ships.
• It must be assumed (given this scenario) that those measures were already at-
tempted with no cooperation from Green.
• The mission to “deter” is ambiguous.
• Can the MNTF ever legally enter Green territorial waters?
º The answer is no.
• Agreed, but can the MNTF board the ships in international waters?
º [Some seemed to think yes, but further discussion led to a consensus that the
answer is no here as well, without some legally recognized justification.]
• Then there is the issue of the international strait. What is the law here?
• What is required is a UNSCR that would make the interdiction of terrorists le-
gal and authorized.
• The principal problem in this scenario is that the MNTF must act soon or risk
losing the ships on the high seas.
º [Some felt that it should not be difficult for the MNTF to track the ships on
the high seas. Others felt that it would be quite difficult and that the sce-
nario stipulated that there would be some actions by the ships to inhibit
tracking. There was a general view that the ships would likely be lost if they
were allowed to leave port.]
º We may have only minutes to hours to act here. That creates a real sense of
urgency to act within Green’s territorial waters.
• [Some felt that the scenario offered clear grounds for the MNTF to enter terri-
torial waters and board the Green ships. Others felt very strongly that such
grounds did not exist absent a clear UNSCR or authorization from Green,
which were not provided in the scenario. The general sense of the opponents
of action was that this is a very slippery slope and that justification to act
against these ships in this scenario would amount to justification under almost
any circumstances.]
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• The MNTF needs a much more detailed mission statement. The word “deter”
is far too ambiguous.
• But what about the right of self-defense? Doesn’t that come into play here?
º [Some felt that the right to self-defense justified action; others felt that it did
not.]
• The UN could have authorized action through a UNSCR but evidently did
not; thus, the circumstances have not met UN requirements for action.
• This is obviously a political decision, not a military decision. This should be
made by senior political authorities and not the MNTF commander.
• True, but the MNTF commander is the one on the scene, and political deci-
sion makers have yet to act.
º True, but there would be a continuous stream of communications between
the MNTF and national/UN authorities in such a situation, seeking
direction.
• Can the ships be disabled in their port?
º Possibly, but this would again require a political decision.
• We need to gain time for a political decision to act.
º True, but the scenario provides no option for gaining time. The ships could
depart port in the very near term and then be lost at sea.
• Why not just wait and seize them on the high seas?
º Small ships, big ocean.
º Does the law allow the stopping and boarding of ships on the high seas?
º [No, a lawfully flagged ship cannot be interfered with on the high seas with-
out the permission of the flagging country.]
• [Several delegates were strongly in favor of boarding. At least one delegation
came out strongly opposed to boarding.]
• What are the ROE here?
• The UN must be clearer than just “deter.”
• The MNTF commander needs to be, and will want to be, involved in the craft-
ing of the mission statement, to ensure that it is something that is understood
operationally all of the way down the chain. The MNTF commander must be
able to explain the mission so that all of his subordinates fully understand it.
• What is needed is a “system” that will define the clear legal standing of the
MNTF. This needs to work through the mass media to announce the intention
of the MNTF. Such a system is not now in place.
• This is much larger than a military issue. The military must demand clarity
from the civilian leadership. The military commander shouldn’t be making
these types of decisions.
• We need more definitive UNSC guidance.
º [But UNSCRs are never definitive because they are the product of political
compromise. This is what the military commander has to deal with.]
• The MNTF was dispatched based upon national intentions, and therefore this
problem cannot be solved based on majority rule.
• This scenario presents a problem that is dealt with in real life daily. Some
MNTF ships cannot do some things. However, they will act in a supporting
role to provide defense, logistics, etc.
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º [This issue was not further developed, but there seemed to be some possible
disagreement with the idea that a ship could remain part of a MNTF that
was carrying out an act deemed unlawful by that ship’s leaders.]
• MIO operations already have clear ROE.
• This comes under the right of self-defense.
• At what point would the MNTF be allowed to take preemptive action?
General Discussion on Scenario B
• What is absolutely critical here is to make a direct link between the WMD on
the ships and terrorism. There is nothing illegal about a sovereign ship having
WMD on board. Intelligence is critical to making this terrorist connection.
• If the ships are in international waters flying a Green flag, then they can only
be stopped by a Green ship, unless the terrorist link can be made. Then there
is an obligation to stop and board.
• But this is urgent given the Olympics connection—tens of thousands could be
at risk.
• [Most of the delegates voiced the opinion that the scenario provided sufficient
grounds for boarding the ships on the high seas. None expressed opposition.
Those most vocally in disagreement with action in Scenario A agreed with ac-
tion in Scenario B. Some expressed the opinion that the urgency or
consequences of the act did not alter the law. The boarding is either justified
or not justified, regardless of the consequences. Others seemed to feel that the
nature of WMD might justify more preemptive actions.]
• [The basis for action was in disagreement:
º Some held it to be the UN Charter (right of self-defense).
º One delegation held it to be the Rome Convention (Article 3.1.d).]
• What about new technical capabilities for interdicting a ship?
º [The law of proportionality applies—the most efficient/effective means.]
Seminar Working Group Six
Antiterrorism/Force Protection
Participants:
Moderators
Operational Perspective: CAPT Mark Seaman, USN
Policy Perspective: Prof Barney Rubel
Legal Perspective: Maj Richard Jaques, USMC
Country Delegate
Albania CAPT Fravini, President, Albanian Naval War College
Azerbaijan CAPT First Rank Shahin Asraf Oglu Sultanov,
Commander of Naval Forces
Bulgaria RADM Emil Ivanov Lyutskanov,
Chief of the Bulgarian Navy
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Canada VADM Ronald S. Buck, Chief of Maritime Staff
El Salvador CAPT Marco Palacios, Navy Chief, Salvadoran Navy
Honduras CDR Juan Pablo Rodriquez Rodriquez,
Honduran Navy Inspector General
Israel VADM Yedidia Ya’ari, Commander in Chief
Kuwait MG Ahmad Y. Al Mulla, Chief of Kuwait Naval Forces
Nicaragua CAPT Juan Santiago Estrada Garcia,
Chief of the Nicaraguan Naval Force
Peru ADM Ricardo Arbocco,
Peruvian Chief of Naval Operations
Poland CAPT Andrzej Felski,
Deputy Commandant Polish Naval Staff Officer
Portugal ADM Francisco Antonio Torres Vidal Abreu,
Chief of the Portuguese Navy
Romania CAPT Vitalian Popescu, Chief N3
Spain COL Manuel Quiroga Diaz, General Chief of Staff
Turkey RADM Engen Heper,
Commander, Turkish Coast Guard
United States ADM William J. Fallon,
Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
United States RADM Albert M. Calland III,
Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command
Antiterrorism/Force Protection Scenario and Questions Posed:
A MNTF ship pulls into an Orange port for refueling and logistics while supporting
sanctions enforcement operations against Green. Worldwide, there is significant
opposition to the multinational operation against Green, and the possibility of an
attack against the MNTF vessel cannot be excluded. In addition, several organiza-
tions and their subversives sympathetic to Green are known to operate in Orange.
Accordingly, security for the MNTF vessel while pierside is an acute concern, and
the ship has increased its security posture.
What elements of security is the host nation responsible for?
Are Orange security guards on the pier sufficient?
What elements of security is the MNTF ship responsible for?
Are visible, armed guards topside on the MNTF ship appropriate?
What if the host nation does not view armed guards topside as a “friendly” mea-
sure? What are possible alternative measures?
How are sovereignty issues/security concerns between the host nation and the
MNTF resolved? Is a better zone (restricted area) needed? How large should the
zone be? Who should enforce it?
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How do the host nation and MNTF ship collectively guard against swimmer
and/or small-boat threats?
Some protection measures might have an impact on the normal functioning of a
busy commercial port. How does this figure in defense considerations?
What ROE is appropriate for the MNTF ship against perceived threats while in port?
Should external assets (e.g., special operations forces, marine guards, coast guard
security units, etc.) be brought in to ensure force protection while the MNTF ship is
in port? What intelligence support would be needed?
How do the external assets coordinate with host-nation security assets?
There are likely to be varying degrees of vulnerability for MNTF ships during
port periods. Larger vessels will have larger crews and can muster sufficient security
forces for self-defense, whereas a small vessel can possibly be overwhelmed by a sig-
nificant threat.
How do force protection and host-nation support expectations differ based on
MNTF ship size?
What are the roles of threat level and threat assessment in determining
antiterrorism/force protection practices?
How are differences resolved between the host nation and visiting forces?
What are the expectations of each under differing threat levels?
How can navies work together and across agencies to reach agreements on
threat levels and appropriate responses?
Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Six:
1. Members all seemed in complete agreement on the responsibilities and au-
thority delineations between the host country and the ship’s captain. This
agreement extended to the policy level.
2. With respect to the role of the MNTF commander and his staff, the picture
was a bit less clear. Whereas most members seemed to agree that there might
be a role for the MNTF staff in coordinating force protection for port visits,
this did not reach the point of command authority. Port visits are strictly the
business of the two countries involved. As one member put it: if something
happened to a ship from the MNTF in port, how could you establish culpability/
responsibility if the MNTF had a force protection planning cell?
3. Buffer zones were brought up as a needed procedure, but their exact nature
and who had what authority in them was a matter for the nations involved to
decide. There was clear agreement that aboard the ship while in port, the
ship’s nation retained authority, because the ship itself is sovereign territory.
Ashore, the host nation has the authority.
4. The notion of self-defense authority was briefly discussed, but a detailed ex-
amination of it did not ensue. The group decided that they would simply
examine the case of the visiting ship being tied up to a pier, or at least an-
chored within the harbor. The question of whether there were differences in
territorial oceanic waters and inland waters was judged to be an unnecessary
complication.
5. The delegates addressed the need for ROE but did not address preferences/
pros and cons regarding coalition ROE applicable to all vice national ROE . . .
and the assorted mechanisms for coming to agreement (or not) on them. They
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generically indicated that the MNTF commander could establish baseline force
protection requirements, and the ship’s commanding officer could increase
these requirements, but they did not address a scenario in which the MNTF
commander establishes baselines that exceed those authorized by the ship’s na-
tion (for example, when the MNTF commander’s requirements allow use of
deadly force to protect property but national ROE do not allow this).
6. The group raised the question of how to deal with problems associated with a
third nation (for example elements of MNTF) providing some force protec-
tion measures for a ship of another nation in Orange. The example, I believe,
was elements of one nation providing for boats in the water around the ship
from another nation. The seminar did not explore this question.
7. A resolution of issues between the ship’s nation and the host country would be
worked through the attachés, while many minor issues could be coordinated
and worked out through a coordination center/liaisons.
Principles that Apply
Responsibility for ship’s safety rests with the CO. However, host nation exercises sover-
eignty within its territorial waters and is responsible for enforcement of its laws and its
security. Host nation may or may not allow ship to exercise all the force protection
measures it believes necessary. CO’s options are to accept the risks or leave port.
Issues
• How willing and/or capable is host nation for providing security? Two subcate-
gories that apply if the ship pulls into port:
º The host nation is willing and capable?
º The host nation is willing and incapable? Unwilling and capable?
Planning Activities
• Information and capabilities sharing between Country Orange, the ship, the
ship’s nation, and the MNTF commander can be facilitated by an advanced
party or assessment teams.
• A coordination center or liaison between the ship and the host nation is key to
resolving issues.
• One of the factors of force protection is physical space. Depending on the level
of threat and FP capabilities, establishing buffer zones with access limitations
is one method of mitigating risk.
Seminar Working Group Seven
Illegal Fishing
Participants:
Moderators
Operational Perspective: CAPT Chester Helms, USN
Policy Perspective: Dr. Andrew Winner
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Legal Perspective: CDR Glenn Sulmasy, USCG
Country Delegate
Argentina ADM Jorge Omar Godoy,
Argentine Navy Chief of Staff
Georgia VADM Gigla Zurab Iremadza,
Commander of the Georgian Navy
Ghana RADM John Kodzo Gbena, Chief of Navy
Haiti LCDR Leon Charles, Chief of Naval Operations
Italy RADM Paolo Pagnotella,
Commander, Italian Naval War College
Jamaica CDR Sidney Innis,
Commanding Officer, Jamaica Defence Force
Korea ADM Jung-Il Moon, Chief of Naval Operations
Korea RADM Dongjo Jeong,
President, Republic of Korea Naval War College
Kuwait MG Ahmad Yousef Al-Mulla,
Commander of Kuwait Naval Forces
Nicaragua CAPT Juan Santiago Estrada Garcia,
Chief of the Nicaraguan Naval Force
Norway MG Rolf Thomsen,
Director General, Norwegian Defense College
Singapore LTC Hwye Min Seow, Head of Naval Personnel
Slovenia CAPT Ljubomir Kranjc, Deputy Force Commander
South Africa RADM Brian Donkin,
Commandant South African Defence College
United Kingdom CAPT Nick Lambert,
Commander, UK Maritime Battle Staff
United States VADM James D. Hull,
Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area
United States Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr., Provost, Naval War College
Illegal Fishing Scenario and Questions Posed:
Orange has routinely voiced concerns over illegal fishing in its economic exclusion
zone. Orange recently has stated that the dwindling fishing stocks are causing wide-
spread famine among its people and are also having an increasingly disastrous
effect on its economy. Orange, an impoverished nation with a vast coastline (ap-
proximately 1,000 nm), has only a small navy and coast guard and is able to patrol
only small segments of its vast fishing grounds and only on an infrequent basis.
182 Sixteenth International Seapower Symposium
Accordingly, Orange has requested international assistance in enforcing its fishing
boundaries.
Would a multinational naval force be justified to police Orange’s waters against
illegal fishing?
How big would the policing force need to be?
What authority would such a policing force have?
What would the police force’s ROE be if illegal Green fishing craft, supported by
Green military vessels, are detected in Orange’s EEZ?
What host-nation support would be needed from Orange?
What additional resources (if any) would the MNTF need?
Summary of the Discussion in Seminar Seven:
In answer to the first question posed in the scenario, “Where does legal authority
start to call in a multinational force?” seminar members discussed whether a MNTF
was the way to go first. Many noted that it was necessary to exhaust all diplomatic
means of resolving the problem before resorting to a MNTF. Indeed, it was unclear
from the scenario brief whether diplomatic means had been attempted and had
failed, resulting in the establishment of a MNTF. Eventually, the group agreed to
take that as a premise—that diplomacy had failed, or at least had failed so far—in
order to move on and consider some of the other issues laid out in the scenario.
Participants discussed real-world examples of cooperation among navies and
law enforcement officials to combat illegal fishing. In one example, cooperation be-
tween South Africa and Australia in a portion of the southern Indian Ocean helped
to deter or drive off illegal fishing boats attempting to fish in areas where endan-
gered species resided and where other states had legal rights. Another example
cited was cooperation between the United States and Russia in the Bering Sea.
While all agreed that there are real-world examples of both illegal fishing and of in-
ternational cooperation to combat it, they also noted that the degree to which this is
an issue requiring something on the order of a MNTF really depends on the eco-
nomic impact on the country in question.
The discussion moved to how illegal fishing by Green could be best addressed by
multinational assets. Most participants felt that the notional task force provided for
by the scenario was overkill for this particular mission, and there was a concern that
a large-scale, military-heavy task force would exacerbate rather than calm the situa-
tion. The group put forward several sets of suggestions on how to counter this
possibility and to best attempt to resolve the problem generally.
First, it was suggested that any multinational force could begin by providing sur-
veillance capabilities and merely providing information to both countries on
potential violations before any enforcement actions were even considered. Second,
it was suggested, with significant agreement, that at least at the outset of any mis-
sion, unit types that were less threatening, such as coast guard or other law
enforcement vessels, be used vice navy vessels. Naval vessels would become neces-
sary if Green utilized its navy to accompany fishing vessels from its country in
violating Orange’s EEZ (one possibility envisioned in the scenario). All in all, there
was strong support for at least initially limiting the MNTF’s role to one of surveil-
lance, tracking, and reporting.
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If the mission eventually went beyond this set of tasks, the question of rules of en-
gagement would then arise. The discussion on ROE highlighted various real-world
experiences, including the difficulty of disabling shots and how it is difficult to stop
a ship without the authority to attempt such shots. One participant noted that the
resistance of some lawbreakers in other real-world cases depended on the level of
fines and whether a vessel seized would be forfeited. The ROE, it was agreed, de-
pended largely on the political/legal mandate given to the MNTF. In fact, at least
one participant noted that the ROE was relatively easy and had been worked out in
multilateral instances numerous times, but that the primary issue was political
agreement on the overall mission. Again, the discussion of ROE returned to the
question of whether the MNTF would escalate the situation or help to resolve it. If
the ROE were too robust, it risked making peaceful resolution more difficult. After
some discussion, it was agreed that the scenario assumed that sanctions had failed
and that the initial task of the MNTF was to deter illegal fishing. It was assumed
that deterrence might have to escalate to compelling Green to cease fishing, but
that a mission analysis would essentially determine relevant ROE. Finally, it was
agreed that the key element was a robust command and control mechanism that
would allow rapid consultations and decisions on individual situations.
A discussion also occurred on whether the best method of operation was to have
Orange law enforcement officials on board to take custody of Green ships and fish-
ermen or whether the MNTF ought to undertake this portion of the mission. The
group debated the pros and cons of including such personnel on MNTF ships.
The discussion also ranged to questions about whether a MNTF of this sort
would create a precedent for the future resolution of these types of issues. In dis-
cussing that issue, the talk turned to the level of mandate and participation that
would be optimal. Many participants felt that a regional or even subregional politi-
cal framework would be best, rather than escalating the issue all the way to the
United Nations at the outset. A subregional mandate might make an exit easier and
might be healthier for the region as a whole rather than bringing in outside forces.
Another possibility noted was a UN mandate but with subregional state
implementation.
It was noted that the issue might not, at times, be completely bilateral. It was also
noted that a level of force or pressure somewhat less than military force—namely,
economic pressure—might be applied in such a scenario. Others noted that if there
were more than two parties involved, then applying an economic embargo against
those benefiting from Green fishing might help to resolve the issue. If, however,
Green was fishing to feed its people, then this would be an attenuating factor. De-
pending on the situation, participants also noted that it might be important not to
be seen as taking Orange’s side only. The best outcome would be a MNTF and asso-
ciated measures that forced both sides to the table to negotiate a solution in a
serious manner. All agreed, however, that it was critical to understand each side’s
motivations for its activities.
A participant asked whether UNCLOS had any meaning in this scenario, and
why the issue got to this level if both parties are assumed to be members of the
treaty. It was noted that all nations who are signatories to UNCLOS are bound by its
provisions but that not all nations were currently participants. It was also noted that
the treaty does not contain sanctions provisions for those who violate its clauses.
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Member states can complain and take the issue to the United Nations or other or-
ganizations, who can then apply sanctions; but UNCLOS, it was concluded, was at
best informative and not dispositive. It does not compel signatories to resolve their
disputes, nor does it provide clear examples of how this is to be done. In a follow-up
legal question, a participant asked if Green could be accused of illegal fishing if it
was not an UNCLOS signatory. The answer was given that it was possible under cus-
tomary international law.
All agreed that this issue, while not highly prevalent today, would likely become
one in the future due to population growth and resource scarcity.
Seminar Working Group Eight
Humanitarian Assistance
Participants:
Moderator
Operational Perspective: CAPT Fred Horne, USN
Policy Perspective: COL John Taska, USMC
Legal Perspective: COL John Phelps, USMC
Country Delegate
Argentina GEN Carlos Edgardo Fernandez,
Coast Guard Commandant
Belize MAJ Lloyd Jones, Commanding Officer
Belize Defence Force Maritime Wing
Canada Commissioner John L. Adams,
Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard
Croatia CDR Predrag Stipanovic,
Head of N-5 Plans and Policy
Denmark RADM Kurt Birger Jensen,
Admiral Danish Fleet
El Salvador CDR Guillermo Jiminez Vasques,
Deputy Fleet Commander
Finland RADM Hans V. Holmstrom,
Commander in Chief, Finnish Navy
Italy ADM Marcello de Donno, Chief of Staff
Kenya MG P. O. Awitta, Commander of the Kenya Navy
Netherlands Commodore Jan G. van der Burg,
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff for Plans and Policy
Norway RADM Jan Eirik Finseth, Chief of Staff
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Pakistan Commodore Mirza Arshad Hussain,
Commandant, Pakistan Naval War College
Panama LCDR Abdiel Marin,
Secretary General of the National Maritime Service
Uruguay ADM Carlos A. Giani,
Commander in Chief of the Uruguayan Navy
Yemen BGEN Ruais Al Mujajwar, Chief of Yemen Navy
United States RADM David S. Belz,
Assistant Commandant for Operations
United States RADM John D. Stufflebeem,
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Plans, Policy and Operations
United States Dr. William G. Perett, Political Advisor to the
Chief of Naval Operations, CNA Corporation
Humanitarian Assistance Scenario and Questions Posed:
Orange has been ravaged by civil war between rival ethnic groups, which has di-
vided the military establishment and led to a breakdown of authority. An agree-
ment brokered by the UN has resulted in an uneasy ceasefire, but large
concentrations of refugees from both ethnic groups are too intimidated to return to
their homes, many of which have been destroyed. Banditry by renegade military
units is exacerbating the problems of inadequate food and medical care. To estab-
lish an immediate presence in Orange to enforce the ceasefire, a MNTF has been
formed as the maritime component of a UN peacekeeping force whose mission is to
maintain the ceasefire and provide security. The MNTF is also chartered with es-
tablishing conditions for the introduction of follow-on peacekeeping forces and to
render communications and logistics aid to nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) engaged in relief operations. The leaderships of the two military groups
are located in the capital city, Billeroy.
How should the MNTF ground forces be employed initially? Under what ROE
will they operate? What if the initial entry is opposed?
What support (if any) should be requested from the rival military groups?
Can MNTF aircraft play a role in controlling the situation?
How does the MNTF coordinate with the NGOs?
Is the composition of the MNTF appropriate for its mission? What additional re-
sources (if any) would the MNTF need?
Report of the Discussion in Seminar Eight:
Assumptions
• Multinational task force (MNTF) requires common understanding of stan-
dard operating procedures (SOP), doctrine, each other’s capabilities, and the
limitations of each other’s rules of engagement (ROE).
• MNTF will be operating under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter in this spe-
cific case.
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• Tenuous cease-fire exists. MNTF will enforce the cease-fire, separate the
fighting factions, and establish the conditions under which the NGOs can per-
form their roles.
• Warring factions or some local element has requested multinational assistance
to maintain the cease-fire. This local element can help determine where to es-
tablish aid distribution points, refugee centers, and the like.
• MNF commander has determined requirements for NGO support to include
security.
United Nations
• UN Secretariat should act as an overseer of the overall relief organization.
• Although the UN resolution will provide a clear mandate, humanitarian assis-
tance actions are very complex. This reality will require extensive communication
between military and political leaders of the MNTF.
• MNTF commander will report through the military advisor to the Secretary-
General of the UN. This is a difficult chain of command.
• There must be a recognized legitimacy of mission, internationally and locally.
The UN resolution will provide international legitimacy. Local legitimacy will
depend on the perceptions generated by MNF actions.
Rules of Engagement and Planning
• Determination of the ROE will occur after the precise mission is determined.
This will require extensive negotiations.
• The objective to be met will require common MNTF procedures and doctrine
and, most importantly, a common understanding of objective and the means
by which this objective will be pursued.
• Identification of the end state is vital to determining the method and means
the MNTF will use to perform its mission.
• Identification of whether the action is primarily a policing action or a military
action is a vital early determination to make. Closely related to this question is
whether the MNTF action is primarily a humanitarian assistance function or a
peace enforcement action. If this is or becomes a policing problem, adequate
MNTF policing forces must be supplied.
• There must be clarity of mission.
• MNF commander must determine what branches, sequels, and contingencies
should be planned for.
Nongovernmental Organizations
• A difficult challenge is how best to deal with NGOs. What types of communica-
tions will be required to work effectively with diverse organizations toward a
common goal? What is the best connection for each NGO?
Local Factions
• MNF commander must consider how to engage with warring local factions.
• MNF should strive to remain impartial if not neutral. If MNF is perceived lo-
cally as being partial to one side, it may lose its legitimacy. If MNF is viewed as
illegitimate by both sides, the warring sides may unite against the MNF.
• Must have local knowledge—intelligence of political and military situation.
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COUNTRY/DELEGATE TITLE SERVICE
Albania
RADM Kudret Celaj Commandant of
Albanian Navy
Albanian Navy
CAPT Fravini President, Albanian
Naval War College
Albanian Navy
Argentina
GEN Carlos Edgardo
Fernandez
Perfecto General,
Argentine Coast Guard
Argentine Coast
Guard
VADM Jorge Omar Godoy Argentine Navy
Chief of Staff
Argentine Navy
CAPT Rafael Luis Sgueglia Director of Operations,
Policy and Planning
Argentine Navy
Australia
VADM Chris Ritchie Chief of Navy Royal Australian
Navy
CDRE Russell R. Baker Director General, Navy
Strategic Policy and
Futures
Royal Australian
Navy
Azerbaijan
RADM Shahin Asraf Oglu
Sultanov
Commander of Naval
Forces
Republic of
Azerbaijan Navy
Bangladesh
RADM Shah Iqbal Mujtaba Chief of Bangladesh Navy Bangladesh Navy
Barbados
LCDR Errington Shurland Chief of Barbados
Defense Force Coast
Guard
Barbados Coast
Guard
Belgium
VADM Michel Hellemans Naval Representative to
the Chief of Defence
Belgian Navy
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List of Delegates
Belize
MAJ Lloyd Jones Commanding Officer
Belize Defence Force
Maritime Wing
Belize Defence
Force
Brazil
RADM Marcus Vinicius Director, Brazilian Naval
War College
Brazilian Navy
Brunei
COL Matussin Joharie Bin
Haji
Commander,
Royal Brunei Navy
Royal Brunei Navy
MAJ Abang Abas bin Abang
Haji Omarzuki
Staff Officer for
Operations
Royal Brunei Navy
Bulgaria
RADM Emil Ivanov
Lyutskanov
Chief of the Bulgarian
Navy
Bulgarian Navy
CDR Mitko Aleksandrov Petev Deputy Chief of
Operations Branch
Bulgarian Navy
Cameroon
VADM Guillaume N’Gouah
N’Gally
Chief of Staff Cameroon Navy
Canada
VADM Ronald S. Buck Chief of Maritime Staff Canadian Navy
COMIS John L. Adams Commissioner of the
Canadian Coast Guard
Canadian Coast
Guard
RADM Glenn V. Davidson Commander, Maritime
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Canadian Forces
Chile
ADM Miguel Vergara Chief of Naval Operations
Chilean Navy
Chilean Navy
ADM Rodolfo Codina Commandant, Chilean
Coast Guard
Chilean Coast
Guard
CAPT Edmundo Gonzalez Director of the Chilean
Naval War College
Chilean Navy
China (PRC)
VADM Zhou Borong Deputy Chief of Staff—
Plans
People’s Libera-
tion Army Navy
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Croatia
RADM Zdravko Kardum Commander in Chief,
Croatian Navy
Croatian Navy
CDR Predrag Stipanovic Head of N-5 Plans and
Policy
Croatian Navy
Denmark
RADM Kurt Birger Jensen Admiral Danish Fleet Danish Navy
CAPT Lars Kragelund Commander Naval Base
Korsoer
Danish Navy
Dominican Republic
VADM Euripides Antonio
Uribe Peguero
Dominican Republic Navy
Chief of Staff
Dominican Navy
RADM Rafael Lee Ballester President of the Naval War
College
Dominican Navy
Ecuador
RADM Victor Hugo Rosero
Barba
Commandant of the
Ecuadorian Navy
Ecuadorian Navy
LCDR Mac Abelardo Mera Sub-Director of Naval
Education and Training
Ecuadorian Navy
Egypt
RADM Mohamed Ibrahim
Ahmed Madyn
Egyptian Navy
RADM Mohammed Ali
Mohamed Zaki
Egyptian Navy
El Salvador
CAPT Marco Palacios Navy Chief Salvadoran Navy
CDR Guillermo Jiminez
Vasquez
Deputy Fleet Commander Salvadoran Navy
Finland
RADM Hans V. Holmstrom Commander in Chief,
Finnish Navy
Finnish Navy
CDR Tapio Maijala Commander Kotka
Coastal District
Finnish Navy
France
VADM Alain Dumontet Commander, Naval Action
Force
French Navy
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Georgian Navy
Georgian Navy
CAPT Zaza Erkvania Deputy Commander of
Georgian Navy
Georgian Navy
Germany
VADM Lutz Feldt Chief of German Naval
Staff
German Navy
CAPT John K. Schamong German National Liaison
Representative to Supreme
Allied Commander
Transformation
German Navy
Ghana
RADM John Kodzo Gbena Chief of Navy Ghana Navy
Greece
RADM Ioannis Goulousis Deputy Chief of Hellenic
Naval Staff
Hellenic Navy
COMO Christos Karadimss Hellenic Navy
Guatemala
CAPT Otto Guillermo
Wantland Carcamo
Commander of the Carib-
bean Command
Guatemalan Navy
CAPT Rafael Alfonso Reneau
Franco
Commander of the Na-
tional Naval Defense,
Puerto Quetzal, Escuintla
Guatemalan Navy
Haiti
LCDR Leon Charles Chief of Naval Operations Haitian Navy
Honduras
COL Nelson Mejia Mejia Commander of the Hon-
duran Navy
Honduran Navy
CDR Juan Pablo Rodriquez
Rodriquez
Honduran Navy Inspector
General
Honduran Navy
Iceland
MR Asgrimur L. Asgrimsson Head of Survey Division,
Icelandic Coast Guard
Iceland Defence
Force
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India
Deputy Inspector General A.
Rajashekhar
Commander, Coast Guard
District #1 Gujarat
Indian Navy
Israel
VADM Yedidia Ya’ari Commander in Chief Israel Navy
Italy
ADM Marcello de Donno Chief of Staff Italian Navy
RADM Paolo Pagnotella Commander, Italian Naval
War College
Italian Navy
Jamaica
CDR Sidney Innis Commanding Officer,
Jamaica Defence Force
Jamaica Defence
Force
Japan
ADM Koichi Furusho Chief Maritime Staff Japan Maritime
Self Defense Force
Jordan
BG Dari Alzben Commander Royal Jordanian
Naval Forces
Kenya
MG P. O. Awitta Commander of the Kenya
Navy
Kenya Navy
Korea
ADM Jung-Il Moon Chief of Naval Operations Republic of Korea
Navy
RADM Dongjo Jeong President, Republic of Ko-
rea Naval War College
Republic of Korea
Navy
Kuwait
MG Ahmad Y. Al Mulla Chief of Kuwait Naval
Forces
Kuwait Naval
Forces
LTC Abdallah A. Dashti Commander, Squadron 74 Kuwait Naval
Forces
Latvia
CAPT Ilmars Lesinskis Commander in Chief of
Latvian Naval Forces
Latvian Navy
Lithuania
CAPT Kestutis Macijauskas Commander in Chief of
the Lithuanian Navy
Lithuanian Navy
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Malta
BRIG Rupert Montanaro Commander of the Armed
Forces of Malta
Malta Navy
MAJ Martin Cauchi Inglott Major Armed Forces of
Malta
Malta Navy
Mexico
RADM Ernesto Gallardo President, Mexican
Naval War College
Mexican Navy
Morocco
CDRE Mohamed Laghmari Commander Royal Moroccan
Navy
Netherlands
VADM Ruurt A. A. Klaver Commander in Chief,
Royal Netherlands Navy
Royal Netherlands
Navy
CDRE Jan G. van der Burg Deputy Chief of Naval
Staff for Plans and Policy
Royal Netherlands
Navy
New Zealand
RADM Peter M. McHaffie Chief of Navy, Royal New
Zealand Navy
Royal New
Zealand Navy
CAPT Patrick Williams Future Defense Attaché,
Washington
Royal New
Zealand Navy
Nicaragua
CAPT Juan Santiago Estrada
Garcia
Chief of the Nicaraguan
Naval Force
Nicaraguan Navy
CAPT Armando Jose Gomez
Zapata
Head of Pacific Naval Dis-
trict Military Region
Nicaraguan Navy
Nigeria
VADM Samuel Afolayan Chief of the Naval Staff Nigerian Navy
RADM Amos Adedeji President, Nigerian Naval
War College
Nigerian Navy
Norway
RADM Jan Eirik Finseth Chief of Staff Royal Norwegian
Navy
MG Rolf Thomsen Director General, Norwe-
gian Defense College
Royal Norwegian
Navy
Pakistan
ADM Shahid Karimullah Chief of Naval Staff Pakistan Navy
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COMO Mirza Arshad Hussain Commandant, Pakistan
Naval War College
Pakistan Navy
Panama
GEN Jose Antonio Isaza Ros Director General of the
National Maritime Service
Panama Navy
LCDR Abdiel Marin Secretary General of the
National Maritime Service
Panama Navy
Peru
ADM Ricardo Arbocco Peruvian Chief of Naval
Operations
Peruvian Navy
RADM Luis Ramos Ormeno Director of the Peruvian
Navy War College
Peruvian Navy
Philippines
VADM Ernesto De Leon Flag Officer in Command Philippine Navy
COMO Carlos Agustin President of the Philippine
National Defense College
Philippine Navy
Poland
ADM Roman Krzyelewski Commander and Chief of
the Polish Navy
Polish Navy
CAPT Andrzej Felski Deputy Commandant Pol-
ish Naval Staff Officer
Polish Navy
Portugal
ADM Francisco Antonio
Torres Vidal Abreu
Chief of the Portuguese
Navy
Portuguese Navy
VADM Antonio Carlos Rebelo
Duarte
President, Naval War Col-
lege Lisbon
Portuguese Navy
Qatar
BG Mubarak Ahmed S. A.
Al-Mannai
Commander Qatar Emiri
Navy
Qatar Emiri Navy
COL Tarig Khalid M. F.
Al-Obaidli
Commander Qen
Al-Udeid Missile Boat
Qatar Emiri Navy
Romania
RADM Victor Blidea Director of Navy Staff Romanian Naval
Forces
CAPT Vitalian Popescu Chief N3 Romanian Navy
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RADM Ronnie Tay Chief of Navy Republic of Singa-
pore Navy
LTC Hwye Min Seow Head of Naval Personnel Republic of Singa-
pore Navy
Slovenia
CAPT Ljubomir Kranjc Deputy Force Commander Slovenian Armed
Forces
South Africa
VADM Johan F. Retief Chief of the South African
Navy
South African
Navy
RADM Brian Donkin Commandant South Afri-
can Defence College
South African
Navy
Spain
ADM Angel Tafalla Balduz Vice Chief of Naval
Operations
Spanish Navy
RADM Jesus Alvargonzalez Chief of Staff, Maritime
Action Force
Spanish Navy
COL Manuel Quiroga Diaz Chief of General Staff Spanish Civil
Guard
Sri Lanka
VADM Daya W. K. Sandagiri Commander of the Sri
Lanka Navy
Sri Lanka Navy
CAPT M. Pemathilake Senior Staff Officer Sri Lanka Navy
Sweden
RADM Jörgen Eriksson Navy Inspector and Direc-
tor of Naval Training
Royal Swedish
Navy
Thailand
VADM Werapon Waranon Chief of Royal Thai Navy Royal Thai Navy
Tonga
LT COL Tau ’Aika ’Uta ’atu Commander of the Tonga
Defence Force
Tonga Defense
Services
Tunisia
RADM Tarek Faouzi El-Arbi Deputy Chief of Staff Navy Tunisian Navy
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Turkey
RADM Engen Heper Commander, Turkish
Coast Guard
Turkish Naval
Forces
RADM Ilker Guven Commander, Turkish Na-
val War College
Turkish Naval
Forces
United Kingdom
ADM Jonathan Band Commander in Chief,
Fleet
Royal Navy
CAPT Nick Lambert Commander, UK Mari-
time Battle Staff
Royal Navy
United States
ADM Vernon E. Clark Chief of Naval Operations U.S. Navy
ADM Thomas H. Collins Commandant, U.S. Coast
Guard
U.S. Coast Guard
ADM William J. Fallon Commander, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet/
Commander, Fleet Forces
Command
U.S. Navy
ADM Gregory G. Johnson Commander, U.S. Naval
Forces, Europe/
Commander, Allied
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U.S. Navy
ADM Walter F. Doran Commander, Pacific Fleet U.S. Navy
ADM Michael G. Mullen Vice Chief of Naval
Operations
U.S. Navy
VADM Gary Roughead Commander, Second Fleet U.S. Navy
VADM James D. Hull Commander, U.S. Coast
Guard Atlantic Area
U.S. Coast Guard
VADM Terry M. Cross Commander, U.S. Coast
Guard Pacific Area
U.S. Coast Guard
RADM Ronald A. Route President, U.S. Naval War
College
U.S. Navy
RADM Richard B. Porterfield Director of Naval
Intelligence
U.S. Navy
RADM John M. Kelly Commander, Navy
Warfare Development
Command
U.S. Navy
RADM John D. Stufflebeem Deputy Chief of Naval Op-
erations for Plans, Policy
and Operations
U.S. Navy
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Operations
U.S. Coast Guard
BGEN Thomas A. Benes President, Marine Corps
University/Commanding
General Marine Corps Ed-
ucation Command
U.S. Marine Corps
RADM Thomas H. Gilmour Assistant Commandant for
Marine Safety, Security
and Environmental
Protection
U.S. Coast Guard
RADM Albert M. Calland III Commander, Naval Spe-
cial Warfare Command
U.S. Navy
RADM Robert T. Moeller Commander, Cruiser De-
stroyer Group ONE
U.S. Navy
RADM Richard D. Jaskot Commandant, National
War College
U.S. Navy
RADM Michael A. McDevitt Director, Center for Stra-
tegic Studies, CNA
Corporation
U.S. Navy (Ret.)
DR James F. Giblin, Jr. Provost, U.S. Naval War
College
U.S. Navy
DR William G. Perett Political Advisor to the
Chief of Naval Operations,
CNA Corporation
U.S. Navy
MR Gerard Yoest Political Advisor to the
Commandant of the Coast
Guard
U.S. Coast Guard
Uruguay
ADM Carlos Giani Commander in Chief of
the Uruguayan Navy
Uruguayan Navy
CAPT Miguel Sorrenti President of the Uru-
guayan Naval War College
Uruguayan Navy
Venezuela
RADM Jaime Toro Calderon President of the Venezue-
lan Naval War College
Venezuelan Navy
RADM Leopoldo Aponte
Gonzalez
Chief of Naval Education
and Training
Venezuelan Navy
Yemen
BG Ruais Al Mujajwar Chief of Yemen Navy Yemen Navy
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